Lexstat 18 usc section 1001 united states code service

131. Immunity

Where individual had received use and derivative use immunity regarding grand jury testimony, such testimony could not be basis of prosecution for making false statements to law enforcement officials under 18 USCS § 1001. In re Weir (1974, SD Cal) 377 F Supp 919, affd (1974, CA9 Cal) 495 F2d 879, cert den (1974) 419 US 1038, 42 L Ed 2d 315, 95 S Ct 525.

There was no agreement between parties, nor did government make promise, that defendant would receive transactional immunity for falsehoods told in return for truthful statements. United States v Rosario (2002, ED NY) 237 F Supp 2d 242.

132. Invalidity or unconstitutionality of statutory requirement

The constitutionality of former § 159(h) of Title 29 which required affidavits concerning Communist party affiliation of union officers was not involved in postconviction proceeding by union officer convicted of making false statements in such an affidavit under 18 USCS § 1001, as the claimed invalidity of the statutory requirement would be no defense to knowingly making a false statement in any matter within the jurisdiction of a department or agency of the United States. Bryson v United States (1969) 396 US 64, 24 L Ed 2d 264, 90 S Ct 355, 72 BNA LRRM 2833, 61 CCH LC P 10510.

Unconstitutionality of operation or proceeding in relation to which alleged deception had been practiced was not defense to prosecution for such deception, as long as department or agency of United States had colorable authority to do what it was doing. United States v Meyer (1944, CA2 NY) 140 F2d 652.

Defendant's due process rights were not violated by his indictment for conspiracy to make false statements or to misapply and convert tribal property, 18 USCS §§ 666, 1001, where he was put on fair notice that his conduct was criminal under statutes at time of his actions, since recent holding that selling excess federal property was prohibited by Act did not affect crime for which he was indicted. United States v Oseby (1998, CA8 SD) 148 F3d 1016, 49 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1135.

Defendants' motion to dismiss indictment on ground that prosecution violated their rights of free speech and free exercise of religion as protected by First Amendment was denied where (1) defendants were not prosecuted for engaging in those activities, they were prosecuted for concealing those activities; (2) defendants' claim of undue burden on free exercise of religion under Religious Freedom Restoration Act was without merit because there was no reason why providing complete and truthful description of organization's planned activities whether or not those activities were religiously motivated, inhibited or substantially burdened exercise of religious freedom; (3) IRS clearly had statutory and regulatory authority to inquire about entity's proposed activities, and thus, defendants could have been prosecuted under 18 USCS § 1001 and 26 USCS § 7206 for providing false responses regarding those activities; (4) unconstitutional conditions doctrine did not preclude IRS from denying entity 26 USCS § 501(c)(3) status based on nature of its activities because IRS could have reasonably concluded that entity's efforts to support and promote armed conflict were not charitable or religious in nature and could have denied tax-exempt status on that basis; and (5) because information regarding entity's activities had natural tendency to influence IRS's investigation of entity's 26 USCS § 501(c)(3) eligiblity, it was material. United States v Mubayyid (2007, DC Mass) 476 F Supp 2d 46, 99 AFTR 2d 1362.

133. Reliance

Fact that defendant may have relied on United States Customs' past inactivity in failing to object to abuse of "reasonable quantities" limitation on vessel supplies was no defense in prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 by falsely designating as "vessel supplies" large quantity of whiskey on United States Customs form. United States v Lichenstein (1980, CA5 Ga) 610 F2d 1272, cert den (1980) 447 US 907, 64 L Ed 2d 856, 100 S Ct 2991.

134.--Expert advice

Defendant signing forms in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 cannot assert defense of reliance on expert advice unless he establishes good faith reliance on expert coupled with full disclosure to expert. United States v Smith (1975, CA5 Fla) 523 F2d 771, cert den (1976) 429 US 817, 50 L Ed 2d 76, 97 S Ct 59, reh den (1976) 429 US 987, 50 L Ed 2d 599, 97 S Ct 509.

Reliance defense, urged most frequently in tax evasion cases, is designed to refute government's proof that defendant intended to commit offense; essential elements of defense are (a) full disclosure of all pertinent facts to experts, and (b) good faith reliance on expert's advice. United States v Miller (1981, CA4 SC) 658 F2d 235.

Defense of good faith reliance on expert advice is designed to refute government's proof that defendant intended to commit offense; defendant must show that (1) he fully disclosed all relevant facts to expert and (2) that he relied in good faith on expert's advice. United States v Johnson (1984, CA11 Fla) 730 F2d 683, 15 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1115, cert den (1984) 469 US 857, 83 L Ed 2d 119, 105 S Ct 186 and cert den (1984) 469 US 867, 83 L Ed 2d 142, 105 S Ct 211.

135. Miscellaneous

Defendant, employed by employer seeking access to classified material from atomic energy commission, who knowingly made false statements on such commission's security questionnaire, cannot escape conviction for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 by claiming that he had not defrauded United States of financial or proprietary interest, or that his employer and not defendant had submitted questionnaire, or that defendant did not have training required for him to have any access to classified atomic information. Pitts v United States (1959, CA9 Cal) 263 F2d 353, cert den (1959) 360 US 935, 3 L Ed 2d 1547, 79 S Ct 1457, reh den (1959) 361 US 857, 4 L Ed 2d 97, 80 S Ct 47.

To make fear of one's life sufficient to excuse perjury, fear must be more than general apprehension of danger, particularly if one has chance to escape or to seek protection of government. United States v Housand (1977, CA2 Conn) 550 F2d 818, cert den (1977) 431 US 970, 53 L Ed 2d 1066, 97 S Ct 2931.

Intent element of 18 USCS § 1001 precludes conviction for honest misinterpretation of government forms; not only was government's certification form which defendant signed not so vague on its face as to violate due process, but also jury was properly not impressed by defendant's argument that she had made understandable mistake in interpreting it. United States v Weatherspoon (1978, CA7 Ill) 581 F2d 595 (criticized in Truck Ins. Exch. v Kafka (1995, ND Ill) RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 8873).

Fact that false statement by accountant to IRS auditor regarding charitable contribution by accountant's client was discovered and did not influence outcome of audit is not defense in prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001 since false statement has capacity to impair IRS auditing function. United States v Fern (1983, CA11 Fla) 696 F2d 1269, 83-1 USTC P 9151, 51 AFTR 2d 819.

In prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001, defendant's defense that he did not participate in scheme while codefendant's main defense was that government could not prove federal offense, are not mutually antagonistic defenses since both could have been accepted by jury. United States v Petullo (1983, CA7 Ill) 709 F2d 1178.

Farmer's filing of 1099s with IRS, falsely reporting over $ 20 million income to recipients, including judge, lawyers, bankers, and others involved in foreclosure of his property, cannot be considered purely protest speech, since 18 USCS § 1001 is not content-based, and freedom of speech does not protect speech which violates or incites violation of "tax law", even where he argued duty to file 1099 under 26 USCS § 6041, since jury found that he filed falsely. United States v Citrowske (1991, CA8 Minn) 951 F2d 899, 92-1 USTC P 50014, 71A AFTR 2d 4230.

In joint trial where both farmer and his nephew-farming partner were charged as principals and as aiders and abettors of one another in offenses relating to conversion of pledged crops, 18 USCS §§ 2, 658, 1001, 1956, and 1957, acquittal of nephew was no defense to conviction of farmer. United States v McClatchy (2001, CA5 Miss) 249 F3d 348, reh den (2001, CA5 Miss) 2001 US App LEXIS 13266 and cert den (2001) 534 US 896, 151 L Ed 2d 155, 122 S Ct 217.

Evidence was sufficient to prove that foreign politician made false statements on Customs forms regarding how much money or currency he had in his possession, where his second false statement could not amend his first, since there is no recantation defense under 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Sebaggala (2001, CA1 Mass) 256 F3d 59, 57 Fed Rules Evid Serv 484.

Defendant charged with filing false claims for income tax refunds in violation of 18 USCS § 287 and making false statements to government agency in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 is entitled to have insanity defense determined in accordance with law applicable at term of offense. United States v Lakey (1985, SD Tex) 610 F Supp 210.

Former chief of staff of Agriculture Secretary fails to plead prima facie case of selective prosecution, even if no person has ever before been indicted for failing to disclose receipt of $ 22,000 or less on public financial disclosure report, where he has not shown that no individual has ever been indicted under 18 USCS § 1001 for alleged falsehoods in sworn declaration, because there is inadequate proof that (1) he has been singled out as compared to persons similarly situated, or (2) Office of Independent Counsel was actuated by impermissible motives. United States v Blackley (1997, DC Dist Col) 986 F Supp 616.

Unpublished Opinions

Unpublished: Counsel was not ineffective in violation of Sixth Amendment during defendants' trial for making material false statements regarding planting dates in their applications for crop disaster assistance, violation of 18 USCS § 1001, because (1) defendants made no showing of deficient performance of counsel as they had not adequately demonstrated viability of two-prong defense they claimed counsel erred in not presenting; (2) even if defenses were viable, counsel's decision not to employ them was entitled to deference as reasonable trial strategy as counsel's tactics might have been best available, and record amply reflected that defendants consented to their use; (3) defendants made no showing of prejudice because they had not shown that there was any reasonable probability that proceedings would have been different (in their favor) had counsel made arguments and defenses defendants raised in their habeas petition, but rather, if proposed defenses had been pursued, there was reasonable probability that defendants would have been convicted of crop insurance fraud as well as disaster program fraud. United States v Wheeler (2007, CA5 Miss) 2007 US App LEXIS 22095.

D.Evidence

1.In General 136. Variance between indictment and proof

While extent by which proof may vary from indictment before prejudice arises is much narrower in false statement case under 18 USCS § 1001 than in many other prosecutions, there is no fatal variance between indictment based on such statute and proof merely because statement shown by evidence is not in haec verba with statement in indictment. United States v Lambert (1974, CA5 Fla) 501 F2d 943 (ovrld in part on other grounds by United States v Rodriguez-Rios (1994, CA5 Tex) 14 F3d 1040).

No fatal variance between indictment for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 and proof offered at trial existed where defendant was informed of particular false statement in question; fact that indictment charged defendant with "making" of false statement "by means of a letter" but that proof showed the "using" of false documents was of no significance. United States v Guthartz (1978, CA5 Fla) 573 F2d 225, reh den (1978, CA5 Fla) 576 F2d 931 and cert den (1978) 439 US 864, 58 L Ed 2d 173, 99 S Ct 187.

Variance between proof adduced at trial and allegations of indictment were insignificant and did not require reversal where only variance consisted of substitution of numerals "15" in indictment for letter "S" shown at trial, since mere variance in proof that does not affect substantial rights of accused will not warrant setting aside conviction. United States v Ford (1986, CA5 Tex) 797 F2d 1329, cert den (1987) 479 US 1070, 93 L Ed 2d 1011, 107 S Ct 964 and reinstated, in part (1987, CA5 Tex) 824 F2d 1430, cert den (1988) 484 US 1034, 98 L Ed 2d 776, 108 S Ct 741.

Defendant, teacher, was improperly convicted under 18 USCS § 1001 of making false statement to Federal Bureau of Investigation agent who questioned him about participating in scheme to defraud public school district by falsely inflating overtime hours because government failed to prove that defendant lied during time frame alleged in indictment, which was ambiguously phrased; thus, indictment materially varied from proof adduced at trial, and new trial was required. United States v Baker (2008, ED La) 544 F Supp 2d 522.

137. Self-incrimination

Fifth Amendment gives taxpayer no privilege to file false tax return when faced with choice of prosecution for failure to file return or for incriminating statements in truthful return; resulting pressure is not testimonial compulsion, and prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001 may occur. United States v Knox (1969) 396 US 77, 24 L Ed 2d 275, 90 S Ct 363, 70-1 USTC P 15925, 27 AFTR 2d 1902.

District court properly suppressed statements that were made during interview with INS agent in defendant's trial for perjury, 18 USCS § 1621, and for making false statement, 18 USCS § 1001; questioning of alien from China while he was in custody in Guam on administrative deportation warrant constituted "interrogation" for purposes of Miranda because facts showed that defendant was subject to especially heightened risk of prosecution for illegal entry under 8 USCS § 1325; therefore, agent was required to give Miranda warning before interview. United States v Chen (2006, CA9 Guam) 439 F3d 1037.

Where individual had received use and derivative use immunity regarding grand jury testimony, such testimony could not be basis of prosecution for making false statements to law enforcement officials under 18 USCS § 1001. In re Weir (1974, SD Cal) 377 F Supp 919, affd (1974, CA9 Cal) 495 F2d 879, cert den (1974) 419 US 1038, 42 L Ed 2d 315, 95 S Ct 525.

138. Perjury rule

In prosecution of one for unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly concealing by trick material fact for purpose of defrauding home owners loan corporation by deleting part of abstract showing judgment against property on which loan was sought, fact that judgment debtor believed judgment to be excessive was not admissible in evidence. Christensen v United States (1937, CA7 Wis) 90 F2d 152.

In 18 USCS § 1001 prosecution, perjury rule, requiring corroborated testimony, was not invoked. Todorow v United States (1949, CA9 Cal) 173 F2d 439, cert den (1949) 337 US 925, 93 L Ed 1733, 69 S Ct 1169.

Perjury corroboration rule is not applicable to the prosecution under this section for violation of statute relating to filing of non-Communist affidavit by union official. Fisher v United States (1956, CA9 Wash) 231 F2d 99, 37 BNA LRRM 2599, 29 CCH LC P 69765.

Two-witness rule in perjury cases is not applicable to prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Killian (1957, CA7 Ill) 246 F2d 77, 32 CCH LC P 70750, 39 CCH LC P 66146; Fisher v United States (1958, CA9 Wash) 254 F2d 302, 42 BNA LRRM 2020, 34 CCH LC P 71454, cert den (1958) 358 US 895, 3 L Ed 2d 122, 79 S Ct 157, reh den (1959) 358 US 938, 3 L Ed 2d 310, 79 S Ct 322; United States v Marchisio (1965, CA2 NY) 344 F2d 653.

Application of perjury rule to prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 by false noncommunist affidavit would merely thwart attainment of end that Congress sought to accomplish by enactment of § 9(h) of Taft-Hartley Act, where defendant was active member of party until few days before filing affidavit, when he made extrajudicial admissions to FBI agents, in form of written statements, that he maintained contact with Communist Party throughout time he was officer of union; in case at bar evidence of two witnesses plus defendant's own admissions is substantial ground for finding of falsity. Sells v United States (1958, CA10 Colo) 262 F2d 815, 43 BNA LRRM 2476, 36 CCH LC P 65189, cert den (1959) 360 US 913, 3 L Ed 2d 1262, 79 S Ct 1298.

Making of false statement which is covered by 18 USCS § 1001 can be proved by testimony of person to whom statement is made even though such testimony is uncorroborated by other witnesses and even though such testimony is contrary to that of defendant. Neely v United States (1962, CA9 Ariz) 300 F2d 67, 9 AFTR 2d 1046, 93 ALR2d 718, cert den (1962) 369 US 864, 8 L Ed 2d 84, 82 S Ct 1030.

In prosecution for conspiracy and for making false statement in contravention of 18 USCS § 1001 to the Office of Educational Opportunity to obtain fraudulently monies which were the subject of poverty program grant, it was unnecessary for the government to present testimony from trainees named in forged check endorsements and receipts and in the false time and attendance sheets, as long as the government presents sufficient, relevant circumstantial evidence to prove concert of action in the commission of unlawful acts from which a common design could be inferred. United States v Cogwell (1973, CA7 Ill) 486 F2d 823, cert den (1974) 416 US 959, 40 L Ed 2d 310, 94 S Ct 1975.

There is no need to apply the common law rules of evidence applicable peculiarly to perjury trials. United States v Stephens (1970, WD Okla) 315 F Supp 1008.

139. Inferences

Courtroom identification is not necessary where evidence is sufficient to permit inference that defendant on trial is person who made statements in question. United States v Fern (1983, CA11 Fla) 696 F2d 1269, 83-1 USTC P 9151, 51 AFTR 2d 819.

Evidence that attorney for owner of sailing vessel filed with United States Customs Service a Petition for Remission or Mitigation of Forfeiture so that owner could recover vessel seized as having been used in importation of marijuana, that owner's affidavit and false charter agreement purporting to show that boat had been chartered by owner to third party during period of offense was attached to petition, that third party's signature to charter had been forged after forger had practiced writing signatures several times on stationery bearing letterhead of owner's charter company, and that owner subsequently had this piece of stationery in his possession, was sufficient to support jury's inference that owner knowingly and willfully presented false statement and document to Customs in violation of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Benz (1984, CA11 Fla) 740 F2d 903, reh den, en banc (1985, CA11 Fla) 756 F2d 885 and cert den (1985) 474 US 817, 88 L Ed 2d 51, 106 S Ct 62.

Defendant's conviction was reversed, where government adduced no evidence from which jury could have drawn permissible inference that defendant intended to defraud Small Business Administration at time loan documents were signed; any wrongdoing defendant may have committed occurred subsequent to signing of loan documents and could not support conviction. United States v McCarrick (2002, CA11 Fla) 294 F3d 1286, 15 FLW Fed C 678.

140. Miscellaneous

In prosecution of union officer for filing, in violation of 18 USCS § 1001, affidavit with National Labor Relations Board falsely denying that he was member of Communist Party, membership can be proved by evidence of lawful acts and statements as well as by evidence of unlawful acts and statements. Killian v United States (1961) 368 US 231, 7 L Ed 2d 256, 82 S Ct 302, 49 BNA LRRM 2189, 43 CCH LC P 17306, reh den (1962) 368 US 979, 7 L Ed 2d 441, 82 S Ct 476, 44 CCH LC P 17389.

Trial judge's characterization of government witness as unreliable, followed by statement later in trial that court would rely on that witness' testimony, denied defendants fair trial where first statement caused defense to refrain from pursuing additional evidence to impeach witness and rebut his testimony, and from putting one defendant on witness stand. United States v Mendel (1984, CA2 NY) 746 F2d 155, 16 Fed Rules Evid Serv 771, cert den (1985) 469 US 1213, 84 L Ed 2d 331, 105 S Ct 1184.

Defendant's request for mistrial during his trial on charge of violating 18 USCS § 1001 was properly denied because, while Government's misstatements of evidence during closing arguments constituted prosecutorial misconduct, they did not prejudice defendant; remarks were brief and not deliberate, and strong and thorough curative instruction was given; moreover, case was not close and there was no likelihood that remarks could have affected outcome; record was clear that there was enough independent evidence that defendant submitted false SF-86 Form and that he did so intentionally. United States v Riccio (2008, CA1 RI) 529 F3d 40.

In prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001, absence of proof regarding words constituting false statement required that guilty verdict be set aside. United States v Clifford (1976, ED NY) 426 F Supp 696.

Postal service must comply with grand jury subpoena by supplying personal information which is apparently sought for computer matching program to identify any postal employee who might be receiving federally-funded welfare benefits and who might be shown by further investigation to have obtained such benefits by making false or fraudulent statements in violation of 18 USCS § 1001. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Issued to United States Postal Service (1981, ED Tenn) 535 F Supp 31.

2.Burden of Proof 141. Falsity

Where indictment did not restrict itself to allegation that defendants did knowingly make false statement, but proceeded to state in detail what constituted alleged falsity, government was required to prove falsity as specifically alleged. Stevens v United States (1953, CA6 Tenn) 206 F2d 64.

It is incumbent upon government in prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 to introduce proof sufficient to establish falsity of statements as well as defendant's knowing and willful submission of such statements. United States v Anderson (1978, CA8 Ark) 579 F2d 455, cert den (1978) 439 US 980, 58 L Ed 2d 651, 99 S Ct 567.

142. Intent, knowledge and willfulness

In order to constitute commission of crime created by 18 USCS § 1001 where it is charged that written instrument was used, the proofs relating to instrument need only establish beyond reasonable doubt that accused knowingly and willfully made or used any false writing or document knowing same to contain any false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry; fact that indictment characterizes writing as "contract" or "affidavit" does not require proof that it is such. Robles v United States (1960, CA9 Ariz) 279 F2d 401, cert den (1961) 365 US 836, 5 L Ed 2d 745, 81 S Ct 750, reh den (1961) 365 US 890, 6 L Ed 2d 201, 81 S Ct 1032.

In prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001, by making false statement in connection with bringing foreign currency through United States Customs, government must prove that defendant knowingly made false statement. United States v Fitzgibbon (1978, CA10 Colo) 576 F2d 279, cert den (1978) 439 US 910, 58 L Ed 2d 256, 99 S Ct 279.

It is incumbent upon government in prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 to introduce proof sufficient to establish falsity of statements as well as defendant's knowing and willful submission of such statements. United States v Anderson (1978, CA8 Ark) 579 F2d 455, cert den (1978) 439 US 980, 58 L Ed 2d 651, 99 S Ct 567.

In prosecution for making false affidavit in support of false claim against United States, it was necessary to prove making, by defendant, of false statements in affidavit in question and knowledge of their falsity, and with intent to aid collection of such false claim. United States v Long (1936, DC Mass) 14 F Supp 29.