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In spite of success in Minneapolis, hot spot-policing has been criticized for displacing crime
to other areas (Repetto, 1976). That is, police intervention simply causes criminals to move to
unprotected places. At the same time, there is a body of research that argues that the effects of
hot-spot policing spill over into places adjacent to the target areas (Clarke and Weisburd, 1994).
For example, the Kansas City Gun experiment examined whether gun crimes were displaced into
the seven patrol beats contiguous to the target area (Sherman, & Rogan, 1995). Contrary to the
displacement argument, none of the contiguous beats showed significant increases in gun crime
and two of the contiguous beats reported significant decreases in gun crimes.
The Kansas City Gun experiment was also important because it supported the argument that
intensive police patrol near gun crime hot spots could lead to a reduction in violent crime.
According to the Kansas City argument, added patrols increased gun seizures, which in turn
reduced violent crime (Sherman and Rogan, 1995). In addition, it was believed that increased
patrol visibility in the hot spot areas would generally deter all other types of crime. While the
authors admit that their quasi-experimental design requires further testing, their results suggest
that directed patrols can reduce gun violence.
In 1997, Indianapolis implemented a 90-day directed patrol project similar to the Kansas
City study in an effort to reduce gun violence, “drive-by” shootings, and homicides. The results
of the evaluation indicate that directed police patrols in gun-crime hot spots can reduce gun
violence by increasing the seizures of illegally carried firearms (McGarrell, Chermak, and Weiss,
2002). In Indianapolis, the police worked closely with citizens within the targeted communities
to secure community support and address their concerns. The researchers found that gun crime
declined 6 percent in the areas of intervention, while increasing 8 percent in similar comparison
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areas. They concluded that “focused deterrence” (targeted enforcement) sent a message of
increased surveillance to those individuals most likely to commit gun-related crimes.
Hot-spot policing is supported by both rational choice (Cornish and Clarke, 1986) and
routine activities theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979). Rational choice theory argues that offenders
calculate the relative costs and benefits of alternative courses of actions and, from these
calculations, make a choice that maximizes the expected benefits. Rational choice models
assume that the range of alternatives open to actors is constrained by the environment and by the
situations within which they make their decisions (Simpson, 2006). As such, it could be argued
that hot-spot policing increases the potential cost of crime because of the added police presence
and the resulting increased chance of apprehension. Routine activities theory argues that three
elements must be present for a crime to occur: a motivated offender, a suitable victim, and the
absence of a capable guardian. This “crime triangle” can be directly affected by hot-spot
policing. Hot-spot policing, by its very nature, increases the number of capable guardians
(police) within a particular area or at a specific place thus deterring crime.
Hot-spot policing generally involves the increased use of routine police strategies such as
preventative patrol. Hot-spot policing, however, can also be combined with problem-solving
strategies such as tavern closings, zero-tolerance enforcement, and police-corrections
partnerships. In fact, evidence suggests that hot-spot policing may be more effective when
combined with other crime-control strategies.
Police-Corrections Partnerships
P
olice intervention has long been recognized as an effective way to prevent crime. A recent
innovation in policing that capitalizes on the effectiveness of police intervention is partnership
with correctional agencies. Police-corrections partnerships seek to reduce crime through the
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added supervision of offenders. While police typically seek out “new” crimes, establishing
relationships with probation and parole authorities gives police the added ability of removing
criminals from the community for violating the conditions of their probation or parole. This
added supervision carries a message of both specific and general deterrence by providing an
additional mechanism of offender incapacitation and informing the criminal community that
crime will not be tolerated.
In 1999, Parent and Snyder reviewed fourteen police-corrections partnerships for the
National Institute of Justice. Included in this review was an analysis of six “enhanced
supervision” programs involving police, probation, and parole authorities. While the authors
provided scant empirical evidence on how well these police-corrections partnerships worked,
criminal justice practitioners and policymakers continue to show great interest in the potential of
these approaches.
Probably the most widely known example of police-corrections cooperation is Boston’s
Operation Night Light, an innovative program that teamed police and juvenile probation officers.
Operation Night Light paired one probation officer and two police officers, who together made
surprise visits to the homes, schools, and worksites of high-risk probationers during the evening
and overnight hours. Unlike police officers, probation officers have broad authority to stop and
question offenders and, in some cases, immediately revoke their probation if the offender
violates its conditions. Begun in 1992, Operation Night Light was considered to be an important
part of Boston’s overall crime reduction strategy. So successful was Operation Night Light that
more than twenty jurisdictions around the country have created some form of police-probation
cooperation based upon the success of the Operation Night Light program.
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