Naval postgraduate school monterey, california thesis

1. 
Phase I: Planning, Preparation, and Rehearsals 
If the best military generals were asked to plan a successful bank robbery, 
they would be helpless. Complex rescue operations require the mentality 
and expertise of a bank robber, and not those of an Army commander who 
is used to moving 2000 tanks (Gazit, 1980, p. 132).
A hostage rescue operation is the most dangerous and delicate of all special 
operations missions. Shlomo Gazit
30
describes in his article 
Risk, Glory, and the Rescue 
Operation,
four planning principles that distinguish the rescue operation from a standard 
military operation. First, the search for bright, original, and even crazy ideas. Second, 
the importance of saving time in the planning and preparations. Third, the early and 
continual involvement of the political decision-makers so that they will be able to 
evaluate the planning ideas as they arise. Fourth, the inclusion of the rescue force 
commanders in the planning process from the earliest possible moment.
Harvey Schlossberg and Frank Bolz from the New York City Police Department, 
developed tactics that led to the resolution of high-conflict incidents without the loss of 
life, from the lessons learned at the Munich Olympics in 1972. These tactics are still 
being taught today at police departments across the country. They noted three conditions 
paramount for their negotiators, applicable for military hostage rescues. First, the 
importance of containing and negotiating with the hostage taker in a hostage incident.
Second, the importance of understanding the hostage taker’s motivation and personality 
in a hostage situation. Third, the importance of slowing down an incident so time can 
work for the negotiator (McMains & Mullins, 2001, pp. 2-3).
As mentioned before, 
timing
is crucial during the planning process. During the 
first few minutes of the siege, the terrorists are uncertain if their operation will succeed 
and therefore at great risk of making fatal mistakes; they must get the hostages under 
control and down to a manageable size, establish security, and become aware of their 
operational space and their surroundings. Through these initial moments, the terrorists 
are at their most vulnerable point. However, the reality is that a hostage rescue unit is 
30
Major General Shlomo Gazit (retired) served as Director of Military Intelligence of Israel from 
1974-1979. In that post during the Israeli operation at Entebbe, Gazit participated in the planning of that 
rescue effort. He was Coordinator of Government Operations in the Occupied Territories from 1967-1974 
(From introduction of 
Risk, Glory, and the Rescue Operation
, Gazit, 
International Security
, Volume 6, 
Issue 1, Summer, 1981, p. 111). 

---

28 
almost never going to be in close proximity to the hostage incident to respond that fast.
These units are for the most part based in the capital city of most countries for this 
specific reason, but anything more than a few minutes distance to the target site, and it is 
already too late; the terrorists will establish control and gain the upper hand soon after 
their takeover. After this brief window of opportunity closes, the terrorists will gain 
relative superiority and assume control of the crisis area. The rescue force must wait for 
a new window of opportunity to develop. It is then that timing becomes so critical.
Waiting allows the situation to develop, intelligence to be gathered on the target area, and 
rehearsals to be conducted by the rescue force. The longer the wait, the better prepared 
the rescue force will be to conduct the assault. Along the same lines, the longer the wait, 
the better the chances are for a negotiating team to establish credibility and come up with 
a peaceful solution to the crisis.
There are also several drawbacks for waiting though, one of them being the 
precarious condition of the hostages. The hostages can develop Stockholm
31
or 
transference
32
syndrome, their health status worsens, and their chances of being killed 
increase. In addition, the tensions and frustrations inside the crisis area increase with 
time, setting the stage for a possible violent confrontation between the hostages and the 
terrorists. Overall, the benefits of waiting outweigh the risks. If the situation at the crisis 
site is under control, and negotiations are established, the longer the wait the better the 
chances of success for a rescue attempt. 
At the onset of the hostage taking, the designated rescue force must be summoned 
at once, to start developing an