Naval postgraduate school monterey, california thesis

INTELLIGENCE
SURPRISE
DECEPTION
OPERATOR’S
SKILL
Figure 1.
Author’s Principles for Hostage Rescue Operations 

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The findings of this thesis will enable decision-makers to better plan and organize 
hostage rescue forces to act at the appropriate time (window of opportunity), maximizing 
their chances of success. Additionally, it will also enable decision-makers to comprehend 
the hostage crisis environment by providing a useful planning model that can be 
implemented effectively and accurately, presenting a clear picture of possible outcomes 
throughout a hostage crisis. 
A. 
THE ISSUE OF TIMING
Timing refers to the effects achieved as well as to the application of force 
(Joint Pub. 3-0, 2001, p. III-15) 
The question of 
when
to send in a rescue force to resolve a hostage crisis is one 
that has troubled most military strategists and politicians throughout time. History has 
shown that, for the most part, the best moment for the execution of a hostage rescue 
attempt is later in the life of the crisis. Waiting to conduct an operation later allows for 
critical information and intelligence to surface, planning and preparation of the rescue 
force to be refined, and negotiations to try to achieve a peaceful resolution. Executing 
the operation later will also allow for the natural degradation of the will and readiness of 
the captors (Nordberg, 1999, p. 8). The biorhythm hypothesis states that there are 
different moments in time that present themselves throughout a hostage crisis, not just 
one. Furthermore, it also contends that at different points later in the crisis, the roles are 
turned, benefiting the hostage takers or the terrorists in different ways. The key is to plan 
for the most effective window of opportunity, and conduct the rescue maximizing the 
element of surprise, the intelligence gathered, and the operator’s
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state of readiness.
Timing also requires being able to know the enemy’s culmination point
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. In 
hostage rescue operations, the terrorist’s culminating point could be reached when he no 
longer has the logistical means to support his operation, when the hostages’ health 
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Most references erroneously use the term operator to designate anyone that “pulls a trigger” in SOF.
In a counterterrorist unit, the term 
operator
is given to those members of the unit that have served and have 
experience in all operational areas of that organization: the assault force, the sniper-observer force, and the 
technical support element.
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The culminating point is that point in time and space where the attacker’s effective combat power no 
longer exceeds the defender’s or the attacker’s momentum is no longer sustainable, or both. Beyond the 
culminating point, attackers risk counterattack and catastrophic defeat and continue the offense at great 
peril. Defending forces reach their culminating point when they can no longer defend successfully or 
counterattack to restore the cohesion of the defense. The defensive culminating point marks that instant at 
which the defender must withdraw to preserve the force.

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condition has become critical and medical assistance is required, or when the 
psychological and physical stresses of the siege overwhelm the captors. For the rescue 
force, the culminating point could be reached because of the psychological and physical 
stresses of a prolonged wait, a lack of intelligence, training or rehearsing excessively, or 
the loss of the element of surprise.
An operational commander might have the best-trained and equipped rescue force 
and all the necessary logistical supporting assets at his disposal, but if he does not 
understand and track the crisis biorhythm and cannot pinpoint the best execution time, the 
rescue will fail. By drawing out the negotiations process as long as possible, the 
terrorists will tire and the authorities will have the appropriate time to prepare a tactical 
response.