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were arrested, their assets were confiscated and they stood before a
military tribunal that sentenced them to three to ten years in prison, despite
decisions by four civilian courts to drop all charges put forward by the state
security apparatus.
In that context, the MB issued the first draft of its less-than-moderate
manifesto, mentioned earlier in this chapter. Hamed Quwaisi points out
that the manifesto is part of a “larger crisis in Egyptian political life, where
the regime has marginalised the people’s influence in public matter[s], and
forced them to resign from politics”.
55
That is not to suggest that he does
not blame the group. Indeed, he blames the “absence of a political reformist
mentality” for the poor quality of the draft.
Given its institutional moderation, the regime’s onslaught did not
push the MB all the way back to radicalism. The Brotherhood’s distribution
of the draft to intellectuals and politicians reflected a willingness to accept
criticism, while the debate that followed reflected internal diversity, a sign
of political maturity.
The draft manifesto should be assessed in the light of mainstream
political trends in Egypt. Political movements relying on grassroots support
need to keep an eye on their supporters’ preferences, even if they believe in
the ‘mission’ of social change and reform. While the majority of Egyptians
emphasise the importance of sharia as the only source of legislation, the
draft manifesto only emphasises it as the ‘main’ source. The group’s stance
against women or Copts holding the presidency reflects a cultural deficit
within society that is an outcome of the Wahhabi heritage carried by the
1970s movement into contemporary Islamist movements. According to a
Gallup poll, only 50% of Egyptians support the right of women to hold
leadership positions. This could only compare well with Saudi Arabia’s
40%. Statistics from other Muslim countries are significantly higher. The
Brotherhood – consciously or not – keeps itself just one step ahead of
society, trying to strike a balance between ideological purity, intellectuals’
fears and grassroots support.
55
H.A.M. Quwaisi, “Political Significance of the MB Party Manifesto Crisis”
( Aldalalat Alsiyasiyya Li Azmit Barnamij Hizb al Ikhwan), IslamOnline.net, 22
November 2007 (retrieved from www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=
ArticleA_C&cid=1195032526684).
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Wasat
The Wasat party was founded by a group of middle-generation leaders
who broke off from the Brotherhood in 1996. Although their attempts to
acquire legal recognition failed three times (in 1996, 1998 and 2004), Wasat
leaders are still struggling for this recognition and are applying for legal
recognition again in 2009.
They have every reason to believe they are entitled to it. They have
the support of “prominent secular journalists, intellectuals and political
figures who see them as representing a moderate and enlightened form of
political Islam”.
56
In addition, they also have the report by the Coptic-led,
State Representatives Committee of the Administrative Court, which
acknowledges their manifesto as “unique” – a condition for new political
parties that had previously been used by the Parties Committee to deny
them legal recognition.
The group has developed three different platforms, the third of which
(published in 2004) is currently being revisited in order to present it to the
Parties Committee. Although membership of the Wasat party is still under
1,000, it has the potential to attract large numbers of Egypt’s Islamic
bourgeoisie class when it acquires legal recognition.
The Wasat membership records are highly revealing in themselves:
2% of the ‘Islamist’ party members are Copts, a significantly high
percentage compared with the Coptic presence in other parties.
57
Over 35%
of members are women, 25% are workers and 60% hold university degrees.
In many ways, Wasat has succeeded in reaching out to supporters beyond
the traditional Islamist base. It has accomplished the development of a
mainstream national discourse with Islamic roots.
The party’s manifesto reflects moderate views. Its agenda for political
reform stresses the following principles: freedom of speech; freedom of
belief and religious practice for “all Abrahamic religions”; respect of
human rights; “complete equality” between all citizens – men and women,
Muslims and non-Muslims – in legal and political rights; judicial
independence; and (most significantly) separation between religious and
political institutes, along with the financial and administrative
56
C.R. Wickham, Mobilizing Islam, New York: Columbia University Press, 2002.
57
Membership statistics have been provided by al-Wasat.
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independence of al-Azhar from state bureaucracy.
58
It adopts a balanced
international relations agenda by which it does not “completely accept – in
a way close to surrender – the West, nor does it completely reject it”.
59
Ever since its establishment, Wasat has been closer to the moderate
end of its ideological boundaries (with its position in relation to other
groups shown in Figure 1). In many ways, it manifests the ideological
purity of its school. Detachment from a grassroots support base (compared
with the MB), endorsement of intellectuals (secular and Islamist alike) and
relative toleration (although not recognition) by the state have kept Wasat
away from the pressure that often leads to radicalisation. This has also
given its members the space to detach themselves from the impacts of other
schools such as Wahhabism and Qutbism. The group’s insistence on legal
recognition, despite being repeatedly turned down by the regime, is
remarkable.
Figure 1. Continuum of Islamist movement ideologies in Egypt
3.3
Post-institutional Islamist movements
In many ways , Wasat was the first manifestation of the post-institutional
trend in Islamic movements that began in the late 1990s. Egypt’s regime
had focused on security measures while dealing with Islamist movements.
It continuously repressed Jihad until a freeze was declared on its
58
Al-Wasat New Party Papers ( Awraq Hizb Al-Wasat Al Jadeid), Cairo: Dar Al Tiba’a
Al Mutamayiza, 2004, pp. 21-23.
59
Ibid., p. 9.
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