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214 
 
the Union of Cossacks of the Southern Russia, President Yeltsin signed an 
additional decree, ‘on the Reforming of Military Structures, Frontiers and Interior 
Forces on the Territory of the North Caucasian Region and State Support for the 
Cossacks’ that created Cossack units as part of the Russia Federation’s armed 
forces in the North Caucasus. 
This decree was specifically intended to address personnel shortages in the 
Russian forces of the North Caucasus Military District by taking advantage of 
Cossack desires to perform military service. 
Then, following the conclusion of the Confederation-Cossack treaty, the 
Cossack  atamans of the region were invited, and travelled to Moscow, when the 
first Congress of the CCP with the participation of the Cossacks, was supposed to 
be convened. Later, the Cossack groups complained about the lack of coordination 
with the Confederation’s leaders on pre-congress materials. In addition, the 
Cossacks began to recall the problems with the Russian speaking population in the 
North Caucasus. 
Thus the agreement signed by the parties had almost no serious positive 
political consequences for either party or for the region. This brought the Cossacks 
and the Russians closer together and resulted in a split within the Confederation. 
The promising relations between the Cossacks and the Confederation during the 
conflict in Abkhazia began to deteriorate. 
 
                                                                                                                                        
532
 “Agreement signed between Cossacks and CPC,” SWB SU/1676, B/3, 30 April 1993. 

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215 
 
8- Increasing Russian Activity: 
By May 1993, high-ranking Russian officials started to visit the region and 
Moscow introduced new administrative structure. The North Caucasian Military 
District was transformed into a border-adjacent military district.
533
 By so doing 
Moscow aimed to significantly increasing their military potential in the Region, 
settling troops withdrawn from Germany, the Baltic countries and the 
Transcaucasus there.
534
 Then, in mid May, Russian Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin 
and Russian Procurator General Valentin Stepankov, in order to attend the meeting 
of the North Caucasian Coordination Council in Nalchik, came to the region. In 
this meeting, Moscow’s anti-Confederation attitude became clearer. Abdulatipov 
said that he was afraid of the Confederation’s “possible plot against Russian 
interests”. In addition, Stepankov noted that his Office had prevented 
“confederation attempts to become a parallel state power” and expressed concern 
over confederation armed units participating in combat operations in Abkhazia.
535
 
Meanwhile, in June and July, the clashes in Abkhazia re-intensified and the 
rapprochement between Moscow and Tiflis gained momentum. The Confederation 
became one of the most important common subjects of this new system of 
relations. 
 
                                                 
533
 The North Caucasian Military District, the first one on the territory of the Russian Federation 
was set up on 9 January 1993 by Yeltsin’s decree. And then, four days later on 13 January, the 
Russian Security Council discussed the socio-political situation of the region and defined it within 
the sphere of Russia’s vital interests. 
534
 “New status for North Caucasus Military District,”SWB SU/1687, C3/4, 13 May 1993. 
535
 “Stepankov and Abdulatipov on government delegation trip to North Caucasus,” SWB SU/1691, 
B/11, 18 May 1993. 

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216 
 
In this period, especially during the second half of 1992 and the early 
months of 1993, Georgians intended to control the ethnic groups within Georgia 
and Shevardnadze was trying to strengthen his post. 
Throughout late 1992, Shevardnadze tried to get the Russian authorities to 
act against the Confederation. Georgian authorities accused Russia of failing to 
stop the activities of the Confederation. In his critiques, Shevardnadze always 
stated that if resolute measures were not taken, the anti-Georgian decisions and 
activities of the Confederation may involve other countries, especially Russia, and 
the events in Abkhazia may grow from local conflicts into a global 
confrontation.
536
 
He analysed the Confederation and described the its actions as 
“international terrorism reeking of fascism.” In addition, the Georgian authorities 
had always described Confederation volunteers from the North Caucasus as 
‘mercenaries’. 
 
In a Conference of the leaders of the administrative bodies and heads of the 
executive powers of the North Caucasus and southern Russia in Sochi on 13 July 
1993, regional security and conflicts were discussed. The most important names 
related with the Caucasus also took part: Andrey Kozyrev, the Russian Foreign 
Minister; Sergey Shakhray, Deputy Premier; Ramazan Abdulatipov, Deputy 
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet; Viktor Barannikov, the Security Minister; and 
Boris Pastukhov, the Russian President’s special representative for the settlement 
of the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict. 

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217 
 
At the end of the congress, the participants for the first time declared that 
they almost unanimously agreed that cooperation between Russian Federal bodies 
and the Confederation was impossible.
537
 
Under these circumstances, the Georgian authorities ‘earnestly requested’ 
that the Procurator General of the Russian Federation should consider the issue of 
the lawfulness of the activities of the Confederation with reference to its 
interference in the internal affairs of Georgia. The increasing role of the Chechens 
in the Confederation during this period did not benefit the Confederation. As a 
result of Georgian pressure the Russian authorities restarted discussions on the 
status of the Confederation. 
The most striking accusation of the Russian authorities was that the 
Confederation was not registered with the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Justice. 
In fact, the leaders of the Confederation had already put this issue on its agenda 
during the its parliamentary sitting on 26 November 1993 in Grozny. After bitter 
discussions they concluded that it was impossible, either for political or 
psychological reasons. This would result in, according to the leaders of the 
Confederation, the isolation of the Abkhazian from all the other peoples of the 
North Caucasus.
538
 Soslambekov said; 
“I personally am against it. Russia in my opinion should recognize the KNK 
[Confederation] a union of peoples of North Caucasus. After this, like 
Palestine for example, we could have our representative at the United 
Nations. …Russia must determine what is more important to it –the 
                                                                                                                                        
536
 “Sate Council Announces Local Mobilization,” SWB SU/1468, C1/1, 25 August 1992. 
537
 “Conference discusses problems in Southern Russia and Northern Caucasus,” SWB SU/1741, 
B/1, 15 July 1993. 
538
 “Situation in Chechnya updated,” FBIS-USR-93-151, p.46, 1 December 1993. 

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