Gonzaga Debate Institute 2010 Scholars Nuclear K’s

Link – Prolif – Stability

Representations of stability and balance reinforce a technical understanding of proliferation
Muttimer 94 (David, professor of political science at suniversity of Vermont. Reimagining Security: The Metaphors of Proliferation” 1994 http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/OP25-Mutimer.pdf TBC 6/29/10 Pg. 30-31)

A second important entailment of the 'stability' and 'balance' metaphors is that they highlight numerical capabilities, while downplaying qualitative capabilities, and hiding other aspects of security—even aspects of the military other than equipment. This entailment is rooted both in the experiential basis of the metaphors and in their use during the Cold War. 'Balance' is by and large a quantitative, not qualitative characteristic—on a scale, a kilo of feathers will balance a kilo of lead. In particular, the accounting of numbers of various kinds, though notably money, involves the metaphor of 'balance'. Thus it should not be surprising that the application of the balance metaphor to the relationships of arms leads to a focus on numerical capabilities. The experience of superpower arms negotiation was in large measure guided by attempts to achieve 'essential equivalences'—in the number of launchers, the number of warheads, the throw weight of missiles, or the number of tanks. What gets downplayed by the numerical entailment of these metaphors is the variation in capability among different weapons and weapon systems. This can be seen in the present proliferation control systems. The MTCR identifies technologies of concern by range and payload, entirely ignoring the reliability of the weapons, and even their accuracy (which is generally well measured)—in other words, ignoring most of what determines whether a weapon will be delivered on target by a given missile. Similarly, the UN Arms Register records weapons in seven categories, so that, for example, all 'tanks' are counted together. Thus, in the first reporting cycle, the United Kingdom included several pieces of obsolete equipment that were transferred for display in museums. The comments that allow the Register's users to realise that these entries are museum pieces were purely voluntary. For example, Britain reported two exports of tanks. Six tanks were sent to Switzerland, and were marked "Obsolete equipment for museums", while 25 were reported sent to Nigeria. Nothing more than that 25 tanks were sent was reported by the UK, and so the character of these weapons is still formally opaque.60 While it is unfortunate that the numerical entailment of the balance metaphor downplays the quality of arms, it is much more problematic that it hides entirely aspects of the security problem other than arms—be this military doctrine and policy, or the more general politics of security.61 Indeed, the entailments of 'stability' and 'balance' in this context tend to reinforce the autonomous, technological character of the problem which is entailed by the 'proliferation' metaphor. Technology 'spreads' through some natural process. We can count the occurrence of this spread, so that we know where the technology is accumulating. We may even be able to control this autonomous process. However, it is these accumulations, if we do not prevent them, which can then 'upset' balances; in the words of Resolution 46/36L: "excessive and destabilizing arms build-ups pose a threat to national, regional and international security."

Link – Prolif – Stability

The representation of proliferation as a threat to stability assumes the norm of international politics as neutral and peaceful. This only increases the separation between “the West” and the rest of the world
Mutimer 0 (David, International Relations lecturer at Keele University and Research Associate at the York Centre for International and Strategic Studies, The Weapons State: Proliferation and the Framing of Security, p. 11-13) jl

The prevailing view of the weapons proliferation problem sees Iraq as the harbinger of a wider security problem in the twenty-first century, a problem produced by the proliferation of weapons and related technologies. That view looks on the actions I outlined in Chapter 1 as the sensible response of an international community to a threat it has recognized only just in time, if not a little late. It is a view neatly presaged by Charles Krauthammer in the same article in which he introduced the weapon state: The post–Cold War era is thus perhaps better called the era of weapons of mass destruction. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery will constitute the greatest single threat to world security for the rest of our lives. That is what makes a new international order not an imperial dream or a Wilsonian fantasy but a matter of the sheerest prudence. It is slowly dawning on the West that there is a need to establish some new regime to police these weapons and those who brandish them. 1 I want to draw attention to several aspects of this quotation, because they reveal the assumptions on which it, and the proliferation agenda more broadly, are based. The first key aspect of this short text is Krauthammer's claim that weapons proliferation will constitute the greatest single threat to world security for the rest of our lives. I do not want to contest or qualify the claim but instead to ask what it means—and perhaps as important, what is necessary for the claim to be meaningful. It would seem initially that the meaning of the sentence in question is self-evident: the process of weapons proliferation, of the spread of weapons of mass destruction to more countries in more parts of the world, threatens the world's security. Indeed, the meaning seems so apparent that explanation of its meaning are more difficult to read than the sentence itself. But is the meaning indeed so simple or, more to the point, so unproblematic? First, Krauthammer's claim assumes a single, identifiable phenomenon that is “the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. ” The way in which the weapons proliferation agenda was advanced following the Gulf War seems to suggest that this has not always been the case. As I will show in more detail in Chapter 3, for much of the Cold War period, issues related to weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery were not commonly assumed to be part of a problem known as proliferation. Krauthammer's claim also rests on the assumption that there is an unproblematic whole known as world security that can be threatened. He assumes, that is, that at some level the security of the world (whatever that may mean) is indivisible. But what of the last sentence of the quotation? Krauthammer argues that “it is slowly dawning on the West that there is a need to establish some new regime to police these weapons and those who brandish them. ” Within the space of a few lines, the “world security” with which Krauthammer appeared to be concerned has become a problem confronting “the West. ” Who are “those who brandish” these weapons after proliferation? They are not individuals or even groups of organized criminals, as his use of “police” might seem to suggest. Rather, it is “what might be called the 'Weapon State'” 2 that is holding and brandishing these weapons. Weapon states are members of the international community— Krauthammer cited Iraq, North Korea, and Libya but suggested that it is possible for Argentina, Pakistan, Iran, and South Africa to achieve this status. World security is perhaps less universal than first imagined. It is also worth considering the implications of Krauthammer's suggestion that the problem of proliferation, and the attendant growth of weapon states, is “slowly dawning” on the West. For this assertion to be meaningful, there must be a problem in the world somewhere (or in many places at once) that, for whatever reason, is hidden from the view of “the West. ” There must, in other words, be a rigid separation between the object in question—in this case, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—and the viewing subject—in this case, the West. What is more, there must also be a clear, unproblematic subject. The West is taken as a subject that can view, on which something can “dawn. ” Phrased in this way, perhaps the meaning of Krauthammer's short quotation is less obvious. Although we conventionally speak of something called “the West, ” it is not readily apparent that it is sufficiently singular for problems to “dawn” on it. What ties much of this together, what makes the passage coherent, is suggested by Krauthammer's use of prudence, the watchword of the traditional study and practice of international security, a study founded on political realism. In his classic statement of the principles of political realism, Hans Morgenthau writes, “Realism, then, considers prudence … to be the supreme virtue in politics. ” 3 Realism has been increasingly criticized in recent years in ways that resonate with the questions I have posed regarding Krauthammer's quotation. Realism, particularly the security study that forms a central element of its view of international relations, has been accused of serving Western—particularly U. S. —policy in the name of the international. What allows this political effect to pass unnoticed has been realism's claim to objectivity—to the separation of subject and object. Again, as Morgenthau puts it so succinctly, “Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their root in human nature. ” 4 If international politics is governed by objective laws, then security is a neutral state of affairs rather than politically biased.