*Prolif K*
Prolif K 1NC
Representations of proliferation shape a policy agenda of technology denial – reinforcing a North-South divide which outweighs and turns the case. The alternative is key to solve security strategies which oversimplify the regions of the topic
Muttimer 94 (David, professor of political science at suniversity of Vermont. Reimagining Security: The Metaphors of Proliferation” 1994 http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/OP25-Mutimer.pdf TBC 6/29/10 Pg. 36-37)
The discussion in this paper has examined the way in which international security, and
international security policy, are constituted in the terms of an assembly of metaphors. An image, comprising a series of metaphors,
provides the conceptual frame for a problem, and therefore structures the policy agenda by privileging a particular set of solutions which can be proposed and implemented. In particular
, the image highlights certain aspects of a given problem, while downplaying others and hiding still more.
The policy solutions which will be advanced will, not surprisingly,
focus upon the features highlighted by the image, and ignore those downplayed and hidden. I have shown how in the aftermath of the Cold War, and in the context of the Gulf War, an image of a problem of
PROLIFERATION was developed, which comprised three key metaphors: 'proliferation', 'stability' and 'balance'. The entailments of these
metaphors provide an image of an autonomous, technical, apolitical process, which if left unchecked spreads its technological offspring outwards from its source, resulting in excessive and destabilising accumulations elsewhere. This image is reflected in, and is driving the further development of, the instruments of control—the policy being applied to the problem defined by PROLIFERATION. There are two classes of conclusion I can draw from this discussion, those relating to policy and those to theory. I would suggest two conclusions concerning the present policies of proliferation control. The first is that
the image of PROLIFERATION is giving rise to a policy agenda dominated by strategies of technology denial. Such strategies reflect the technological bias and the 'outward from a source' entailments
of proliferation. However,
they are profoundly problematic in the contemporary international system.
Technology denial is serving to deepen the already wide gap between North and South. It ignores entirely the needs of economic development—needs
which are at least as great a security concern as is the spreading of weapons technology. In addition,
the strategy is unsustainable. Because
the PROLIFERATION image is of an autonomous process, it
takes no account of the political and economic interests driving the supply of military technology. These interests are presently being felt in the United States, for example, in opposition to any extension of export controls—despite the United States long being the leader of the supplier control groups.67 The second policy conclusion is related to the first.
The metaphors of 'stability' and 'balance' are similarly ill-suited to the contemporary security environment. Even if we accept that they provided useful conceptual frames to understand the superpower relationship in the Cold War,
they are not appropriate to the regional security arenas of the post-Cold War. The entailments of 'stability' in particular can not account for the variety and complexity of the Middle East, South Asia or the North Pacific, to mention the regions of contemporary concern.
Regional security, and security policy, must then be 'reimagined' on bases other than those provided by 'stability' and 'balance', and hence by PROLIFERATION.
Prolif K 1NC
The alternative is to reframe the affirmative’s images of security around the perspective of the oppressed
Muttimer 94 (David, professor of political science at suniversity of Vermont. Reimagining Security: The Metaphors of Proliferation” 1994 http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/OP25-Mutimer.pdf TBC 6/29/10 Pg. 38)
These conclusions hold two implications for 'critical' security studies. First of all, the exploration of the metaphors underlying policy will form an important part of a general project of critique, understood as revealing the power relations hidden by security relations. Those power relations are masked by the metaphorical understandings of the images of security, and so to reveal them, the images must themselves be revealed. Secondly, the impulse to critique is rooted in a political stance opposed to the dominant powers, and thus supporting the struggles of the oppressed. In order to create alternative security policies from the perspective of the oppressed, the present argument suggests the need first to construct images of security problems which privilege their interests, rather than those of the dominant powers—(DIS)ARMAMENT rather than PROLIFERATION, for example.
Link – General
Representations of dangerous proliferation are racist and cause proliferation
Lal 9 (Prerna April 5 Freelance blogger for the Immigrant Rights and Race in America blog at Change.org, and serve as an Online Organizer for CODEPINK: Women for Peace. http://prernalal.com/2009/04/north-korea-is-not-a-threat-unveiling-hegemonic-discourses/ TBC 7/1/10)
Tied to the race war schema, is the discourse of nuclearism, which refers to the ideology that nuclear weapons are instruments of peace.
Nukespeak in the form of MAD or the hype over so-called precision weapons by our leaders has had trickle-down effects to the point of achieving a mental-wipe or historical amnesia of the U.S. nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This discourse effectively represents a war on history and subjugation of knowledges about the horrors of nuclear war and fallout.
Closely related to nuclearism is the issue of whiteness around nuclear weapons,
the paternalistic presupposition that Western powers are the responsible and rightful leaders on the issue, the racist ideology that nuclear weapons in the hands of an Islamic country or
“terrorist” spells end to world peace or catastrophe while it is perfectly alright for France, Britain, the United States, Russia, China and now India, to have nuclear weapons. The epistemological assumptions of nuclearism are dangerous, besides being racist and morally repulsive
. The formation of a “nuclear club” and an exclusive right to possess nuclear weapons makes them a forbidden fruit and an issue of prestige, thereby encouraging proliferation. Indeed, discourse around the North Korea and Iran nuclear buildup denotes that these countries see a successful completion of the fuel cycle or the launching of a rocket as an issue of great prestige.
There is absolutely nothing prestigious about owning weapons of mass destruction,
weapons that can end civilization. However, countries like North Korea and Iran can be forgiven for their nuclearist mentality; after all, it is an implication of the discourse that has been perpetuated by the West, a discourse that has become common knowledge and culture.
Nuclearism must be addressed and put on the table to move past the current impasse over nuclear negotiations and the non-proliferation regime.
Without denouncing nuclear weapons and facing our moral conscience as the only nation to have ever used nuclear weapons,
we cannot hope to avert nuclear proliferation and prevent ‘rogue states’ from going that route.
