10 | R
OBERT
S
PRINGBORG
membership participated. It has refused to form
strategic alliances with
opposition political parties or groupings, but it has had some limited
cooperation with them. Internally, it has signalled that it is opening up and
becoming more transparent by referring to elections for leadership
positions, but then has argued that the security situation is such that
complete details must remain confidential.
12
The draft political platform it
released in a somewhat confused, informal fashion in early 2008 called for
the creation of a constitutionally empowered religious
committee to review
legislation and excluded Christians or women from holding the presidency.
The subsequent controversy led to awkward backtracking and at least
temporary postponement of the effort to create a definite platform.
Thus, as the political temperature has increased, the MB has appeared
to be even more confused than the government in its reactions. One might
explain this on the grounds that unlike the government, it has to contend
with day-to-day repression that renders political party-like operations
extremely difficult; and unlike popular movements that come and go, it has
an enormous stake in preserving the
durability of its cadre-based,
historically rooted organisation. Hence, it is torn between becoming more
cautious and calculating, or alternatively, more bold in its challenges to
government. The drumbeat of postings on Islamist blogs and of newspaper
articles on the travails of the MB and its offshoot organisations indicates the
intensity of the pressure.
13
The outcome of partial elections within the MB
guidance council in the spring of 2008, for example, was interpreted as
signalling a retreat from
political engagement into dawah, or
proselytisation, as a result of the regime’s crackdown. Similarly, tensions
within the Jordanian MB were seen as causing a split between the political
arm, the IAF, and the MB mother organisation, resulting in the election of a
new and more radical supreme guide, Hammam Sa’id.
14
12
See for example K. Al-Anani, “The Muslim Brotherhood’s Internal Elections”,
Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 17 June 2008 (retrieved from
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0603_muslim_brotherhood_alanani.a
spx?p=1
).
13
For extensive reporting on these blogs and articles that
discuss the challenges
faced by MB organisations, see Marc Lynch’s website, Abu Aardvark
(abuaadvark@gmail.com).
14
M. Lynch, “Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood in Tough Times”, Abu Aardvark
(retrieved from
bounce-2637450@emailenfuego.net
or see also the article at
http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/abuaardvark/2008/06/jordans-muslim.html);
I
S THE
EU
CONTRIBUTING TO RE
-
RADICALISATION
?
|
11
The apparent obstinacy of MB old guards in Egypt and elsewhere in
the face of internal challenges and growing radicalism may suggest they
are out of touch, that this kind of Islamist organisation is becoming passé.
The MB ‘firewall’, to use Marc Lynch’s term, may be crumbling, and
allowing elements that are more radical back into Islamist and broader
Arab politics.
15
Since the apparent failure of the established leaderships of
these venerable Islamist organisations to adjust to new conditions seems so
manifest, it raises the question of why this is so. Is it just because they are
old, un-
or anti-democratic by instinct, tradition and practice, and fearful of
all challengers, especially youthful ones, out of petty, selfish motives? Or
do they have an alternative vision, one that gives little weight to electoral
politics and democracy more generally, but has seen it useful to play the
quasi-democratic political game while in reality nurturing
hopes of a rise to
power through undemocratic means?
At the very least, it would not be surprising if the old guard
leadership were at best conditional, qualified democrats. The MB is rooted
in the crossing of Egyptian Sufism with 1920s and 1930s fascist-style
political organisation, as Brynjar Lia’s fine study of it so convincingly
demonstrates.
16
It has not only persisted in the face of repeated campaigns
of extermination dating back to the monarchy, but has also survived for
generations in Egypt and elsewhere as the
largest non-governmental
political organisation in the respective country. Most importantly, it has
never enjoyed the luxury of operating in fully democratic systems. Its
success has been owing to the interrelationship of its organisational
coherence and capacity, its mass appeal and the political manoeuvring of
its leadership. Precisely because of its comparative political weight, it has
periodically been of substantial value to leaders in search of publics,
including in Egypt Kings Fuad and Farouk, Abdel Nasser before 1954 and
Sadat almost to the end of his life. It remains
of value even to President
Hosni Mubarak at present, who needs it to justify his authoritarianism, to
and I. Gharaibeh, “Jordan: Rifts in the Muslim Brotherhood”,
Arab Reform Bulletin,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., June 2008.
15
He has discussed this possibility extensively in his blog. See for example,
“Assessing the MB Firewall”, Abu Aardvark, 13 May 2008 (retrieved from
bounce-
2637450@emailenfuego.net
on behalf of Abu Aardvark or see also
http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/abuaardvark/2008/05/assessing-the-m.html
).
16
B. Lia,
The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, London: Ithaca Press, 1996.