Her Work and its Contribution to tHe tHeory and PraCtiCe of Conservation and sustainable natural resourCe ManageMent Policy Matters iuCn CoMMission on environMental, eConoMiC and soCial PoliCy issue 19 aPril 2014

POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

63

AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR 

IDENTIFYING SUCCESSFUL CUSTOMARY 

LAW SYSTEMS OF NATURAL RESOURCE 

GOVERNANCE 

Figure 1 encapsulates some of the main 

contributing factors that lie behind the success 

of customary law systems for natural resource 

governance. Departing from the premises 

put forward by Ostrom and building on 

Bosselman’s work, the framework identifies 

five main indicators of successful systems all 

of which are dependent on users enjoying 

some level of autonomy in system design and 

implementation.

1. Knowledge Management System

Both Ostrom’s and Ørebech’s work point 

to the need for a rational process for the 

development and modification of rules in 

order for any normative CPR governance 

framework to work effectively. Based on 

insights drawn from the Marakwet case study, 

this paper recognises this crucial feature and 

develops it further. 

First, any successful customary system for 

governing a CPR needs to have a record (oral 

or written) of how the system works under 

different conditions and that this knowledge 

and experience ought to be institutionalised. 

The term ‘knowledge management’ is used 

to denote this characteristic. For purposes 

of this framework, knowledge management 

signifies the capacity of the normative system 

to identify the insights and experiences 

necessary to develop rules that result in 

the sustainable governance of common 

pool resources. Knowledge management 

thus implies the capacity to capture the 

accumulated experiences of responses to 

environmental, socio-economic or other types 

of change. It is this record of past experiences 

that forms the basis for institutional memory 

and a repository of knowledge that is 

maintained for the purposes of improving the 

system down the road. 

An insight into the importance of this 

feature was gained during fieldwork 

among the Marakwet. Through focus group 

discussions, the responses of water users, 

and the observations of the researcher, it was 

evident that an implicit system existed for 

accumulating knowledge of the conditions 

affecting water resources and associated 

rule system. Most interview respondents 

demonstrated knowledge of the origin of 

the furrow system in response to prolonged 

drought in the valley and of their water 

rules. The rationale for the rules and their 

relation to past experiences was not always 

evident as respondents often associated 

non-compliance of the rules with taboos 

and religious sanctions. However, as noted 

in the focus group discussions, clan elders 

explained that the objectives of water rules 

Figure 1: Framework for Analysing Successful Customary Law Systems of Water Resource Governance

Knowledge 

Management System

Oral or written record of 

working of system in different 

conditions

Inherent 

Modification 

Procedure

Feedback Mechanism

Right information of current 

operation

Stratification of Rules 

Rule system sufficiently 

stratified to allow for partial 

modification

Autonomy

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POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

64

were the preservation of water resources, 

environmental conservation, or the socio-

economic welfare of local people. 

2. Feedback Mechanism

A second feature characteristic of successful 

customary law systems is the presence of a 

feedback mechanism. A successful system 

must have ways of ensuring that accurate 

information is promptly fed back into the 

system and that information then used in the 

decision making process.

24

 This mechanism 

is dependent on the knowledge management 

system, which ensures that relevant 

information is captured and used to drive the 

appropriate adaptation of resource rules and 

institutions. 

The Marakwet’s customary water governance 

system provides clear evidence of this. The 

flexibility of rules on water and land use point 

to their adaptation to ecological conditions. 

For instance, while commercial mango 

farming was not a traditional practice among 

the community, many women are currently 

involved in growing mangoes that are proving 

successful given their higher tolerance to 

the increasingly dry climate. Further, some 

of the respondents indicated that they are 

testing the feasibility of farming green gram 

commercially, along with other non-traditional 

crops that require less water. The customary 

law rules on farming and use of irrigation 

water have consequently been adapted to 

allow for commercial farming and changes in 

cultivation practices. 

The Marakwet case thus points to the 

importance of an effective feedback 

mechanism and suggests that successful 

customary law systems need to include 

a wider base of knowledge inputs that 

encompass not only environmental change 

but economic and social shifts also. As Ostrom 

and Basurto (2011) note, the success of any 

such system is also dependent on an enabling 

environment that facilitates learning from 

the success and failure of others.

25

 Such an 

informal social learning mechanism can be 

observed in the community habits of the 

Marakwet, whereby customary norms are 

crafted, implemented and enforced by means 

of member consultation—further aided by a 

physical space, the Sambalat trading centre, 

which acts as a hub for irrigation users to 

share experiences. 

3. Inherent Rule Modification Procedure

Bosselman developed this feature by building 

upon Ostrom’s work on rules and game theory 

in the context of institutional arrangements for 

natural resource management.

26

 It concerns 

a procedure by which any given resource rule 

system can be improved and thus ensure its 

continued relevance in the context of changing 

circumstances. It is both considered an 

essential attribute of system sustainability

27

 

and requires the maintenance of an open-

minded attitude to rule making by those 

involved—thus assuring congruence between 

rules in use and local conditions. 

As noted, Marakwet’s customary water 

governance system, while based on traditional 

norms and institutions, continues to evolve 

to adapt to changing circumstances. For 

instance, the incorporation of younger men 

into the clan elder council responsible for 

irrigation furrows is one important example 

of institutional flexibility that allows for rule 

modification when needed. 

4. Stratification of Norms

One of the necessary conditions for designing 

an effective feedback mechanism is a rule 

system that is sufficiently stratified. Bosselman 

refers to this feature as ‘fine graininess’,

28

 and 

involves rules that can be easily modified; that 

partial changes can be made without having 

to affect the entire system. Although this 

feature guarantees the sustainability of the 

rule system rather than the sustainability of 

the resource system, resource sustainability is 

closely associated with a resilient governance 

system that exhibits institutional adaptive 

24

 (Bosselman 2005)

26

 (Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994)

27

 (Ostrom and Basurto 2011)

28

 (Bosselman 2005)

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POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

65

capacity. A system with a great potential to 

deliver sustainable development outcomes 

would be useless if it were to fail in its actual 

operation as a rule system—for example, 

a system whose design requires an entire 

overhaul each time a single rule is changed.

While most rules of the Marakwet’s water 

resource governance system were broadly 

defined, implementation take places through 

consultation with all water users, which 

subjects rules to negotiation and also allows 

them to be modified with relative ease. For 

instance, while there are clear rules on clan 

allocation of water resources from the furrow 

systems, the elders explained that these rules 

could be altered to grant more water resources 

to those families in greater need.

29

 In other 

words, discretion is sometimes used in the 

application of rules, but this occurs without 

having to change the major institutions that 

fall under customary law. 

5. Autonomy 

Lastly, as was noted in the work of Ostrom 

and Basurto (2011), evidence from research 

on irrigation systems from different countries 

around the world has clearly demonstrated 

that the autonomy of resource users to design, 

operate and modify rules governing the water 

resources they use and depend on, ensured 

better and more equitable outcomes. This 

finding resonates strongly with the analysis 

of the customary law system of the Marakwet, 

where the community itself develops norms. 

The operation and implementation of rules 

is thus in the hands of resource users, with 

such autonomy in rule design regarded as 

inviolable. 

LESSONS FROM OSTROM FOR 

CUSTOMARY LAW SYSTEMS

This paper confirms the parallels that exist 

between CPR governance systems and 

customary law governance systems. While 

the former focus on the normative structures 

(rules in use) for managing shared resources, 

customary law systems for natural resource 

governance are interested in a similar 

institutional framework albeit one where the 

basis of authority rests in informal rather 

than formal/statutory norms and institutions 

and where the focus is the relationship that 

connects actors and their environment to 

those rules. Given these parallels, Ostrom’s 

pioneering work on commons management 

provides a set of most useful insights into the 

operation of resilient customary law systems 

for the governance 

of common pool 

resources, such 

as the irrigation 

system of the 

Marakwet.

The centrality of 

autochthony for 

building resilient 

customary law 

systems confirms 

Ostrom and 

Basurto’s (2011) 

observation that, 

in places where 

commoners enjoy 

autonomy in CPR 

rule design there 

is an increased 

likelihood for 

positive outcomes. 

As noted, while 

the origin of 

customary 

law systems is 

often linked to 

past traditions 

and customs, 

the systems 

themselves 

must continue to evolve in response to 

changing environmental and socio-economic 

circumstances. Consequently, Ostrom and 

Basurto’s tool for analysing ever-changing 

commons governance institutions also 

provides a most useful framework for the 

analysis of customary law governance systems. 

29

 (Focus Group Discussion with Clan Elders and Representatives of Furrows Council (Marakwet District- Kenya, February 10 2010)  

2010)

The centrality 

of autochthony 

for building 

resilient 

customary 

law systems 

confirms 

Ostrom and 

Basurto’s 

observation 

that, in 

places where 

commoners 

enjoy autonomy 

in CPR rule 

design there is 

an increased 

likelihood 

for positive 

outcomes.

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POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

66

As is the case with successful CPR 

management systems, customary law systems 

must also contain mechanisms to ensure 

adaptability to changing circumstances if 

they are to persist. The analysis presented 

in this paper lends credence to Ostrom’s 

central thesis that ‘tragedy’ is not a necessary 

outcome for commons scenarios and by 

extension customary law systems for natural 

resource governance. As demonstrated 

by the analysis of Marakwet’s customary 

water governance system, autochthonous 

or home grown normative and institutional 

frameworks for governing CPRs, providing 

they can successfully adapt in the face of 

change, can produce positive and sustainable 

resource outcomes.  

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