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Khawarij sectarian group, the reasons mainstream Muslims move closer to
this discourse need to be further scrutinised.
To understand the causes of radicalisation, one should not examine
what radicals view as mandated by Islam, but rather “why specifically they
choose this [radical] line of Islamist thought above all others [which is a
product of] how they view their [social and political] contexts”.
3
It is rather
an attitude towards the status quo and not religious observance that
promotes radical religious doctrine. As Esposito and Mogahed note, “the
real difference between those who condone terrorist acts and all others is
about politics, not piety”.
4
Research should focus on the political and not
the theological foundations of radicalism to be able to counteract the
phenomenon.
2.
Two trends of radicalism
What is it specifically about ‘politics’ that provokes radicalism? Statistics
and empirical evidence alike suggest that there are two main trends of
radicalism, each with a different characterisation and orientation.
2.1
Hostility towards Egypt’s regime
The first trend of radicalisation is characterised by hostility towards
Egypt’s regime. Elements of Islamist groups denounce the state for
“disrespecting Islam”,
5
a charge that progressed to ‘corrupting Islam’ after
the constitutional amendments of 2007.
But it is not only religion that matters for Muslims. Both politically
radicalised and moderate Muslims “desire to limit the power of rulers and
regimes they regard as authoritarian, un-Islamic and corrupt”.
6
Hostility and radicalisation, in the case of radical groups, differ from
one group to another. Even so, “the starting point for most violent groups
3
T. El Bishry, “Tareq El Bishy’s Reflections on ‘Islamic Anger’ Book” ( Qera’a li
Tareq El Bishry Fi Kitab Al Ghadab Al Islamy), IslamOnline.net, 3 January 2008
(retrieved from http://www.islamonline.net).
4
Esposito & Mogahed (2007), op. cit., p. 74.
5
K. El Birry, World is more Beautiful than Paradise – The Biography of an Egyptian
Fundamentalist ( El Donia Ajmal min el Janna – Seiret Usuli Masry) , Beirut: Dar Al
Nahaar, 2002, p. 22.
6
Esposito & Mogahed (2007), op. cit., p. 93.
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in Egypt is that the state is infidel, the regime is infidel, and the president is
either infidel, a sinner or (greatly) unjust, but they all agree on the necessity
of not recognising him, not obeying him and resorting to violence
attempting to change him”.
7
The regime’s crackdown on non-violent
Islamist movements attempting to engage in politics fuels this sentiment, as
it discredits “non-violent participatory Islamists…while radicals will grow
in power”.
8
Radicals exploit such clampdowns to stress the unfruitfulness of
peaceful change, hence attracting more supporters. Commenting on
Egypt’s 2007 constitutional amendments, Zawahiri said, “these
amendments are a blow to everyone who took the path of elections to enact
change in Egypt”.
9
Most of the terrorist attacks that targeted Egyptian
statesmen, politicians and police officers during the 1980s and 1990s stem
from this strain of radicalism.
2.2
Hostility towards the West
The second trend of radicalism is characterised by hostility towards the
West. The Gallup World Poll shows that “politically radicalised (Muslims)
are consistently more negative than are moderates in their opinions of all
Western countries”. While radicals express higher levels of criticism of
moral decay and a spiritual vacuum in Western public life, not a single
respondent to the poll suggested that the West should stop being immoral
or corrupt in order to improve its relations with the Muslim world.
Again challenging conventional wisdom, hostility is not the outcome
of a rejection of Western values as suggested by the discourse on the theme
of ‘why do they hate us?’. Indeed, politically radicalised and moderate
Muslims alike express admiration for the West’s fair political systems,
democracy, respect of human rights, freedom of speech and gender
equality.
7
A. El-Ela Mady, Egyptian Violent Movements and their Interpretation of Islam ( Jama’at
al ‘Unf al Masriyya wa Ta’wilatuha lil Islam), Cairo: Maktabet al-Shorouq el Dawliya,
2006, pp. 41-42.
8
T.C. Wittes, “Three Kinds of Movements”, Journal of Democracy, July 2008, pp. 6-
12.
9
A. al-Zawahiri, “Ayman al Zawahiri: Video: Iraq timetable of withdrawal a
victory”, Northeast Intelligence Network, 6 May 2007 (retrieved from
http://www.homelandsecurityus.com/Zawahiri050607).
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Rather, it is foreign policies that cause hostility. The first foreign
policy element that provokes hostility is military aggression. Two-thirds of
al-Qaeda terrorists come from countries where the United States has a
heavy military presence.
10
Notably, 81% of politically radicalised Muslims –
and 67% of moderates – describe the US as “aggressive”. Both moderates
and radicals avoid sweeping generalisations, and clearly distinguish
among the foreign policies of different Western countries. France and
Germany (which outspokenly opposed the US-led invasion of Iraq) are
scarcely viewed as aggressors, with fewer than 10% of either moderate or
radical Muslims seeing them as such.
This hostility is intensified by the increasing Western military
presence in the region, and is manifest in terrorist attacks targeting Western
interests and tourists. A good example is the series of bombings that took
place in Cairo in 2005. Diaa Rashwan, an expert on Islamic movements,
described the bombings as “terrorist attacks in a regional context”,
11
referring to the regional attacks targeting Western tourists following the
US-led invasion of Iraq.
Other elements that contribute to hostility include the feeling of
cultural invasion, that ‘the West’ does not respect the cultural heritage of
Muslims and simply wants to globalise its value system and culture. Many
Muslim writers and intellectuals equate the contemporary wave of
globalisation with Westernisation – some are even more specific and equate
it with Americanisation.
Yusuf al-Qaradawi, an Egyptian Muslim scholar and chair of the
International Union of Muslim Scholars, argues that before Western
occupation forces began their retreat from Muslim countries in the 1950s,
they planned for a cultural, educational, legislative and social change that
would change the Muslim umma from within”.
12
10
R. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, New York: Random
House, 2005.
11
M.G. Arafa, “Cairo’s Bombing: A Third Generation of Jamaat Appears in the
Horizon” ( Infijar al Qahera: Jeel Thaleth min al Jamaat Yaloohu fil Ufoq),
IslamOnline.net, 11 April 2005 (retrieved from http://www.islamonline.net/
Arabic/politics/2005/04/article07.shtml).
12
Y. al-Qaradawi, “We and the West” ( Nahnu wal Gharb), Yusuf al-Qaradawi
Official Website, 2005 (retrieved from http://qaradawi.net/site/topics/
article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=4519&version=1&template_id=256&parent_id=12).
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