Lib/Con writeup

Frequency data:
The frequency or prevalence of traits in the present study can be explored in terms of the number of persons with mean item scores of 3.5 or higher on the scales, indicating greater than neutral endorsement of the items that measure the trait. 24 percent of this sample endorsed conservatism. 46% endorsed liberalism. 54% endorsed green politics, while 50% endorsed independent politics. Each of these political orientations is a separate item, so a person can endorse each of them independently of the others.
The percentage of person with mean item scores of 3.5 or higher on sum scores for each of the three facets of each division, conservative and liberal, are presented in Table 7. These percentages are generally similar to data obtained by the principle investigator in prior studies for variables previously used, such as religious beliefs, foreign policy attitudes and environment attitudes. For example, in prior studies 6% typically have endorsed religious fundamentalism and 89% have endorsed kindly religious beliefs. In the present study the figures are 3.6% and 71%
There were some exceptions. For example, in government type preferences, in prior studies as many as 20% have endorsed government serving citizens as members of special interest groups and 90% as members of the community overall. For the present measures and sample of students the corresponding figures are 0% and 79% (division 5).
Table 7. Percentages of persons falling in various political topic categories.

Division or topic.	Traits a + b + c (Conservative). Percent with mean item score of 3.5 or higher	Traits d + e + f (Liberal). Percent with mean item score of 3.5 or higher
1. Religious beliefs.	3.60%	71%
2. Belongingness.	0%	79%
3. Gender attitudes.	0%	86%
4. Foreign policy (militarism/peace).	0%	76%
5. Government type preferences.	0%	79%
6. Economics.	1.7%	79%
7. Civilian violence management.	1.9%	83%
8. Social group relationships.	1.9%	91%
9. Locus of authority.	0%	79%
10. Environment philosophy.	2%	80%
11. Miscellaneous content.	0%	78%
12. Tribal attitudes	12%	71%
Mean	1.925%	79%

The implication of these percentages is not clear to the present investigators. In prior studies by the principle investigator the ratio of similar traits tended to be in the order of 13 to 1 in favor of the "pro-social" traits. In the present data the ratio is 41 to 1. Larger and more diverse samples may yield different ratios in the future.

Summary and discussion.
The overall implication of the data presented herein is that the conservative and liberal political worldviews are indeed multifaceted to a very rich degree, consistent with the data and theory cited by Jost et all that political attitudes permeate a wide range of human attitudes, from religious beliefs to attitudes about war and peace, and about economics, social group relations, and even music and vehicle type preferences.
To reiterate an earlier point, full appreciation of the richness and scope of this diversity is probably best gained by examining the content of research instruments used to measure it, such as the 800 questionnaire items that make up the scales in the present study.
The present data is compatible with the theory that conservative and liberal worldviews are rooted in evolutionary functions responsible for survival of the species. If they are so-rooted in evolutionary functions, several implications follow. One is that we would expect some persons in any group of humans, even in small tribes or perhaps families to represent the conservative worldview and some to represent the liberal worldview. This would equip each clan or group to meet either threats or opportunities, as current circumstances demand for survival. In informal inquiries to friends, the present author has learned that frequently even within a given family there is significant diversity of liberal and conservative worldviews. A more formal study would be interesting.
Another implication of the evolutionary theory is that we would expect liberals to side with conservatives in time of desperation requiring war, putting all “niceties” aside to maintain the life-and-death philosophy required of victory in war. We might expect conservatives to be slightly paranoid, even in times of peace, like “lookouts”. Hopefully, at least in modern times, conservatives can be persuaded to limit their penchant for militarism enough to minimize unnecessary warmongering and to limit military spending to promote balanced national budgets.
Education correlates positively with many liberal traits but negatively with conservative ones. This may reflect that conservatives are not as open or interested in learning or science. It suggests that conservatives may not be willing to change their worldviews and that liberals are willing to learn more in support of their current worldviews. It does not strongly suggest that conservatives can be “converted” to liberal views. The challenge may be for society to understand the nature of liberalism and conservatism in detail and use this understanding to manage political groups more adroitly. Certainly adroit management will be required if we are to prevent overpopulation and over use of resources, jeopardizing the survivability of the planet.
How can conservatives be reassured that disease and death can be managed without militarism, prejudice and fearfulness? How can liberals be convinced that providing food, medical aid and disease control to developing nations must be connected to population control programs to prevent overpopulation? How can both groups be convinced of the importance of replacing fossil fuel use with non-polluting fuels, and quickly enough to protect ice caps, glaciers and low-lying nations from destruction? Solutions to these problems will require the utmost cooperation between liberals and conservatives, not competition and obstruction.
It is hoped that the 60 plus scales developed for this study will be useful to other researchers. They will be put in a manual and loaded on the author's web site for this purpose.
It is hoped also that interested parties will want to replicate this study, as by arranging with the author to have groups of students or other adults complete the four questionnaires online. The data files for such studies can then be sent to the interested researchers for their independent analysis.
It is also hoped that a much larger and more diverse and random sample of persons can somehow be acquired, to double-check the present findings. Interested parties are again invited to contact the author to this end.
Study caveats:
The present sample is relatively small and not representative of the national population, so conclusions cannot yet be generalized with confidence to larger populations until larger and more diverse and representative samples are obtained.
The present authors are not aware of biases that might have deliberately influenced their work, but biases may by definition operate subconsciously, and thus be inaccessible to introspective detection. Scales written with other content may yield different frequencies, perhaps. The principal author tried to be true to traits of a full range of political discourse and measure them with enough items to provide reliable measures. Other investigators may develop other traits or measures that will yield different frequencies and perhaps different correlations with liberal and conservative dispositions.
Conservative readers of the present findings may find them threatening. It is hoped that they will respond by replicating the study rather than simply arguing away its findings. Replication can easily be arranged with the author, to provide access to any group that wants to complete questionnaires conscientiously.

References:

Altemeyer, B., & Hunsberger, B. (1992). Authoritarianism, religious fundamentalism, and prejudice. International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 2, 113B133.
Eidelson, R. J., & Eidelson, J. I. (2003). Dangerous ideas: Five beliefs that propel groups toward conflict. American Psychologist, 58, 182–192.
Jost, J. (2006). The End of the End of Idelogy. American Psychologist, October, Vol. 61, No. 7, 651-670.
Jost, J, Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A, & Sulloway, F. (2003), Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition, Psych. Bulletin, Vol. 129, No. 3, p 339-75.
Jost, J, Nosek, B, & Gosling, S. (2008), Ideology: Its Resurgence in Social, Personality, and Political Psychology. Perspectives on Psychological Science, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp 126- 136.
McConochie, W. (2007), A Comprehensive Measure of Warmongering as a multifaceted but primarily unitary psychological trait; Response sets as a concern in questionnaire construction, Publication #11, Politicalpsychologyresearch.com.
McConochie, W., (2008a) Research Report # 5, Sixteen Variable Study: Antisocial Traits, Religioius Beliefs and Desired Government Features. Politicalpsychologyresearch.com, Publications Page.
McConochie,W. (2008b). Five Horsemen of the Apocalypse: An Evolutionary Species Survival Theory of War and Peace. Politicalpsychologyresearch.com.
McConochie, W. (2008c). Political Psychology Research Instrument Manual, Publication # 4, Authoritarianism Endorsement Scale, Manual, Publication # 8. Politicalpsychologyresearch.com
Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., Stallworth, L. M., & Malle, B. F. (1994). Social Dominance Orientation: A personality variable predicting social and political attitudes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 741-763.

Saucier, G. & Skrzypinska, K., Spiritual But Not Religious? (2006), Evidence for Two Independent Dispositions, Journal of Personality, 74:5, October.

Saucier, G. (2000). Isms and the structure of social attitudes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78, 366B385.

Thornhill, R., Fincher, C., Aran, D., (2009).  Parasites, democratization and the liberalization of values across contemporary countries. Biological Reviews, 84, 113-131.

Copyright 2010 William A. McConochie