7 / Croce /
The Essence of Aesthetic
would be truth. Thus the doctrines of art, that for the sake
of brevity I shall term “conceptualistic,” contain elements
of dissolution, the more copious and efficacious by as
much as the spirit of the philosopher who professed them
was energetic, and therefore nowhere are they so copious
and efficacious as in Schelling and Hegel, who had so
lively a consciousness of artistic production as to suggest
by their observations and their particular developments a
theory opposed to that maintained in their systems.
Furthermore, the very conceptualistic theories are
superior to the others previously examined, not only in so
far as they recognise the theoretic character of art, but
also carry with them their contribution to the true
doctrine, owing to the claim that they make for a
determination of the relations (which, if they be of
distinction, are also of unity) between fancy or
imagination and logic, between art and thought.
And here we can already see how the very simple
formula, that “art is intuition,” — which, translated into
other symbolical terms (for example, that “art is the work
of imagination” ), is to be found in the mouths of all those
who daily discuss art, and also in older terms (“imitation,”
“fiction,” “fable,” etc.) in so many old books, — when
pronounced now in the text of a philosophical discourse,
becomes filled with a historical, critical, and polemical
content, of the richness of which I can hardly here give
any example. And it will no longer cause astonishment
that its philosophical conquest should have cost an
especially great amount of toil, because that conquest is
like setting foot upon a little hill long disputed in battle.
Its easy ascent by the thoughtless pedestrian in time of
peace is a very different matter. It is not a simple resting-
place on a walk, but the symbol and result of the victory
of an army. The historian of aesthetic follows the steps of
its difficult progress, in which (and this is another magical
act of thought) the conqueror, instead of losing strength
through the blows that his adversary inflicts upon him,
acquires new strength through these very blows, and
reaches the desired eminence, repulsing his adversary, yet
in his company. Here I cannot do more than mention in
passing the importance of the Aristotelian concept of
mimesis (appearing in opposition to the Platonic
condemnation of poetry), and the attempt made by the
same philosopher to distinguish poetry and history: a
concept that was not sufficiently developed, and perhaps
not altogether mature in his mind, and therefore long
misunderstood, but which was yet to serve, after many
centuries, as the point of departure for modern aesthetic
thought. And I will mention in passing the ever-increasing
consciousness of the difference between logic and
imagination, between judgment and taste, between
intellect and genius, which became ever more lively
during the course of the seventeenth century, and the
solemn form which the contest between Poetry and
Metaphysic assumed in the “Scienza Nuova” of Vico; and
also the scholastic construction of an Æsthetica, distinct
from a Logica, as Gnoseologia inferior and Scientia
cognitionis sensitivae, in Baumgarten, who, however,
remained involved in the conceptualistic conception of art
and did not carry out his project; and the Critique of Kant
directed against Baumgarten and all the Leibnitzians and
Wolffians, which made it clear that intuition is intuition
and not a “confused concept” ; and romanticism, which
perhaps better developed the new idea of art, announced
by Vico, in its artistic criticism and in its histories than in
its systems; and, finally, the criticism inaugurated in Italy
by Francesco de Sanctis, who made art as pure form, or
pure intuition, triumph over all utilitarianism, moralism,
and conceptualism (to adopt his vocabulary).
But doubt springs up at the feet of truth, “like a young
shoot,” — as the terzina of father Dante has it, — doubt,
which is what drives the intellect of man “from mount to
mount.” The doctrine of art as intuition, as imagination, as
form, now gives rise to an ulterior (I have not said an
“ultimate”) problem, which is no longer one of opposition
and distinction toward physics, hedonistic, ethic and
logic, but within the field of images itself, which sets in
doubt the capacity of the image to define the character of
art and is in reality occupied with the mode of separating
the genuine from the spurious image, and of enriching in
this way the concept of the image and of art. What
function (it is asked) can a world of pure images without
philosophical, historical, religious or scientific value, and
without even moral or hedonistic value, possess in the
spirit of man? What is more vain than to dream with open
eyes in life, which demands, not only open eyes, but an
open mind and a nimble spirit? Pure images! But to
nourish oneself upon pure images is called by a name of
little honour, “to dream,” and there is usually added to
this the epithet of “idle.” It is a very insipid and
inconclusive thing; can it ever be art? Certainly, we
sometimes amuse ourselves with the reading of some
sensational romance of adventure, where images follow
images in the most various and unexpected way; but we
thus enjoy ourselves in moments of fatigue, when we are
obliged to kill time, and with a full consciousness that
such stuff is not art. Such instances are of the nature of a
pastime, a game; but were art a game or a pastime, it
would fall into the wide arms of hedonistic doctrine, ever
open to receive it. And it is a utilitarian and hedonistic
need that impels us sometimes to relax the bow of the
mind and the bow of the will, and to stretch ourselves,
allowing images to follow one another in our memory, or
combining them in quaint forms with the aid of the
imagination, in a sort of waking sleep, from which we
rouse ourselves as soon as we are rested; and we
sometimes rouse ourselves just to devote ourselves to the
work of art, which cannot be produced by a mind relaxed.
Thus either art is not pure intuition, and the claims put
forward in the doctrines which we believed we had above
confuted, are not satisfied, and so the confutation itself of
these doctrines is troubled with doubts; or intuition cannot
consist in a simple act of imagination.