Naval postgraduate school monterey, california thesis

1. 
Phase I: Planning, Preparation, and Rehearsals 
In Operation CHAVIN DE HUANTAR, the rescue force had 126 days to prepare, 
and they used this time to the fullest. Immediately following the takeover, the PNP 
developed an emergency assault plan in conjunction with the SUAT, and remained on 
site with this task for several days, until the designated unit was properly assembled and 
given the designation of “rescue force”. The following two weeks were chaotic for all 
military and police units responsible for the security of the residence; the shortage of 
personnel, equipment, and intelligence delayed the proper assignment of duties and 
responsibilities for the rescue forces. In the meantime, the PNP and SUAT forces 
scrambled to acquire whatever resources they had to maintain an emergency rescue 
capability. Some frustrated PNP commanders that impatiently wanted to end the crisis, 
developed a myriad of hastily assembled rescue plans that included rocket propelled 
grenades, explosives, and less-than-lethal ammunition. Eventually order was established 
with Gen. Hermosa R
í
os as the task force commander, Vladimiro Montesinos in charge 
of all intelligence operations, and President Fujimori as the commander in chief of all 
forces. 
Immediately after we found out that our parents were inside, we parked 
our vehicle in front of the residency and slept there for the next two 
weeks. Initially we were very worried because we thought the police 
would go in any minute and massacre everyone because of their lack of 
expertise in these types of situations. They wanted to go in with bazookas 
and blow everything up. Little by little, we managed to persuade them 
against an emergency assault (Personal interview with LCDR Sergio 
Giampietri, Peruvian Navy, on 20 March 2004). 
Preparations to construct a replica of the residence began in early January. Forty 
civilian workers were contracted to begin construction of a full size mock up at the 
Peruvian Army’s Commando School in El Chorrillo. Initially, the site was meant to 
replicate only the first floor of the residence, and it was to be made of bricks. As the 
siege was prolonged, a mock up of the second story of the residence was built side by 
side to the first floor mock up site. As time went on, the construction continued with a 
second floor added on top of this latest mock up of the second floor layout, turning this

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location into a two-story site. Eventually, tunnels were built underneath the site, allowing 
for the realistic and full-blown live fire rehearsals for the assault force and the breaching 
parties.
The initial and only blueprints available for the Japanese residence did not 
coincide with the actual construction of the residence; structural modifications had been 
made from its original construction. Eventually, a set of updated sketches was sent via 
fax from Japan, enabling the mockup construction to be identical to the actual residence. 
The master breacher for the operation, UEC CDR Carlos Tello, conducted 
numerous tests and rehearsals with different types of explosive charges in order to perfect 
the type of charge to be used during the initial entry into the residence. The main concern 
was to have enough force to make a hole through the floor of the residency and kill as 
many terrorists as possible, without having the second story collapse, bringing the whole 
structure to the ground and killing or injuring the hostages
42
. He had to improvise and 
devise a series of shape charges made out of plastic explosives and shrapnel inside 
buckets, which were then attached upside down from inside the tunnels to the ground 
floor of the residence.
I knew the advisors were there from other countries ready to give us the 
appropriate explosives I needed to make the explosions work. I was not 
allowed to ask for any materials; it was so frustrating, knowing I had to 
improvise with what I had instead of using the right charges (Personal 
interview with CDR Carlos Tello, Peruvian Marines, on 24 September 
2003). 
At one point during testing, CDR Tello complained to President Fujimori about 
the amount of smoke that remained inside the structure after each shot because of the 
type of explosives he was using, trying to sway the President to request help from U.S. 
advisors. President Fujimori simply told CDR Tello to do the best he could with what he 
42 Using too large an explosive charge will harm hostages as was the case when Egypt's Force 777 
attempted to storm Egyptair flight 648, a Boeing 737, which was hijacked to Malta. Force 777 decided to 
blow a hole in the roof to gain entry into the aircraft. They also decided that the charge should be large 
enough to stun the terrorists. However, the explosion was so huge that six rows of seats were ripped loose 
and nearly twenty passengers were killed. This mistake, in addition to numerous others, ultimately led to 
the deaths of 57 hostages (Information retrieved from specwarnet.net/world/ct.htm, on 20 January 2004)
.

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had, that this operation was a problem for Peru to solve without any outside help. The 
morning of the operation, President Fujimori requested CDR Tello to double the charge 
to ensure all members of the MRTA would be neutralized from the initial explosion, but 
CDR Tello adamantly refused explaining that if he did, the whole residence would 
collapse (Personal interview with CDR Carlos Tello, Peruvian Marines, on 24 September 
2003).