Microsoft Word mitatcelikpaladokto doc

 
 
 
264 
 
 
Interestingly, Shanibov denied the above-mentioned order of Basayev and 
said that the Confederation, its Parliament or the Presidential Council has never 
made any decision to create a Confederation force in Abkhazia. The volunteer 
activity, he said was resumed by the region’s national democratic movements 
without the participation of the Confederation, and all the volunteer detachments 
were part of the Abkhazian army. The creation of a separate force under the title of 
the Confederation was, according to Shanibov, something undertaken by the 
volunteers themselves and was a testimony that the volunteer movement was 
running out of control.
638
 
In contrast, in Shanibov’s words, the Confederation’s efforts aimed 
primarily at mobilizing the public opinion in the Russian Federation, Georgia, and 
the entire Caucasus to prevent a further deepening of the armed conflict in 
Abkhazia. Moreover, he stressed once more that “we do not control the volunteers’ 
movement, because this mechanism is acting without us.”
639
 This was the first 
concrete sign of a discord among the leaders of the Confederation. 
 
On 7-8 July, the Abkhaz forces reinforced with the North Caucasian 
volunteers attacked from the sea on Sukhum. The Russian authorities protested the 
Confederation and for the first time they declared that the cooperation between the 
Russia’s federal bodies and the Confederation was impossible. The warring parties, 
hoping to avoid further casualties and under strong pressures from Moscow agreed 
                                                 
638
 “President of Confederation of Peoples of the Caucasus on Abkhaz Conflict,” SWB SU/1740, 
B/12-13, 14 July 1993 
639
 Ibid. 

---

 
 
 
265 
 
to a new Russian mediated agreement in Sochi, on 27 July. This new agreement, 
which came into effect on 28 July 1993, like its predecessor proposed a cease-fire 
that was monitored by UN and the withdrawal of the Georgian troops and 
weaponry within 15 days and the subsequent restitution of the legitimate 
governments of Abkhazia.
640
 
The Confederation assessed the conclusion of the Agreement ‘positively’ 
and the armed formations from the North Caucasus started to withdraw from 
Abkhazia. Amin Zekhov, the chief of staff of the Confederation’s armed forces, 
said that the troops of the Confederation would leave Abkhazia according to the 
cease-fire agreement over 10 to 15 days, on condition that the Georgian side also 
withdrew its troops.
641
 
 
The Georgian side, however, did not comply with the agreement and 
Ardzinba issued a statement to the UN and other powers on 9 and 11 September 
respectively, in which he warned the dangers of the Georgian non-compliance. The 
executive committee of the Congress of the Kabardian People, replied at first and 
issued a statement calling on Georgia to fulfil the conditions of the Sochi 
Agreement and urged the North Caucasian volunteers to be ready to return to 
Abkhazia, if Georgia continued to fail to comply with its undertakings. 
 
                                                 
640
 This was the third attempt at putting an end to the fratricidal war and Vakhtang Goguadze, the 
speaker of the Georgian parliament, Sokrat Dzhindzholia, Deputy Chairman of the Abkhazian 
Supreme Soviet, and Andrey Kozyrev, Russian minister of Foreign Affairs, signed agreement. For 
the text of “An agreement on a cease-fire in Abkhazia and a mechanism to monitor its observation,” 
see SWB SU/1753, B/4-5, 29 July 1993. In addition see Pauline Overeem et al., “Report of a UNPO 
coordinated human rights mission to Abkhazia and Georgia,” Central Asian Survey, 14(1): 151-153. 

---

 
 
 
266 
 
At the end of the September, while the Zviadist forces were entering the 
town of Gali, the Abkhaz forces organized a new offensive and captured Sukhum 
on 27 September 1993 and drove the Georgian forces out of the Abkhazian proper. 
Within two weeks of the fall of Sukhum, Shevardnadze went to Moscow, 
ostensibly to attend a meeting with Yeltsin and the leadership of Azerbaijan and 
Armenia. The four leaders agreed on the need for collective action to stabilize the 
situation in the Caucasus. In his speech at this meeting, Shevardnadze declared his 
intention to join the Commenwealth of Independent States (CIS) and argued that 
Russia and the other CIS states should help the Caucasian countries to maintain 
their collective security. 
 
The Confederation took the clashes between the Abkhaz and the Georgians 
as a chance for recovering its previous prestige, which had been wounded during 
the clashes between the Osetians and the Ingush. This was the reason of 
Confederations insistence on the Abkhaz cause. To put the importance of Abkhazia 
Shanibov said that the peoples of the Caucasus and other small peoples of the 
former Soviet Union saw their destiny in the fate of Abkhaz. According to him, 
Abkhazia was an important test case for this principle. The fight of Caucasian 
peoples for the freedom of Abkhazia was actually the struggle for their own 
freedom. He believed that if the Abkhaz, with the help of volunteers from the North 
Caucasus region, could show that an attack on such a people couldn’t take place 
                                                                                                                                        
641
 “Confederation of Peoples of the Caucasus approves cease-fire,” SWB SU/1755, B/11, 31 July 
1993 and “North Caucasus volunteers reportedly begin to leave Abkhaz conflict zone,” SWB 
SU/1762, B/11, 9 August 1993. 

---