246
republic. In connection with this Dudayev issued an ultimatum demanding that the
Russian troops be withdrawn beyond the borders of the Chechen Republic.
590
The possibility of the diffusion of the armed clashes to the entire North
Caucasus made the atmosphere more delicate and the Confederation quickly
intervened. Musa Shanibov tried to appease the situation by saying panic caused by
the introduction of Russian troops in Ingushetia was needless, and evaluated the
situation which has come about “resulted from the fact that Ingush leaders, laying
claims to a part of Chechen territory, gave wrong information to Russian military
on the border between Chechnya and Ingushetia”.
591
As a result, Russian troops,
which were “misled”, occupied some settlements of Chechnya. However, yet, as a
security move, the chairman of the Confederation ordered the partial mobilization
of the entire territory of the CCP.
592
Within the same day, on 10 November 1992,
the representatives of the Chechen government and the Ingush side signed a
protocol in Nazran. According to the protocol, until the formation of power
structures in the Ingush Republic, the border between the two republics was
recognized as being the line separating them up to their union in one autonomous
entity in the year 1934. On the basis of this agreement, the Russian tanks started to
leave the disputed regions on 11 November.
593
590
“Russian troops enter Ingushetia; Dudayev demands they withdraw from Chechnia,” SWB
SU/1536 B/1-2, 12 November 1992.
591
In fact there is no clear border between Chechnia and Ingushetia exists. Russian troops were
occupied Sunzhenskiy and a part of Malgobekskiy rayons and Chechens stated that those regions
have never been a part of Ingushetia, and they have always belonged to Chechnia.
592
“Head of Confederation of Mountain Peoples accuses Ingush of misinforming Russia,” SWB
SU/1537, B/4, 13 November 1992.
593
“Gaydar in Nazran: Russian troops to withdraw from border area,” SWB SU/1537 B/2-3, 13
November 1992. On 16 November, Russia and Chechen republic were reached an agreement on
troop withdrawals with the participation of Yusup Soslambekov, see “Chechnia and Russia reach
agreement on withdrawing troops,” SWB SU/1540 B/1, 17 November 1992 and “Agreement reached
between Russia and Chechia on troop withdrawals,” SWB SU/1541 i, 18 November 1992.
247
The agreement and the restraint of Russia and Chechen republic in the
Ingush-Osetian conflict took positive reactions from the Confederation’s side.
Musa Shanibov commented on that and declared that “it may be that this is the first
step towards changing Russian policy in the Caucasus”.
594
After failing to stop the Ingush side and to impede the entrance of Russian
forces into the region, which were invited by North Osetia, the Confederation’s
attitude toward the Ingush became of particular importance. Indeed, there already
was a deterioration of relations between the two.
595
Confederation assessed the
introduction of the Russian troops in North Caucasus, specifically Ingushetia, as a
result of the wrong actions of the Ingush leaders. A member of the parliament of
the CCP told that:
“the next session of the parliament would discuss the possibility of
expelling Ingushetia because it had concealed its preparations for an armed
attack on North Osetia. It’s now clear why there is not a single Ingush in the
confederation volunteer units in Abkhazia”.
596
In addition to that, Haji Murat Ibrahimbeyli, Chairman of the Committee on
Interethnic Accord of the CCP evaluated the Ingush demands for the return of
Prigorodnyi rayon as the just demands. However, he added that, the Ingush leaders
were to be blamed for:
“expressing these demands in a frankly rude manner, whipping up hysteria
at mass meetings in the months proceeding the catastrophe, and initiating
the formation of forward-based armed detachments in the territory of the
Prigorodnyi Raion.”
597
594
“Shanibov welcomes restraint of Russia and Chechnia,” SWB SU/1547 B/6, 25 November 1992
595
Oğuz, “the Unity,” 136-7.
596
“Confederation of Peoples of the Caucasus to consider expelling Ingushetia,” SWB SU/1540, B/3
17 November 1992.
597
Zverev, “Ethnic Conflicts,” 60.
248
The North Osetian side has also reacted negatively towards the
Confederation, as opposed to the positive attitudes during the South Osetian-
Georgian discord. Akhsarbek Galazov turned down the proposal by the leaders of
the CCP to replace Russian peacekeeping force by confederation units. He said that
North Osetia was a sovereign republic within the framework of Russia (even it was
still a member of the confederation) and confederation units’ presence on its
territory would mean interference in the internal affairs of both Russia and North
Osetia, and the consequences of this action may aggravate the situation.
598
By the Russian intervention, the conflict although the lack of armed clashes,
turned into a protracted one rather than abated. Moreover, the impact of this
conflict, however, went beyond the two peoples involved. Russians, beyond the
permanent military presence, re-established total control over the North Caucasus
by controlling this central part of the region. And, in addition to the
Confederation’s failed attempt to find solutions for the conflict, the newly
established Russian organizations began to emerge and assumed the task of
facilitating a dialogue between the Ingush and Osetians.
The clash, of course, had also negative consequences for both of the Ingush
and the Osetians. For the Ingush, at the end of 1992, they were left in a far worse
position than previous one. They lost most of their substantial foothold in
Prigorodnyi, as well as many lives and livelihoods. For the Osetians, most of their
population that were living in Prigorodnyi became the victims of an uprising and
598
“North Osetian speaker dismisses Caucasian Confederation offer to send troops,” SWB SU/1553
B/9 2 December 1992.
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