Synthetic Biology | Discussion
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scenarios and adequate regulatory requirements is of utmost relevance concerning release experiments
involving synthetic organisms with the above-mentioned characteristics.
An important point in relation to additional experimental data on the risk analysis of
biomolecular systems and
SB is the need to provide practical examples for mimicking natural biological systems and bridge the gaps
between theoretical concepts and experiments carried out (Zhou et al. 2011). An important
component for the
mitigation of potential risks imposed by SB is the focus on risk research. By increasing the efforts in this area,
the relevance of
potential or conceived risks versus real hazards may be facilitated and streamlined. Dana et al.
(2012) identified the following areas of risk research to be most urgent and promising:
a) characterisation of the differences in physiology between conventional
and SB organisms
b) establishment of the capabilities of SB microorganisms
to alter their habitat, the food webs
and biodiversity
c) characterisation of the rate of evolution of SB microorganisms in artificial and natural environments
d) understanding of processes relevant for
gene transfer
The risk of SB discussed broadly in chapter 5 may be mitigated by the application of appropriate layers of
containment to avoid adverse effects of deliberate or accidental release of SB organisms. With respect to the
European Union, the regulatory requirements applying to GMOs are to be observed also when working with
synthetic organisms. By adhering to the safety levels and related appropriate provisions laid down in the
relevant and national legislation, particularly on contained use, a high level of workplace and environmental
safety is ensured. On the international level, the NIH guidelines for research involving recombinant or
synthetic nucleic acid molecules (National Institutes of Health (NIH) 2013) are a good general basis for
establishing physical containment in SB. They rely on biosafety level standards as established by the World
Health Organization (World Health Organization (WHO) 2004). Biosafety levels correspond to certain codes of
practices, presence of
laboratory design, equipment and facilities (World Health Organization (WHO) 2004). An
international agreement concerning adherence to high standards seems to be of particular importance
concerning current SB activities as most of their results are intended for contained use (see chapter 4).
Although effective provisions are in place it should be kept in mind that physical containment is not fail-proof
(Wright et al. 2013). Consequently, some synthetic biologists propose biological containment to overcome the
limitations of physical containment (Wright et al. 2013; Marliere 2009) – however, also single biological
containment measures suffer from certain drawbacks. A solution would be to apply multiple biosafety
mechanisms. On the other hand, the higher the complexity the more prone to failure the system will be
(Wright et al. 2013). Given the expected increase in SB endeavours the effectiveness of different containment
strategies is to be subject to continuous evaluation and development. Aspects concerning containment
strategies have been extensively discussed by the International Civil Society Working Group on Synthetic
Biology (ICSWGSB) (2011). Accordingly, it may be anticipated that effective containment may require updating
and upgrading of the containment facilities.
A major element of mitigating potential risks from SB is to provide proper training (Marris and Jefferson 2013).
Newcomers to SB frequently lack formal biosafety training and sensitisation to ethical, social and legal norms
usually established in the traditional life science research communities (NSABB 2010; Schmidt 2010a). Even
under optimal educational and training conditions understanding of the complexities and non-linearities of
biological systems diminishes over time because proportionally lesser and lesser biologists are involved in SB
(Murray 2010). This issue also reflects one of the major characteristics of SB,
i.e. its trans-/interdisciplinarity
(discussed in chapter 1). SB relies on well-educated and comprehensively trained staff capable of
understanding interactions, networks and the complexity of biological systems. A high sensibility of the