Her Work and its Contribution to tHe tHeory and PraCtiCe of Conservation and sustainable natural resourCe ManageMent Policy Matters iuCn CoMMission on environMental, eConoMiC and soCial PoliCy issue 19 aPril 2014

POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

56

Organization (FAO) of the United Nations. 

Forestry Paper 136. Rome, Italy.

Cox, Michael and Tomas Villamayor. 2010. “A 

review of design principles for community-

based natural resource management”. Ecology 

and Society

 15(4): 38. Available from: http://

www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss4/

art38/[Accessed April, 2012]

FAO.  1997. Pre Investment Study on Forestry 

and Wildlife Sub-Sector of Eritrea; Technical 

Cooperation Program (TCP)

. Food and 

Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the United 

Nations. Rome, Italy.

Gebremedhin, Jhon and Girmay Tesfay. 2003. 

“Community natural resource management: 

The case of woodlots in Northern Ethiopia”. 

Environment and Development Economics

 8: 

129-148.

Hardin, Gareth. 1968. “The tragedy of 

commons” Science 162(3859): 1243-1248. 

Negassi, Amanuel, Bo Tengnas, Estifanos 

Bein and Kifle Gebru.  2002. Soil and Water 

Conservation Manual for Eritrea: Some Case 

Studies

. RELMA, Technical Report Series, 23. 

Nairobi, Kenya 

National Statistics and Evaluation Office 

(NSEO). 2003. Eritrea Demographic and 

Health Survey 2002. Calverton, Maryland, USA 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons: 

The Evolution of Institutions for Collective 

Action

. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 

Press

Ostrom, Elinor. 1999. Self-Governance and 

Forest Resources

. CIFOR Occasional Paper No. 

20

Ostrom, Elinor. 2007. “A diagnostic approach 

for going beyond panaceas”. PNAS 104(39): 

15181-15187

Sibhatu, Adam. 2006. An Institutional Approach 

to Appropriation and Provision in the Commons: 

A Case study in the Highlands of Eritrea

. 

Graduation thesis in AgricAdmin, University of 

Stellenbosch. South Africa

Singleton, Sara and Michael Taylor. 1992. 

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community”. Journal of Theoretical Politics 

4(3): 309-324.

Tucker, Catherine. 1999. “Common property 

design principles and development in a 

Honduran community”. Fletcher Journal of 

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Table 2: The 

hiza’ti woodland management system and Ostrom’s Design Principles 

OSTROM’S DESIGN PRINCIPLES 

FULFILLED / NOT FULFILLED

Clearly defined boundaries and users  

Fulfilled

Congruence between appropriation and 

provision rules and local conditions 

Fulfilled

Collective choice arrangement 

Fulfilled but potentially threatened by   

 

interference of government institutions 

Monitoring 

Fulfilled

Graduated sanctions 

Fulfilled

Conflict resolution mechanism 

Fulfilled

Rights to organise 

Fulfilled but dependent on future  

 

 

government interventionscontinuing to  

 

be supportive of self-organisation

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5

Governing the Commons Through Customary Law 

Systems of Water Governance

The Case of the Marakwet

Elizabeth Gachenga

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POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

58

Governing the Commons Through 

Customary Law Systems of Water 

Governance

The Case of the Marakwet

Elizabeth Gachenga

1

Abstract 

The resilience of customary law systems of natural resource governance in many parts of the 

world lends credence to Ostrom’s theory on the governance of commons. Ostrom argued that 

resource users who enjoy relative autonomy in the design of rules for governing and managing 

common-pool resources, frequently achieve better economic (as well as more equitable) 

outcomes than when experts do this for them.

2

 In support of this theory and acknowledging 

that most common pool resource governance regimes are based on a customary law system, 

Bosselman has sought to demonstrate a link between customary law systems and positive 

outcomes for sustainable development.

3

 Using a case study of the customary law system of 

water governance of the Marakwet community of Kenya, this paper tests and builds on the 

design principles and tools developed by Ostrom, to study normative institutions in a dynamic 

environment.

4

 The paper proposes an analytical framework that helps identify the features that 

strengthen customary institutions and ensure their adaptability and resource sustainability. This 

exercise illustrates the parallels between commons governance and customary law governance 

of natural resources. 

Keywords: commons, common pool resources, customary, law, natural resource governance, 

irrigation system, sustainability, sustainable development, property, water

1

 Elizabeth Gachenga (PhD) is a law lecturer and researcher at Strathmore Law School in Nairobi, Kenya. This paper is based on 

research undertaken as part of her doctoral research at the University of Western Sydney. Email [e-mail]

2

 (Ostrom 1990); (Agrawal and Gupta 2005); (Gibson, McKean, and Ostrom 2000); (Tang and Ostrom 1993); (Schlager and Ostrom 

1992); (Ostrom and Basurto 2011)

3

 (Bosselman 2005)

4

 (Ostrom and Basurto 2009)

5

Plate 1: The River Embobut, which is the source of the irrigation furrows used by the 

Marakwet people. (Photo credit: Elizabeth Gachenga)

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