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4 □ 10,000 B.C.: THE GEOLOGY OF MORALS
Every stratum is a judgment of God; not only do plants and animals,
orchids and wasps, sing or express themselves, but so do rocks and even riv-
ers, every stratified thing on earth. The first articulation concerns content,
the second expression. The distinction between the two articulations is not
between forms and substances but between content and expression,
expression having just as much substance as content and content just as
much form as expression. The double articulation sometimes coincides
with the molecular and the molar, and sometimes not; this is because con-
tent and expression are sometimes divided along those lines and some-
times along different lines. There is never correspondence or conformity
between content and expression, only isomorphism with reciprocal pre-
supposition. The distinction between content and expression is always
real, in various ways, but it cannot be said that the terms preexist their dou-
ble articulation. It is the double articulation that distributes them accord-
ing to the line it draws in each stratum; it is what constitutes their real
distinction. (On the other hand, there is no real distinction between form
and substance, only a mental or modal distinction: since substances are
nothing other than formed matters, formless substances are inconceivable,
although it is possible in certain instances to conceive of substanceless
forms.)
Even though there is a real distinction between them, content and
expression are relative terms ("first" and "second" articulation should also
be understood in an entirely relative fashion). Even though it is capable of
invariance, expression is just as much a variable as content. Content and
expression are two variables of a function of stratification. They not only
vary from one stratum to another, but intermingle, and within the same
stratum multiply and divide ad infinitum. Since every articulation is dou-
ble, there is not an articulation of content and an articulation of
expression—the articulation of content is double in its own right and con-
stitutes a relative expression within content; the articulation of expression
is also double and constitutes a relative content within expression. For this
reason, there exist intermediate states between content and expression,
expression and content: the levels, equilibriums, and exchanges through
which a stratified system passes. In short, we find forms and substances of
content that play the role of expression in relation to other forms and sub-
stances, and conversely for expression. These new distinctions do not,
therefore, coincide with the distinction between forms and substances
within each articulation; instead, they show that each articulation is
already, or still, double. This can be seen on the organic stratum: proteins
of content have two forms, one of which (the infolded fiber) plays the role
of functional expression in relation to the other. The same goes for the
nucleic acids of expression: double articulations cause certain formal and
10,000 B.C.: THE GEOLOGY OF MORALS □ 45
substantial elements to play the role of content in relation to others; not
only does the half of the chain that is reproduced become a content, but the
reconstituted chain itself becomes a content in relation to the "messenger."
There are double pincers everywhere on a stratum; everywhere and in all
directions there are double binds and lobsters, a multiplicity of double
articulations affecting both expression and content. Through all of this,
Hjelmslev's warning should not be forgotten: "The terms expression plane
and content plane ... are chosen in conformity with established notions
and are quite arbitrary. Their functional definition provides no justifica-
tion for calling one, and not the other, of these entities expression, or one,
and not the other, content. They are defined only by their mutual solidarity,
and neither of them can be identified otherwise. They are defined only
oppositively and relatively, as mutually opposed functives of one and the
same function."
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We must combine all the resources of real distinction,
reciprocal presupposition, and general relativism.
The question we must ask is what on a given stratum varies and what
does not. What accounts for the unity and diversity of a stratum? Matter,
the pure matter of the plane of consistency (or inconsistency) lies outside
the strata. The molecular materials borrowed from the substrata may be
the same throughout a stratum, but that does not mean that the molecules
will be the same. The substantial elements may be the same throughout the
stratum without the substances being the same. The formal relations or
bonds may be the same without the forms being the same. In biochemistry,
there is a unity of composition of the organic stratum defined at the level of
materials and energy, substantial elements or radicals, bonds and reac-
tions. But there is a variety of different molecules, substances, and forms.
Should we not sing the praise of Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire? For in the nine-
teenth century he developed a grandiose conception of stratification. He
said that matter, considered from the standpoint of its greatest divisibility,
consists in particles of decreasing size, flows or elastic fluids that "deploy
themselves" by radiating through space. Combustion is the process of this
escape or infinite division on the plane of consistency. Electrification is the
opposite process, constitutive of strata; it is the process whereby similar
particles group together to form atoms and molecules, similar molecules to
form bigger molecules, and the biggest molecules to form molar aggregates:
"the attraction of like by like," as in a double pincer or double articulation.
Thus there is no vital matter specific to the organic stratum, matter is the
same on all the strata. But the organic stratum does have a specific unity of
composition, a single abstract Animal, a single machine embedded in the
stratum, and presents everywhere the same molecular materials, the same
elements or anatomical components of organs, the same formal connec-