64 □ 10,000 B.C.: THE GEOLOGY OF MORALS
What precisely is the relation now between content and expression, and
what type of distinction is there between them? It's all in the head. Yet
never was a distinction more real. What we are trying to say is that there is
indeed one exterior milieu for the entire stratum, permeating the entire
stratum: the cerebral-nervous milieu. It comes from the organic substra-
tum, but of course that substratum does not merely play the role of a sub-
stratum or passive support. It is no less complex in organization. Rather, it
constitutes the prehuman soup immersing us. Our hands and faces are
immersed in it. The brain is a population, a set of tribes tending toward two
poles. In Leroi-Gourhan's analyses of the constitution of these two poles in
the soup—one of which depends on the actions of the face, the other on the
hand—their correlation or relativity does not preclude a real distinction
between them; quite the contrary, it entails one, as the reciprocal presuppo-
sition of two articulations, the manual articulation of content and the
facial articulation of expression. And the distinction is not simply real, as
between molecules, things, or subjects; it has become essential (as they
used to say in the Middle Ages), as between attributes, genres of being, or
irreducible categories: things and words. Yet we find that the most general
of movements, the one by which each of the distinct articulations is already
double in its own right, carries over onto this level; certain formal elements
of content play the role of expression in relation to content proper, and cer-
tain formal elements of expression play the role of content in relation to
expression proper. In the first case, Leroi-Gourhan shows how the hand
creates a whole world of symbols, a whole pluridimensional language, not
to be confused with unilinear verbal language, which constitutes a radiat-
ing expression specific to content (he sees this as the origin of writing).
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The second case is clearly displayed in the double articulation specific to
language itself, since phonemes form a radiating content specific to the
expression of monemes as linear significant segments (it is only under
these conditions that double articulation as a general characteristic of
strata has the linguistic meaning Martinet attributes to it). Our discussion
of the relations between content and expression, the real distinction
between them, and the variations of those relations and that distinction on
the major types of strata, is now provisionally complete.
Challenger wanted to go faster and faster. No one was left, but he went on
anyway. The change in his voice, and in his appearance, was growing more
and more pronounced. Something animalistic in him had begun to speak
when he started talking about human beings. You still couldn't put your
finger on it, but Challenger seemed to be deterritorializing on the spot. He
still had three problems he wanted to discuss. The first seemed primarily
terminological: Under what circumstances may we speak of signs? Should
we say they are everywhere on all the strata and that there is a sign when-
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0,000 B.C.: THE GEOLOGY OF MORALS D 65
ever there is a form of expression? We may summarily distinguish three
kinds of signs:
indexes (territorial signs), symbols (deterritorialized signs),
and icons (signs of reterritorialization). Should we say that there are signs
on all the strata, under the pretext that every stratum includes territoriali-
ties and movements of deterritorialization and reterritorialization? This
kind of expansive method is very dangerous, because it lays the ground-
work for or reinforces the imperialism of language, if only by relying on its
function as universal translator or interpreter. It is obvious that there is no
system of signs common to all strata, not even in the form of a semiotic
"chora" theoretically prior to symbolization.
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It would appear that we
may accurately speak of signs only when there is a distinction between
forms of expression and forms of content that is not only real but also cate-
gorical. Under these conditions, there is a semiotic system on the corre-
sponding stratum because the abstract machine has precisely that fully
erect posture that permits it to "write," in other words, to treat language
and extract a regime of signs from it. But before it reaches that point, in
so-called natural codings, the abstract machine remains enveloped in the
strata: It does not write in any way and has no margin of latitude allowing it
to recognize something as a sign (except in the strictly territorial sense of
animal signs). After that point, the abstract machine develops on the plane
of consistency and no longer has any way of making a categorical distinc-
tion between signs and particles; for example, it writes, but flush with the
real, it inscribes directly upon the plane of consistency. It therefore seems
reasonable to reserve the word "sign" in the strict sense for the last group of
strata. This terminological discussion would be entirely without interest if
it did not bring us to yet another danger: not the imperialism of language
affecting all of the strata, but the imperialism of the signifier affecting lan-
guage itself, affecting all regimes of signs and the entire expanse of the
strata upon which they are located. The question here is not whether there
are signs on every stratum but whether all signs are signifiers, whether all
signs are endowed with signifiance, whether the semiotic of signs is neces-
sarily linked to a semiology of the signifier. Those who take this route may
even be led to forgo the notion of the sign, for the primacy of the signifier
over language guarantees the primacy of language over all of the strata even
more effectively than the simple expansion of the sign in all directions.
What we are saying is that the illusion specific to this posture of the abstract
Machine, the illusion that one can grasp and shuffle all the strata between
one's pincers, can be better secured through the erection of the signifier
than through the extension of the sign (thanks to signifiance, language can
claim to be in direct contact with the strata without having to go through
the supposed signs on each one). But we're still going in the same circle,
we're still spreading the same canker.