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science-in particular, those relating to various frustrations in scientific activity.
Also quite rightly, the authors talk about the "organismic" aspects of the dialectics
of nature and society, when in footnote 44 they note that
«
the dialectics discussed here between nature and society are in no way
equivalent to the dialectics of nature as it was developed by Engels and later Marxism.
The first emphasizes the specifically human nature of the relationship of man to his own
body. The second, on the contrary, projects specifically human phenomena onto a
nonhuman nature, and then seeks to dehumanize a person, looking at it only as an object
of natural forces or laws of nature»
.
Briefly summarizing the above extensive preamble, it should be said that, upon
acquaintance with the full cycle of "Shanin" lectures, it seems that the orthodox
or classical view of the economy or economic model criticized by Grigoriev is
closely related to the classical notion of a scientific model in general, if not based
on it (which is correlated with the second point of the concept of science in the
sense of neoconomics, see above). What is meant?
The expression M =
used in the apparatus of modern symbolic logic means
that the structure of the model M given in the parentheses suggests the existence
of only one universe of objects, on which only one function of interpreting these
objects is assigned, which puts one of them into correspondence with the others.
Operating exclusively on the level of the notion of a model structure, one can
assume that in such a classical view of it the concept of a single reproduction
circuit can be interpreted very well, and the balance or equilibrium is interpreted
in it in the notion of the consistency and completeness of the very logical model
of this contour. If we follow this assumption further, we get that the interaction
of the two reproductive circuits is the ratio of the models M
1
=1
,I
1
> and
M
2
=2
,I
2
>, and the relations in the set of reproduction loops within one national
economy are expressible as relations in the set of models Г
m
. Why all these
symbolic exercises?
The fact is that when there is a confusion of contours due to interaction by means
of external money, then it becomes unclear about what kind of logical structure
should have itself. First, the desire that arises here is to start portraying semantic
monsters
like
this:
M
1+2
=1
,I
1
,U
2
,I
2
>;
this:
M
1+2
=1
,U
2
,I
1
,I
2
>;
this:
M
1+2
=1
,U
2
,I
1
>; this: M
1+2
=1+2
,I
1
,I
2
>; or this: M
1+2
=1+2
,I
1
>. Of course, they can
be a visual symbolic record of the states of monetary interaction of reproductive
142
circuits, and being taken in the presented sequence – perhaps even the
process of
such interaction. But how to build the model itself with such structures, will it be
anything substantial at all? Such monsters came to me in 1999 when I was
working on a diploma, when I tried to express the conflict of interpretations and
other communicative situations through the structure of a logical model.
Of course, all these delights then caused objections from the representatives of
the science of logic, with whom I consulted on this matter. But, anyway, it is
necessary to recognize that the same conflict of interpretations can be expressed
by the structure
1
,I
2
>, but mixing of reproductive circuits, if the assumption of
the possibility of a logical interpretation of a single contour through the classical
structure (U, I) (for which I do not see any obstacles) is true-a record like
1
,U
2
,I>
(the brackets "<>" themselves can be interpreted as a cortege of the established
unified social order in the oecumene, and U
1
и U
2
– as, for example, incompatible
subject-technological sets of various contours, calculated on various systems of
division of labor). The emergence of semantic monsters was made possible by the
basic thesis of my diploma, which was that almost all the tradition of the science
of logic that has been going on since Aristotle's time was a tradition of the logic of
a monologue, but not a dialogue, almost to the very Austin with his " verbal acts
"(a strict and sane calculation of which has not yet been built). And that even the
dialogues of Plato represent a very reduced structure of question-answer
relations. As part of my clarification, the words of JR Collingwood sounded
eloquent, arguing that his contemporary academic logic was the logic of answers,
but not the logic of questions, that is, monologue. Of course, in this case, the so-
called dialectical logic is not being considered: the historical removal of the
contradiction in synthesis is certainly an important system-wide worldview
discovery, but there are no clear calculations with this logic, nor its reproduction
in machine form for
automating dialogue modeling, nor how to use it this
logic for
the formalization of communicative situations – for example, the same conflicts
of interpretations and other communicative failures. The logic that has gone
through scholasticism even though it was the logic of Aristotle (more precisely,
the name of Aristotle), it was, first of all, the expression and representation of
God Logos, which is monotonous and one, correct and correct – always and
everywhere.