Naval postgraduate school monterey, california thesis

4. Deception 
Military deception assists a commander in attaining surprise, security, 
mass, and economy of force. Military deception supports military 
operations by causing adversaries to misallocate resources in time, place, 
quantity or effectiveness (Joint Pub 3-58, 1996, p. I-2).
Hostage rescue operations require a very different type of approach to help the 
rescue element reach the entry without being compromised. Deception affords the rescue 
force the much-needed element of surprise. When used properly, it can direct the 
terrorist’s attention from the assault, or delay their reaction long enough for surprise to be 
gained at the crucial moment. During the famous Israeli rescue at Entebbe in July of 
1976, the Israeli assault force disguised their approach to the target by riding across the 
airfield in Mercedes sedans (typically used by Ugandan dignitaries), successfully 
delaying the initial actions of the Ugandan guards.
The deception plan must be considered at the strategic and operational levels of 
the operation. At the strategic level, the negotiations must maintain the focus of freeing 
the hostages by diplomatic means at all cost, even in the face of a mounting rescue 
attempt. On the operational level, the deception plan might give the impression to the 
hostage takers that the military preparations have nothing to do with the rescue of the 
hostages. 
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Combatives is the term used to designate hand-to-hand combat. The term has evolved with the 
advent of urban warfare and close quarter battle. It incorporates the elements of survival, martial arts, 
wrestling, and grappling, with the overall goal of subduing or killing the enemy at close range.

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Because hostage rescue operations are inherently very complex missions that 
require a mastery of the operational art
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, the deception plan is a crucial principle. In 
SpecOps
, McRaven mentions the element of simplicity as being crucial in special 
operations (p. 13). This principle does not apply to hostage rescue operations. A simple 
plan is a graceful plan, but hostage rescue operations by default, are very complex 
endeavors and far from being simple. The volatility of the situation, the political 
implications, the media coverage, and the national test of will, all provide a degree of 
complexity that must be tampered by any means possible. It is therefore critical to 
introduce the deception plan at the strategic, operational, and tactical level of the rescue 
operation. The deception plan can, on one hand, hide military preparations and rehearsals 
from the negotiations process or the media, or, on the other hand, it can help promote the 
fact that the country is steadfast in its resolve not to negotiate and rescue the hostages.
More importantly, the deception plan can be used to catch the enemy completely off 
guard, distracting their attention during the initial few seconds of the approach and 
assault on the target. A drawn out negotiations process can also be a great deception tool 
to masque an impending assault. The analogy of the frog in a boiling pot applies here; if 
a frog is thrown in a boiling pot, he will immediately jump right out of it. However, if he 
is slowly brought up to a boil, he will die before he knows it. The terrorists will not 
know if things are slowly heating up because of a good deception plan.
There are five categories of deception plans. First, 
strategic
deception is planned 
and executed by and in support of senior military commanders to result in adversary 
military policies and actions that support the originator’s strategic military objectives, 
policies, and operations. Second, 
operational
deception is planned and executed by and 
in support of operational-level commanders to result in adversary actions that are 
favorable to the originator’s objectives and operations. It is planned and conducted in a 
theater of war to support campaigns and major operations. Third, 
tactical
deception is 
planned and executed by and in support of tactical commanders to result in adversary 
actions that are favorable to the originator’s objectives and operations. It is planned and 
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Operational art is the employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives 
through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and 
battles. Operational art translates the joint force commander’s strategy into operational design and, 
ultimately, tactical action, by integrating the key activities at all levels of war (Joint Pub 3-0, 2001, p. II-2). 

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conducted to support battles and engagements. Fourth, 
service 
deception is planned and 
executed by the services that pertain to service support to joint operations; service 
military deception is designed to protect and enhance the combat capabilities of service 
forces and systems. Fifth, deception in support of 
operational security 
(
OPSEC
) is 
planned and executed by and in support of all levels of command to support the 
prevention of the inadvertent compromise of sensitive or classified activities, capabilities, 
or intentions; deceptive OPSEC measures are designed to distract foreign intelligence 
away from, or provide cover for, military operations and activities. 
There are also four major types of deception plans:
feint, ruse, display
, and 
demonstration
. The 
feint
is an offensive action involving contact with the adversary in 
order to deceive the enemy as to the location and/or time of the actual main offensive 
action
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. The 
ruse
is a trick of war usually involving the deliberate exposure of false 
information to the enemy intelligence collection system. The 
display
is a static portrayal 
of an activity, force, or equipment usually to deceive visual observation. The 
demonstration
is a diversionary attack or show of force on a front where a decision is not 
sought (similar to feint, but no actual contact with adversary intended)
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.