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reason for the conflict arose in Turkey's desire to play a leading role in
relation to the new independent Turkic republics - Azerbaijan and the
states of Central Asia. In the early 1990s, after a series of disappointments
on the way to EU accession, Turkey adopted an increasingly active policy
towards Azerbaijan and the Central Asian republics on the basis of
cultural, historical and linguistic links. During the 1990s, relations between
Turkey and Azerbaijan and the Central Asian republics expanded
significantly. US support in Turkey's desire to play an active role of
regional leadership has caused even greater displeasure on the part of the
Russian leadership. From the Russian point of view, the post-Soviet space
will continue to be in the Russian sphere of influence, although the Soviet
Union has ceased to exist in the formal plan. Consequently, the Russian
leadership, faced with significant difficulties on the domestic front and yet
unable to demonstrate a more persistent foreign policy typical of the later
era of Putin, was nevertheless alarmed by any active rivalry between the
new powers in the region. The conflict between the two countries was also
conditioned by their mutual participation in the multi-ethnic internal
conflicts faced by the two states in a somewhat symmetrical manner.
Turkey indirectly supported the Chechen militants, which caused a big
resonance in Russia. Likewise, Russia provided indirect support to the
armed Kurdish movement of the PKK, creating a similarly loud source of
outrage in the Turkish context. Conflicts also arose over Turkey's attempts
to diversify energy routes. In the 1990s, the main initiative of Turkey in
this sphere was the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline project, which
reflected its desire to establish itself as an energy corridor connecting the
former Soviet space with Western markets. This vision came into direct
conflict with the Russian perspective. Moscow sought to monopolize
energy routes and perceived Turkey's attempts to diversify them as a
natural threat to its dominance in energy supply. Since the BTC project
was implemented with considerable US support, the invasion by Western
powers into the region in the Russian sphere of influence became an
additional source of controversy for Moscow.
However, by the end of the 1990s, at the second stage of the
relationship, the shift in behavior in the strategies of the two states led to a
further rapprochement. The policy of Turkey towards Azerbaijan and the
Central Asian republics was relaxed compared to the beginning of the
1990s. Although Turkey continued to develop economic, cultural and
diplomatic ties with Azerbaijan and the Central Asian republics, this was
achieved in a more balanced way. Turkish politicians have since the late
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1990s realized the limits of "interference" in the region and avoided an
active confrontation with Russia, especially in regions that found
themselves in the direct sphere of influence of Russia. Moreover, there was
a tacit agreement between the two states on non-interference in each other's
internal political conflicts, which had obvious negative consequences. Both
Turkey and Russia took neutral positions with regard to Kurdish and
Chechen conflicts. As a result of these events, the pendulum sharply turned
in the direction of cooperation at the beginning of the new century. This
phase, which generally corresponds to the post-2001 era, can be defined as
the "golden age" of Turkish-Russian relations, the process is clearly
facilitated by several state high-level visits and official bilateral
agreements. Under the leadership of Erdogan and Putin, relations have
acquired a new impulse, based on strong economic interdependence. The
degree of cooperation has significantly improved during the third stage. At
the same time, we must be cautious about the term "strategic partnership",
considering that the essential elements of discord continue to characterize
relations, especially in geopolitical terms.
Conclusion.
Significant economic interdependence can arise among states with
different political views. In addition, this growing interdependence is due
to bilateral relations between key states and the support of private actors or
interests in the form of disparate regional integration schemes. One of the
interesting features of the Turkish-Russian economic partnership is that,
although the BSEC contributed to this process, it was not the central
driving force. Indeed, the Black Sea region has become a dynamic
economic space in terms of trade, investment and human flows, despite the
apparent weakness of the formal regional integration structure.
Growing economic interdependence can coexist with ongoing political
conflicts and geopolitical rivalry. However, the opposing positions of
Turkey and Russia in the context of the Syrian and Ukrainian crises show,
however, that although such conflicts exist and while they interfere with
political relations, they do not significantly undermine the seemingly
lasting economic relations created so far. One of the important strategies
that emerged during this period is the tendency to weed out economic
problems and geopolitical rivalry in order to avoid the negative impact of
certain disagreements on bilateral cooperation. This also contributes to the
coexistence of extensive competition with the deepening of cooperation,
which is clearly reflected in relations in the field of energy. However, if the
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