Politics Disad – Jackson-Vanik

***Aff AT MPX***

AT Russia War Impact

No war – weak arsenal

Perkovich ‘3 – Director of the Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

George. vice president for studies and director of the Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. March/April 2003. Foreign Affairs. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=16207.

As for Russia, a full-scale war between it and the United States now seems inconceivable. Given the desires for larger cuts in nuclear forces that Russia displayed in negotiating the 2002 Moscow Treaty, Russia hardly seems enough of a threat to justify the size and forward-leaning posture of America's present arsenal.

No war – economics

Maisaia ‘8 – USAFA Defense Fellow

Vakhtang, PhD USAFA Defense Fellow, Military Expert, A War With Russia: Real Concern or Fabricated?, 3/3/8. Online

The Russian economy is in deep recession due to the global financial crisis and poor management and could not bear the burden of an additional $5 million a day in war costs. The economic crisis is additional reason why waging war is less probable as war against another sovereign state could lead to social disorder, including in the Armed Forces.

No war – politics

Maisaia ‘8 – USAFA Defense Fellow

Vakhtang, PhD USAFA Defense Fellow, Military Expert, A War With Russia: Real Concern or Fabricated?, 3/3/8. Online

Moscow is seeking to communicate with the new US Administration and with the EU and damaging the already weak international position of Russia does not serve the interests of the incumbent authorities of the Russian Federation. The first Medvedev-Obama meeting, which will probably take place on April 2, will be a most interesting and fascinating event which will engender some corrections in the foreign policy formulation and strategic calculations of the Russian Federation. Hence, Moscow will manipulate the Medvedev-Sarkozy peace plan to present itself as a credible partner in international relations, mostly in terms of combating international terrorism and the Afghanistan mission, which is the number 1 priority for Obama Administration policy making.

AT: Russia Relations MPX

US and Russia will not work cooperatively to solve problems – differing interests and priorities, Russia does not need the U.S. and have negative demands, dislike American solutions, and are concerned with domestic issues.

Shleifer and Treisman ’11 – Professor of Economic at Harvard and Professor of PoliSci at UCLA

Andrei Shleifer, Professor of Economics at Harvard University, and Daniel Treisman, Professor of Political Science at the University of California,Los Angeles, and a Visiting Fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna. “Why Moscow Says No: A Question of Russian Interests, Not Psychology”. Foreign Affairs. Jan/Feb 2011. Vol. 90, Iss. 1; pg. 122. ProQuest.

Today, Russia and the United States share few interests and even fewer priorities. Where their interests do overlap, Russian leaders often doubt the efficacy of U.S. strategy. Moreover, there is an imbalance: whereas the United States, as a global superpower, needs Russia's help in addressing many issues, Russia needs the United States for relatively little. Russia's main demand is entirely negative: that Washington stop expanding nato and emboldening anti-Russian governments and nongovernmental organizations on its periphery. Russian foreign policy under Putin and Medvedev has been shaped by three objectives: boosting economic growth, fostering friendly regimes in other former Soviet states, and preventing terrorism at home. As the Russian leadership sees it, success in each area is critical to retaining power and domestic support.

Despite the reset in US-Russia relations Russia will continually block true multilateral progress.

Shleifer and Treisman ’11 – Professor of Economic at Harvard and Professor of PoliSci at UCLA

Andrei Shleifer, Professor of Economics at Harvard University, and Daniel Treisman, Professor of Political Science at the University of California,Los Angeles, and a Visiting Fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna. “Why Moscow Says No: A Question of Russian Interests, Not Psychology”. Foreign Affairs. Jan/Feb 2011. Vol. 90, Iss. 1; pg. 122. ProQuest.

Russia's international behavior during the last decade has puzzled many U.S. observers. As seen from Washington, the greatest challenges of the moment-terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate change-are global ones that threaten all states. The United States has been trying to organize multilateral responses. Yet the Kremlin has proved singularly unhelpful. For years, Russian negotiators have stalled efforts to compel Iran and North Korea to give up their nuclear weapons programs. Meanwhile, Moscow has applied economic and diplomatic pressure to keep nearby states from joining nato or letting U.S. troops use their bases to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan. And in August 2008, Russia invaded Georgia and effectively detached two mountain enclaves from its territory. More recently, some have seen hints of a thaw in U.S.-Russian relations. Last June, U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev chatted over hamburgers in Washington and announced that their countries' relationship had been "reset." Moscow signed a new treaty to replace the expiring Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and backed a UN resolution tightening sanctions on Iran. But in other ways, the Kremlin continues to disappoint. Russia only agreed to sanctions against Iran that allowed Russia to continue selling the country nuclear power stations and, apparently, developing its oil and gas sectors. Closer to home, Russia has conducted military exercises simulating an invasion of Poland and has deployed advanced antiaircraft missiles in Abkhazia.

AT: Russia Relations MPX – Laundry List

Russia is unlikely to cooperate with the U.S. on any major initiatives.

Shleifer and Treisman ’11 – Professor of Economic at Harvard and Professor of PoliSci at UCLA

Andrei Shleifer, Professor of Economics at Harvard University, and Daniel Treisman, Professor of Political Science at the University of California,Los Angeles, and a Visiting Fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna. “Why Moscow Says No: A Question of Russian Interests, Not Psychology”. Foreign Affairs. Jan/Feb 2011. Vol. 90, Iss. 1; pg. 122. ProQuest.

With very few exceptions, Russia does not need or want help from Washington in achieving its main objectives. What it would value is for the United States to stop interfering in its neighborhood, militarizing the border states, and attempting to undermine Russia's position in energy markets. rational ambivalence Nonetheless, Russia might still hope that the United States succeeds in its global endeavors. For example, the Kremlin has no desire to see Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban. A victory for radical Islamists there could embolden insurgencies throughout Central Asia and invigorate the North Caucasus' terrorist networks. Yet Russian officials are unsure that nato can defeat the Taliban or at least impose a stable settlement. Looking ahead to the situation after U.S. troops leave, the Kremlin does not want to take positions now that will make it impossible to deal with Kabul's future rulers. Moscow also knows that some level of tension keeps its southern neighbors in line. When they feel threatened by the Taliban, Central Asia's leaders are more ready to cooperate in the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization and to welcome Russia's military presence in the region. At the same time, Moscow is concerned about the recent flood of Afghan heroin across its borders; opium production has doubled since the nato invasion. And polls show that Russia's public is far less happy than Putin and Medvedev about assisting nato in Afghanistan. Iran evokes another set of complicated calculations. Moscow would prefer that Tehran not develop nuclear weapons. Yet many Russian officials doubt that even the toughest economic sanctions- fully backed by Russia-would prevent this outcome. Meanwhile, Russia has economic interests in Iran that it would be costly to jeopardize. Its exports to the country have grown from $250 million in 1995 to $3.3 billion in 2008. Moscow hopes for contracts to build additional nuclear power stations, develop oil and gas fields, and supply Iran with modern weapons. It also is loath to give Tehran's radicals any excuses for stirring up trouble in the North Caucasus. A resolution of the conflict between Tehran and Washington would threaten Russia's commercial and strategic interests. Western investment would likely pour into the Iranian oil and gas sectors, competing with Russian multinationals. The lifting of sanctions and the lowering of tensions would depress petroleum prices; new pipelines might be built to carry Iranian gas to Europe. In many ways, the current stalemate serves the Kremlin's purposes. And on the question of North Korea's nuclear program, Russia would like to see Pyongyang disarm but doubts that even its strong support for sanctions would have much of an effect. At the same time, it worries that any military escalation or a collapse of the regime in Pyongyang could send refugees flooding into Russia's Far East. The New start treaty mostly ratified cuts in the Russian nuclear arsenal that were occurring anyway as the weapons aged. Further reductions are not so clearly in Russia's interest; as antimissile systems become more accurate and powerful, Moscow will need to maintain enough missiles and warheads to remain sure of a second-strike capability. On climate change, the Kremlin recognizes that global warming would impose huge costs, causing floods and destroying infrastructure. Still, how the expense of cutting pollution should be shared among the major industrial and industrializing countries remains contentious. Like other countries, Russia has a powerful pro-carbon lobby. limited but constructive Washington should not expect much help from Moscow, not because Kremlin officials are overwhelmed by wounded pride and paranoia but because Washington's priorities are not their priorities- and may not be in their interest at all. The parallel with U.S.-Chinese relations is instructive. In dealing with Beijing, U.S. policymakers perceive conflicts of interest for what they are. They do not feel compelled to patronize and psychoanalyze their Chinese counterparts. It is hard to imagine a U.S. president on the eve of a Beijing summit berating President Hu for his obsolete Marxist mentality and promising to build up Premier Wen Jiabao as a counterweight. If divergent interests make a close relationship between Moscow and Washington unlikely in the next few years, there are grounds for greater optimism in the long run. As its interactions with the United States have shrunk, Russia has been gradually integrating into Europe, both economically and culturally. Because these changes are slow and not particularly dramatic, they have gone largely unnoticed. As it develops further, Russia will become even more European-without losing its distinct identity. In 2008, Russians made 39 times as many trips to western Europe and 19 times as many trips to China as they did to the United States. Of the 41,000 Russian students who studied abroad in 2008, 20,000 were at institutions in Europe; only 5,000 were in the United States. Meanwhile, in 2009,Russians were more likely to buy property in Bulgaria, Montenegro, Germany, Spain, and the Czech Republic than in the United States.

AT: Russia Relations MPX –Accidents

Communication checks prevent accidents.

Ford 8. [Chris, Senior Fellow & Director @ Center for Technology and Global Security @ Hudson Institute, “Dilemmas of Nuclear Force ‘De-Alerting’” Int’l Peace Institute Policy Forum -- October 7 -- www.hudson.org/files/documents/De-Alerting%20FINAL2%20(2).pdf]

The United States and Russia have also worked for years to improve communications, reduce misunderstandings, and develop ways to lessen the risk of inadvertent launch or other errors in their strategic relationship. Most readers will be familiar with the Direct Communications Link (the famous “hotline”) established in 1963.27 In 1971, however, Washington and Moscow also signed an agreement establishing basic procedures to increase mutual consultation and notification regarding relatively innocent but potentially alarming activities – thereby reducing the risk of accidental nuclear war.28 Since 1987, the two parties have also operated securely-linked 24-hour communications centers – the U.S. node of which is the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) operated by the State Department29 – which specialize in transmitting such things as the notifications required under arms control treaties. Pursuant to a 1988 memorandum, NRRC transmittals, which go directly to the Russian Ministry of Defense, include ballistic missile launch notifications. This link also proved useful to help prevent strategic tensions after the terrorist assault of September 11, 2001 – at which point U.S. officials used the NRRC to reassure their Russian counterparts that the sudden American security alert in the wake of the Manhattan and Pentagon attacks was not in any way an indication of impending U.S. belligerence vis-à-vis Russia.

AT: Russia Relations MPX – Relations Miscalc

Low probability of miscalculation or war

Lowther ‘9

Adam. Defense Analyst, Air Force Research Institute. Challenging Nuclear Abolition. August 2009. Online.

With more than 60 years of nuclear weapons experience, there is also a low probability of political miscalculation. Neither the president of the United States nor his counterpart in Moscow has ever “miscalculated” and launched a nuclear weapon. Rather than expecting miscalculation, a better approach may be to assist other nuclear powers in developing the sound practices that have led to six decades of American and Russian restraint.

AT: Russia Relations MPX – Warming

Russia won’t cooperate on solving warming – pollution cuts are contentious and powerful oil lobby.

Shleifer and Treisman ’11 – Professor of Economic at Harvard and Professor of PoliSci at UCLA

Andrei Shleifer, Professor of Economics at Harvard University, and Daniel Treisman, Professor of Political Science at the University of California,Los Angeles, and a Visiting Fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna. “Why Moscow Says No: A Question of Russian Interests, Not Psychology”. Foreign Affairs. Jan/Feb 2011. Vol. 90, Iss. 1; pg. 122. ProQuest.

The New start treaty mostly ratified cuts in the Russian nuclear arsenal that were occurring anyway as the weapons aged. Further reductions are not so clearly in Russia's interest; as antimissile systems become more accurate and powerful, Moscow will need to maintain enough missiles and warheads to remain sure of a second-strike capability. On climate change, the Kremlin recognizes that global warming would impose huge costs, causing floods and destroying infrastructure. Still, how the expense of cutting pollution should be shared among the major industrial and industrializing countries remains contentious. Like other countries, Russia has a powerful pro-carbon lobby.

Russia will not cooperate to solve warming – hydrocarbons are critical to their economy, which is their top priority.

Shleifer and Treisman ’11 – Professor of Economic at Harvard and Professor of PoliSci at UCLA

Andrei Shleifer, Professor of Economics at Harvard University, and Daniel Treisman, Professor of Political Science at the University of California,Los Angeles, and a Visiting Fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna. “Why Moscow Says No: A Question of Russian Interests, Not Psychology”. Foreign Affairs. Jan/Feb 2011. Vol. 90, Iss. 1; pg. 122. ProQuest.

Russian foreign policy under Putin and Medvedev has been shaped by three objectives: boosting economic growth, fostering friendly regimes in other former Soviet states, and preventing terrorism at home. As the Russian leadership sees it, success in each area is critical to retaining power and domestic support. Economic growth comes first. The Kremlin understands that power in today's world rests on economic might. As Putin noted back in February 2000, "There can be no superpower where weakness and poverty reign." At home, Russia's rulers know that they owe their popularity to the economy's remarkable revival. Gdp per capita, adjusted for purchasing power parity, increased from under $7,000 in 1999 to almost $16,000 in 2008 (around that of Ireland in 1987 or Portugal in 1989). Oil and gas played a major role in this boom. Today, hydrocarbons fund about one-third of the Russian government's budget. Although both Putin and Medvedev have spoken of economic modernization and diversification, they realize that at least for the next decade, the country's prosperity will depend on securing stable markets and relatively high prices for its oil and gas. Given recent history, they must be terrified that should these conditions change, not just the country's prosperity but also their own political survival would be at stake. Although the plunge in oil prices in the early 1980s was not the only reason the Soviet Union collapsed a few years later, it was important. Later, after oil prices sank to $9 a barrel in June 1998, Russia defaulted on its debt, finishing off the reputation of Yeltsin's reformers. It is no surprise, then, that Russia's reliance on fuel exports shapes how its leaders view the world. Most of the country's oil and gas exports go to Europe. Overall, imports from Russia accounted for only about 18 percent of energy consumption in the eu in 2007 (when comprehensive data were last available). But some individual countries are much more dependent. Whereas in 2007 France and Germany received 14 percent and 36 percent of their gas from Russia, respectively, the corresponding figures were higher for countries further to the east: 48 percent for Poland, 92 percent for Bulgaria, and 100 percent for the three Baltic states. Some believe that this trade exposes these nations to political pressure from the Kremlin. In 2008, then British Prime Minister Gordon Brown warned that Europe risked being caught in "an energy stranglehold" by states such as Russia.

2AC Econ Low

Russian economy weak- World Bank reports multiple factors offset high oil prices

-aging population, unproductive workers, no business investment, high industry spending

-growth will slow .8% this year

Kramer ‘12

Andrew, Russian Economy Slow to Recover, World Bank Says, NYTIMES, 3/27/12 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/28/business/global/russian-economy-slow-to-recover-world-bank-says.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print

Russia is rebounding from the global recession more slowly than other developing countries despite high oil prices, according to a report Tuesday by the World Bank that hints at problems awaiting Vladimir V. Putin as he assumes his third term as president. A number of factors are weakening the Russian economy, the World Bank said: The aging population, unproductive workers, and business executives who are reluctant to invest over the long term, fearful of risk in general but with specific concerns about Russia. The report called low capital investment a particular concern. Russia is spending on factory equipment, trucks and airplanes at a level typical of more developed economies like Germany. High oil prices have obscured these economic vulnerabilities. Russia had a budget surplus equivalent to 0.8 percent of gross domestic product last year. But the structural problems pose a challenge for Mr. Putin, who will be inaugurated to a new six-year term as president in May. “On a closer examination, the country’s economic situation reveals a number of weaknesses,” Kaspar Richter, the bank’s chief economist for Russia, said about the report, a quarterly analysis of the Russian economy. The bank estimated that Russian economic growth would slow from 4.3 percent last year to 3.5 percent this year, before picking up slightly in 2013. For comparison, other developing economies grew at a pace of 5.5 percent on average last year, according to the report. The slower growth in Russia is even more remarkable in light of expectations economists had for the country just a few years ago. Since the economic crisis, Russia’s long-term trajectory has departed from expectations far more starkly than countries it is often compared with, like China, India and Brazil. By 2011, Russia’s gross domestic product was 20 percent lower than what was estimated in forecasts by World Bank economists in 2007. Other developing economies contracted less sharply, and have grown faster since. As a group, these countries’ economies are now only 5 percent smaller than estimates made before the global slowdown. Russia’s rebound also looks lackluster compared with its own performance after an earlier crisis, in 1998. Then, the economy recovered in seven quarters. This time, it took 14 quarters, or more than three years, the World Bank said. Russia’s public finances still appear robust compared with ailing European neighbors. Its public-sector debt is only 10 percent of the gross domestic product, compared with more than 100 percent for many European states. One problem is Russia’s workers. They are far less productive than their counterparts in the wealthy countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Hour for hour, Russian workers produce only 43 percent of what their counterparts in developed countries do, the report said. The slower growth has brought added risks for Russia. Increases in public-sector spending since 2008 helped buoy the economy but also increased the risks of budget deficits if oil prices decline. That is now looking more likely as worries of war in Iran fade. Government welfare spending accounted for 11 percent of Russian household incomes in 2007; by 2011, government spending made up 18 percent. Such benefits for the population are extraordinarily difficult to reverse without dire political consequences. The added spending kept the poverty rate, at about 13 percent of the population, level over the past four years despite high food inflation, the bank noted.

AT: Repeal k/t Econ

Improving investment ties relies on reforms in Moscow.

Pifer 3/21

Steven Pifer, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe. “The Future Course of the U.S.-Russia Relationship”. March 21, 2012. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2012/0321_arms_control_pifer.aspx

Achieving a boost in bilateral trade and investment links, however, will depend more than anything on steps that Moscow takes to improve the business and investment climate within Russia. While the growing Russian market attracts American companies, many are put off by the absence of rule of law, rampant corruption, corporate-raiding and complex tax, customs and regulatory systems. The cases of Hermitage Capital and Sergey Magnitsky sadly testify to the daunting challenges of doing business in Russia, and lead investors and trading companies to turn to other markets. If the Russian government wants to modernize its economy and enjoy the benefits of full integration into the global economic system, it will have to come to grips with these problems.

Removing Jackson Vanik won’t have any effect on the economy

CFR 9

7/2/09, Reassessing the Jackson-Vanik Amendment http://www.cfr.org/trade/reassessing-jackson-vanik-amendment/p19734#p5

While experts agree that a U.S. decision not to graduate Russia from Jackson-Vanik would be a setback for the countries' economic and political ties, the potential U.S. gains from graduation are subject to debate. Anders Aslund, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University, asserts that Jackson-Vanik has contributed to making the United States a "least favored trading partner" of Russia, pointing out that only 4 percent of Russia's trade is with the United States. Other experts, like Sestanovich, say that ill will inspired by Jackson-Vanik has had minimal impact on trade and therefore the potential U.S. gains from graduating Russia from the amendment are small. Terminating Russia from Jackson-Vanik would be "symbolic of the ability of leaders on both sides to get rid of accumulated, irrelevant issues of friction in the relationship," Sestanovich says, "but it's symbolic friction. It doesn't actually have any real consequences, and the result is you can't actually expect any real payoff."

*Sestanovich is a senior fellow @ CFR

AT: Repeal k/t U.S.-Russia Trade

Economic costs of Jackson-Vanik on trade are zero.

Sestanovich ‘9

Stephen Sestanovich, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a professor of international diplomacy at Columbia University, was the American ambassador at large for the former Soviet Union from 1997 to 2001. “Cold War Leftovers”. May 19, 2009. The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/20/opinion/20sestanovich.html

Economic reasons are the least likely to carry the day. Although American companies may complain about the obstacles they face doing business in Russia, trade is booming. American exports to Russia have tripled since 2004, and our own imports from Russia have more than doubled. Russia remains the world’s single largest importer of American poultry, and in 2008 its pork imports from the United States were up 94 percent from the year before. Russian-American trade relations are not exactly “normal” with Jackson-Vanik on the books, but the economic cost is actually zero.

Lack of IPR, and Russian economic and regulatory policies prevent trade and investment.

Cooper ‘11

William H. Cooper, Specialist in International Trade and Finance. “Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) Status for Russia and U.S.-Russian Economic Ties”. November 4, 2011. www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21123.pdf

Russia’s treatment of imports of U.S. meats—poultry, pork, and beef—is one of the most sensitive issues in U.S.-Russian trade relations. Russia’s agricultural sector, particularly meat production, has not been very competitive, and domestic producers have not been able to fulfill Russia’s expanding demand for meat, especially as the rise of Russian incomes has led to a rise in demand for meat in the Russian diet. U.S. producers, especially of poultry, have been able to take advantage and have become major sources of meat to the Russian market. At the same time, Russia has become an important market for U.S. exports of meat. For example, in 2009, Russia was the largest market for U.S. poultry meat exports.4 On January 1, 2010, the Russian government implemented new regulations on imports of poultry, claiming that the chlorine wash that U.S. poultry producers use in the preparation of chickens violates Russian standards and is unsafe. These regulations effectively halted U.S. exports of poultry to Russia. The United States claimed that the wash is effective and safe and that Russian restrictions are not scientifically based. U.S. and Russian officials conducted discussions to resolve the issue. At their June 24, 2010, press conference that closed a bilateral summit meeting, President Obama and President Medvedev announced that the dispute over poultry trade had been resolved and that U.S. shipments of poultry to Russia would resume. However, the full resumption of shipments was delayed over Russian demands to inspect U.S. poultry processing plants before they can certified for shipping to Russia. On September 30, 2010, the two countries reportedly reached a compromise on this issue whereby Russian inspectors would examine and certify U.S. plants on an expedited basis.5 However, as a result of the Russian restrictions, U.S. exports of poultry to Russia plummeted 59% as of the of 2010 compared to 2009.6 The lack of adequate intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in Russia has tainted the business climate in Russia for U.S. investors for some time. The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) consistently identifies Russia in its Special 301 Report as a “priority watch list” country, as it did in its latest (April 30, 2011) report. The USTR report acknowledges improvements in IPR protection and cites steps taken to fulfill its commitments to improve IPR protection made as part of the 2006 bilateral agreement that was reached as part of Russia’s WTO accession process. It also finds that Russia has problems with weak enforcement of IPR in some areas, including internet piracy.7 Russian economic policies and regulations have been a source of concerns. The United States and the U.S. business community have asserted that structural problems and inefficient government regulations and policies have been a major cause of the low levels of trade and investment with the United States. Russia maintains high tariffs on some goods that U.S. manufacturers try to export. For example, tariffs on cars plus the excise tax that is prorated for engine displacement adds close to 70% on the price of imported U.S. passenger cars and sports utility vehicles. U.S. exporters have also cited problems with Russian customs regulations that are complicated and time-consuming.