M. Friedman
269
this issue or of the evidence that has led to the revision of the hypothesis. I
shall be able only to skim the surface in the hope of conveying the flavor of
that work and that evidence and of indicating the major items requiring further
investigation.
Professional controversy about the relation between inflation and unem-
ployment has been intertwined with controversy about the relative role of
monetary, fiscal, and other factors in influencing aggregate demand. One issue
deals with how a change in aggregate nominal demand, however produced,
works itself out through changes in employment and price levels; the other,
with the factors accounting for the changes in aggregate nominal demand.
The two issues are closely related. The effects of a change in aggregate
nominal demand on employment and price levels may not be independent of
the source of the change, and conversely the effect of monetary, fiscal, or other
forces on aggregate nominal demand may depend on how employment and
price levels react. A full analysis will clearly have to treat the two issues jointly.
Yet there is a considerable measure of independence between them. To a
first approximation, the effects on employment and price levels may depend
only on the magnitude of the change in aggregate nominal demand, not on its
source. On both issues, professional opinion today is very different than it was
just after World War II because experience contradicted tentatively accepted
hypotheses. Either issue could therefore serve to illustrate my main thesis.
I have chosen to deal with only one in order to keep this lecture within
reasonable bounds. I have chosen to make that one the relation between infla-
tion and unemployment, because recent experience leaves me less satisfied
with the adequacy of my earlier work on that issue than with the adequacy
of my earlier work on the forces producing changes in aggregate nominal
demand.
2. STAGE 1: NEGATIVELY SLOPING PHILLIPS CURVE
Professional analysis of the relation between inflation and unemployment has
gone through two stages since the end of World War II and is now entering a
third. The first stage was the acceptance of a hypothesis associated with the
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name of A. W. Phillips that there is a stable negative relation between the
level of unemployment and the rate of change of wages - high levels of un-
employment being accompanied by falling wages, low levels of unemployment
by rising wages (24). The wage change in turn was linked to price change by
allowing for the secular increase in productivity and treating the excess of
price over wage cost as given by a roughly constant mark-up factor.
Figure 1 illustrates this hypothesis, where I have followed the standard
practice of relating unemployment directly to price change, short-circuiting
the intermediate step through wages.
This relation was widely interpreted as a causal relation that offered a
stable trade-off to policy makers. They could choose a low unemployment
target, such as U
L
. In that case they would have to accept an inflation rate of A.
There would remain the problem of choosing the measures (monetary, fiscal,
perhaps other) that would produce the level of aggregate nominal demand
required to achieve U
L
, but if that were done, there need be no concern about
maintaining that combination of unemployment and inflation. Alternatively,
the policy makers could choose a low inflation rate or even deflation as their
target. In that case they would have to reconcile themselves to higher unem-
ployment: U
o
for zero inflation, U
H
for deflation.
Economists then busied themselves with trying to extract the relation
depicted in Figure 1 from evidence for different countries and periods, to
eliminate the effect of extraneous disturbances, to clarify the relation between
wage change and price change, and so on. In addition, they explored social
gains and losses from inflation on the one hand and unemployment on the
other, in order to facilitate the choice of the “right” trade-off.
Unfortunately for this hypothesis, additional evidence failed to conform
with it. Empirical estimates of the Phillips curve relation were unsatisfactory.
More important, the inflation rate that appeared to be consistent with a speci-
fied level of unemployment did not remain fixed: in the circumstances of the
post-World War II period, when governments everywhere were seeking to
promote “full employment”, it tended in any one country to rise over time
and to vary sharply among countries. Looked at the other way, rates of
inflation that had earlier been associated with low levels of unemployment were
experienced along with high levels of unemployment. The phenomenon of
simultaneous high inflation and high unemployment increasingly forced itself
on public and professional notice, receiving the unlovely label of “stagflation”.
Some of us were sceptical from the outset about the validity of a stable
Phillips curve, primarily on theoretical rather than empirical grounds [(2),
(3), (4)]. What mattered for employment, we argued, was not wages in dollars
or pounds or kronor but real wages - what the wages would buy in goods and
services. Low unemployment would, indeed, mean pressure for a higher real
wage - but real wages could be higher even if nominal wages were lower,
provided that prices were still lower. Similarly, high unemployment would,
indeed, mean pressure for a lower real wage - but real wages could be lower,
even if nominal wages were higher, provided prices were still higher.
There is no need to assume a stable Phillips curve in order to explain the