240
By October 1992, the two sides were ready to clash.
The Ingush centered
their emphasis on two aspects: in the first place that the North Osetia had ignored
the law on the rehabilitation of deported peoples by their restrictions on the
registration of Ingush as permanent residents; by their bans on the buying and
selling of houses; and by their imposition of repressive states of emergency in both
Prigorodnyi and Malgobeksky
rayons. They had also another new grievance:
Osetian ignorance of the law on creation of an Ingush
republic within the Russian
Federation.
The North Osetians had their own emphasis, in direct contrast to Ingush.
They claimed that the Ingush had been stockpiling weapons in preparation for an
armed confrontations; that their sovereign territory was not merely threatened from
within by Ingush resettlers but likely to be attacked from without, i.e. from Ingush.
As tensions rose between two communities, Osetians began to flee from
Prigorodnyi to Vladikavkaz and Ingush to Ingushetia.
The scene was thus set for
tragedy.
In October the clashes erupted. On 20 October 1992, a gas pipeline passing
through the Prigorodnyi was blown up and an armoured personnel carrier of the
Osetian militia crushed 12 year-old Ingush girl. During the same period, several
Ingush were killed on the territory of North Osetia. On 23 October, crossfire
between the Ingush and Osetian militia in the village of Yuzhnyi was the beginning
of the intensive armed clashes. Then, a committee for directing the region, named
as the
Ingush Coordinating Council, formed in Prigorodnyi and decided to organize
574
Osipova, “North Osetia and Ingushetia,” 51-52.
241
self-defense units to patrol Ingush settlements on 24 October. Coordinating Council
appealed to the Caucasian peoples and to the Confederation with a request for
assistance in attaining the immediate return of Prigorodnyi rayon to Ingushetia.
575
The North Osetian leadership interpreted the creation of this body as an
encroachment on the republic’s legitimate authority and the attempts at talks
between the two sides quickly broke down and matters went from bad to worse.
On 26 October 1992, the Russian Parliament’s
leadership recommended a
mixed Osetian-Ingush committee to work out a negotiated solution to the crisis,
and Russian Supreme Soviet Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov sent a telegram to the
North Osetian authorities asking them not to use force. Similar telegrams arrived in
Vladikavkaz from all North Caucasian republics and the Confederation.
576
Talks between the Coordinating Council, representatives of the
administration from Nazran and the leadership of North Osetia did not prevent the
explosion. It was then that the conflict moved into its acute phase. After a mass
meeting
was staged in Nazran, which initiated a more or less spontaneous armed
march on the Prigorodnyi, the Ingush subsequently took control of most of the
Prigorodnyi, and marched on Vladikavkaz.
577
On 31 October 1992, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Georgi Khizha (at the
same time he was the head of the inter-regional commission of the Russian
Federation) with around 3,000 Russian special purpose troops went to Vladikavkaz
575
“Ingush leader calls for direct presidential rule,”
SWB, SU/1525 B/6, 30 October 1992.
576
“North Osetian Parliament Calls on
Ingush to Remove Road Blocks,”
SWB, SU/1527 B/1, 2
November 1992.
577
Svante E. Cornell, “Conflicts in the North Caucasus,”
Central Asian Survey, 17(3): 414-5.
242
in order to “restore law and order”.
578
A state of emergency was introduced on the
territories of the North Osetian Republic and Ingushetia and a decree was issued by
President Yeltsin to enforce the actions of the troops on 2 November.
579
More than
that, with that decree Russian government set up a special interim administration
for those districts and headquartered it in Vladikavkaz. Georgi Khizha was
appointed head of this interim administration.
580
The Russian “peace-forces” did
not stop at controlling the Prigorodnyi. Within a few days, they moved into Ingush
proper, and by 10 November they had reached the (still undemarcated)
border
between Chechnya and Ingushetia.
581
While the clashes between the component parts of the Confederation were
on going, the Confederation has also been practicing a crucial transformation
within itself. The Georgian aggression towards Abkhazia; Moscow’s move to
investigate the Confederation; and the arrest of its president caused the major
disturbances and demonstrations all around the Caucasus.
Within this atmosphere, the Confederation of
the Mountain Peoples of the
Caucasus renamed itself as the Confederation of the Caucasian Peoples (CCP)
578
“Russian Troops Attempt to Separate Warring Sides in North Osetia,”
SWB SU/1527 B/2, 2
November 1992.
579
“Yeltsin Imposes State of Emergency in crisis region,”
SWB SU/1528 B/5, 3 November 1992.
580
The interim administration was created by the edict of the president of the Russian Federation of
2
nd
November 1992, No.1327. “On introduction of a state of emergency on the territory of the North
Osetian SSR and the Ingush republic” on the basis of articles 15, 16,and 17 of the RSFSR law of 17
May 1991, “on a State of Emergency”. For the “Text of Interim Administration Statute on North
Osetia and Ingushetia,” see,
SWB SU/1542 B/1-2, 19 November 1992. Osipova, ibid., p.52. The
head of the Interim Administration had been changed several times: Sergei Shakrai (Nov.92),
Alexander Kotenkov (end of 92), Yuri Shatalin (March 93), Viktor Polyanichko (1 July), and
Vladimir Lozovoi. Then in 1995, this interim administration became the
Interim Committee for the
Elimination of the Consequences of the Oset-Ingush Conflict and in 1996 it was transformed into
the office of the Presidential Representative.
581
Cornell, “Conflicts in the North Caucasus,” 415.