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specifics. Among the decisions was a cease-fire to be effective as of 28 June; 
withdrawal of Georgian troops from around Tskhinval; the setting up of a special 
control committee; and the deployment of a peacekeeping force composed of 
Russian, Georgian and Osetian troops was set up.
561
 
The agreement that signed in Dagomys in fact did not satisfy both of the 
conflicting parties. With the words of the Uryzmag Dzhiayev, the South Osetian 
Foreign Minister, the outside powers were “married us [Georgians and Osetians] in 
our absence”. The basic reason of the Osetian uneasiness was the deployment of 
the Georgian troops in South Osetia as a peacekeeping forces. Therefore, Dzhiayev 
added that, “we are pinning our hopes on Russia, but if no effect is forthcoming on 
its part, the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus could be such a 
force”.
562
 
 
The last meeting of the Confederation related with the Osetian-Georgian 
conflict was held in Ingushetian town Jeyrakh on 29 June. At the end of the 
Parliament’s sitting, Shanibov issued a statement on the Dagomys agreement, on an 
outline peace plan for the Georgian-Osetian conflict, and on the latest events in the 
region.
563
 He expressed Confederation’s concern that the armed confrontation 
could lead to a deterioration of the situation throughout the Caucasus. And the 
                                                                                                                                        
560
 “North Osetia Blocks Passage of Caucasus detachments to South Osetia,” SWB SU/1392, B/11, 
28 May 1992. 
561
 The first units of the peacekeeping forces entered the conflict zone on 14 July 1992. Also see 
Suzanne Crow, 18 September 1992. “The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping in the former 
USSR,” RFE/RL Research Report, 1(37): 33. 
562
 “South Osetian Foreign Minister Interviewed on results of Dagomys meeting,” SWB SU/1422, 
B/9, 2 July 1992. 
563
 “Caucasus Parliament Meets to Discuss North and South Osetia,” SWB SU/1423, B/2, 3 July 
1992. 

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Confederation’s most concrete solution was deploying the Confederation’s troops 
in peacekeeping role in South Osetia. 
 
Despite the Confederation’s belief of its success, after the Dagomys 
agreement, a relatively benign atmosphere facilitated between the Osetians and 
Georgians and of corse Russians. Especially by the beginning of the Abkhaz 
conflict this process gained momentum and the links between the Osetians and the 
Confederation gradually weakened. The conflict between the Osetians and the 
Ingush then strengthened this split and from the end of 1992, “historical strains in 
the relationship between the Osetians and the peoples of the North Caucasus come 
to the fore”.
564
 In other words, by the Russian intervention to the conflict and the 
Osetian preference towards Moscow evaporated the mood of cooperation and unity 
of the period of 1989-1991. Nevertheless, the Georgians attacked to Abkhazia and 
the relatively calm situation in the South Osetia forced the Confederation to turn its 
all activities to Abkhazia. 
 
2- The Ingush-Osetian Problem:
565
 
The basic reason of the clashes between the Ingush and the Osetians, the 
only incidence of large-scale inter-communal violence within the Russian 
Federation, was the dispute over the question of who should control the 
                                                 
564
 Jonathan Aves, 1996. Georgia from Chaos to Stability? London: n.p., 35. 
565
 For the detailed account see, Olga Osipova, 1997. “North Osetia and Ingushetia: The First 
Clash,” in Alexei Arbatov and et al. Managing Conflict in the Former Soviet Union: Russian and 
American Perspectives, Cambridge: 27-82; Julian Birch, “Osetia: a Caucasian Bosnia in 
Microcosm,”  Central Asian Survey, 14(1): 52-68; and “Osetiya –land of Uncertain Frontiers and 
Manipulative Elites,” Central Asian Survey, 18(4): 512-528; Felix Corley, 1994. “The Ingush-
Osetian Conflict,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, September, 401-403.  

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Prigorodnyi rayon and the east of the Vladikavkaz in the North Osetian republic –
the Ingush or the Osetians. 
Of the two peoples, by the Caucasian standards, the ancestors of the Ingush 
certainly earlier inhabited the North Caucasus, long predating the arrival of the 
Osetians. The latter arrived in the northern part of Osetia in around the 6
th
 century 
AD. Both of these peoples also divergent from the religious side; the Ingush were 
converted to Islam in the course of the 1860s, while the Osetians, to a considerable 
extent converted to Christianity under the Russian influence, though there have 
been a significant number of Muslim Osetians. Nevertheless, despite the existence 
of the tensions, the emergence of clashes between these peoples was relatively new. 
It basically was a result of the repeated recurving of boundaries in compliance with 
the Soviet divide-and-rule policy. Beyond that, the absence of clear and effective 
political structures and the general stability caused the intensification. 
After 13 years of exile, the Ingush were rehabilitated in 1957 by the decree 
of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR after the death of Stalin and 
the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic was reinstated but the Prigorodnyi was 
not included in the restored territory. However, some returnees went back to their 
houses in Prigorodnyi only to find their lands and houses occupied by Osetians and 
others; the scenario for the future conflicts was thus prepared. A series of protests 
by the Ingush throughout 1970s and 1980s were met by the Osetians with both 
officially sponsored and unofficial countermeasures in areas such as housing 
allocation on jobs, as well as periodic curfews when small scale clashes occurred. 
When the Supreme Soviet of the SU adopted the decree “On the 
Recognition as Illegal and Criminal of All Acts Against the Peoples who have 

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