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implemented in all counterterrorist organizations, specifically those that deal with
hostage rescue operations. The findings in this thesis enable
decision-makers at the
strategic, operational, and tactical levels to better plan and organize hostage rescue forces
to respond striking at the enemy’s centers of gravity and exploiting culmination points.
Additionally, this thesis enables decision-makers to comprehend the hostage crisis
environment by providing a hostage rescue planning model
that can be implemented in
any counterterrorist joint task force to give a clear picture of possible outcomes
throughout a hostage crisis.
Strategic special operations such as hostage rescues require the surgical precision
of an expert counterterrorist unit. The highest levels of government must maintain the
pulse
throughout the planning, preparation, and execution of such operations. CT forces
must be used when the opportunity comes, fully understanding
the risks and benefits of
unleashing such units on the enemy. The operational art of using a counterterrorist force
must encompass a thorough understanding of the four principles presented in this thesis.
In a hostage crisis, engaging a terrorist threat with extreme prejudice whenever
negotiations fail will send the correct message to the terrorist organization.
A hostage
siege is a dramatic event, highly visible and effective in getting
international attention; the terrorists will continue to use this tactic to achieve leverage.
U.S. national policy and commitment to recovering hostages must be steadfast;
bargaining or yielding to terrorist demands only increases the
likelihood of more hostages
taken. No matter how much money is spent, or how well trained our hostage rescue
forces are, we still have innocent people killed because of operations “gone wrong”
(Pittman, 2003, p. 1). On the other hand, brilliant operations such as CHAVIN DE
HUANTAR reinforce the fact that surgical hostage rescue operations do work. The U.S.
has the best counterterrorist forces in the world. We spend billions of
dollars outfitting
and preparing them to do a job nobody wants to take responsibility for, and then expect
no political blowback. We must let the professionals do what they do best. The U.S.
counterterrorism strategy in the GWOT should encourage the use of CT forces
aggressively
against any hostage taker; a faint-hearted policy based on previous failures
and risk aversion will not bring our hostages home.