REP Programme Paper: Averting Violence in Kyrgyzstan: Understanding and
Responding to Nationalism
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27
The report writes with bewilderment that Myrzakmatov ‘enjoys considerable approval among broad
segments of southern Kyrgyz society – including among the younger, better educated and
urbanised social groups that might have been expected to take a more liberal and conciliatory
position.’ This is indicative of its failure to grasp the importance of Kyrgyz nationalism as a force in
the country. As a result, the thrust of the report’s recommendations is, first, positive discrimination
towards Uzbeks and, secondly, the removal or marginalization of Myrzakmatov. It recommends
that international organizations and foreign governments should make clear to Myrzakmatov that
discriminatory policies will damage Kyrgyzstan’s ‘access to international funding,’ and should make
‘judicious use of its financial leverage’ to ‘encourage’ Bishkek to ‘take action in the south.’
102
A similar failure to grasp Kyrgyz nationalism pervades other international actors. The Kyrgyzstan
Inquiry Commission’s second headline recommendation was that the country’s name should be
changed from ‘Kyrgyz Republic’ to ‘Republic of Kyrgyzstan’ as this name is supposedly ‘more
responsive to the civic basis of nation building.’
103
This was not only condescending and arrogant –
as if outsiders can tell a country what it should call itself – but betrayed a belief that Kyrgyz
nationalism was a limited problem that could be dealt with by superficial gestures. It was seized on
by the Kyrgyz media as evidence that outsiders were hostile to Kyrgyz statehood, stoking the
nationalist sentiment it purported to challenge.
104
A representative of the international community engaged in political development activities in
Kyrgyzstan voiced disdain that Uzbek leaders in Osh exhibited ‘lethargy’ in not challenging
Myrzakmatov, as his organization was seeking to do.
105
He went on to express shock that his
organization, and international organizations in general, ‘have totally lost our credibility’ in the eyes
of the Kyrgyz press and populace, and blamed Myrzakmatov for this to a substantial degree.
Another representative of a foreign organization engaged in high-level political activities told me of
disappointment that president Atambaev was ‘quite nationalistic’ by opining that the Uzbeks ought
to ‘learn Kyrgyz, so that they can get government jobs.’
106
This reaction to Atambaev’s remarks is revealing. It is noteworthy that most of the reports written
by international organizations contain recommendations directed exclusively at the Kyrgyz
government and the international community; hardly any give suggestions to either Osh’s municipal
authorities or to Uzbeks. This is bizarre as these will be two constituencies crucial in stabilizing
ethnic relations in the long run. An exception is Neil Melvin’s insightful report. He recognizes that
‘nationalism’ is not a problem that can be isolated as a pathology of a few individuals, but that ‘all of
the parties in the parliament reflect the new nationalist mood to some degree.’
107
This has meant
that the Soviet concept of the ‘titular nation’s’ leading role ‘has been reinforced as the basis of
nation building far above that of citizenship and rule of law.’ Therefore, he goes on, issues such as
the role of the Kyrgyz language and the place of specifically Kyrgyz history and culture ‘are likely to
be key in the years ahead.’
The advocacy of civic reintegration
The second problem arising from the international community’s failure to grasp Kyrgyz nationalism
is the assumption that it is feasible to promote and foster the civic reintegration of Uzbeks as
citizens of an inclusive state. This assumption permeates the work of many international
organizations. The Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Committee’s first recommendation was that ‘The State
should take a strong public stand against extreme nationalism and ethnic exclusivity by declaring
that Kyrgyzstan is a multi-ethnic society and facilitating the integration of its minorities into all
102
Ibid, pp. 15-16.
103
Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission (2011), ‘Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry into the Events in
Southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010’, p 83.
104
For example, ‘Osh Shaarynyn meri M. Myrzakmatov: El Aralyk Beytarap komissiya uluttar aralyk mamilesi kurchtuuga
bagyttalgan butum chygardy’ [The independent international commission has issued its conclusions about the deterioration
of inter-ethnic relations], Osh Shamy, 7 May 2011.
105
Anonymous interview, 26 September 2011, by telephone.
106
Anonymous interview, Bishkek, 24 November 2011.
107
Melvin, Neil (2011) Promoting a Stable and Multiethnic Kyrgyzstan: Overcoming the Causes and Legacies of Violence.
(Washington DC: Central Eurasia Project), p. 44.
REP Programme Paper: Averting Violence in Kyrgyzstan: Understanding and Responding to Nationalism
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spheres of public life.’
108
The Joint Economic Assessment published by Kyrgyzstan’s major
international donors following the June violence stated that ‘the government of the Kyrgyz republic
is encouraged to commit to building a government and civil service representative of the nation’s
ethnic diversity.’
109
In response to its disturbing findings of systematic and widespread injustice towards Uzbeks in
Kyrgyzstan, Amnesty International recommended that the Kyrgyz government create ‘specialist
units of investigators, prosecutors and judges’ to investigate allegations of injustice, and that
‘Appointments to these units should be ethnically and gender balanced.’ Likewise, the international
community ‘should provide funding, training and technical assistance to the June 2010 specialist
units in order to ensure that they can function independently and effectively and deliver justice
without prejudice.’
110
Similarly, the International Crisis Group, after carefully detailing a shocking
catalogue of abuses of Uzbeks, recommends ‘The appointment, or reappointment, of qualified
Uzbeks to positions in local government, from civil administration through the police to education’,
and encouraged UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon to be ‘calling for a truly inclusive political
process.’
These goals are laudable and modelled on positive discrimination and ethnic minority inclusion
policies in other countries. But they are ill-suited to contemporary Kyrgyzstan. In the first place,
they do not take account of how the clan/network model of politics works – it is important not only
for recruitment, but also for advancement and promotion. Even if a headline government policy
succeeded in placing numerous Uzbeks in state employment, what of their future? Promotion and
advancement is, like recruitment, dependent to a substantial degree on networks and connections.
This, combined with prejudice and antipathy given rampant aggressive nationalism, would work
against Uzbeks. As a prominent Uzbek human rights activist in Osh put it to me, ‘it isn’t simply a
matter of recruiting. When people are mistreated, when their career paths are closed off and they
are forced to do all sorts of menial tasks and not given the responsibility they should be, then they
will just leave. It is a real problem.’
111
As well as networks, promotion and success also depend on the ability to pay bribes, as Johan
Engvall’s research demonstrates.
112
With substantial Osh Uzbek wealth dissipated since June 2010
through theft and destruction of property, loss of livelihoods and payments of extortion money to
gangs and security forces, Uzbeks would find it relatively harder to progress along this pathway.
Furthermore, properly incorporating Uzbeks into the security forces through military service – which
most manage to avoid – could be highly dangerous to them, owing to problems of ‘hazing’
(violent/humiliating initiation ceremonies).
113
For example, in December 2011, 15 ethnic Kyrgyz
conscripts deserted
en masse from the same unit after complaining
about violent assaults by
officers, reflecting a military culture that has allegedly led to many deaths in the Kyrgyz army.
114
It is
easy to imagine that, compounded by racism, Uzbek conscripts would fare even worse in such a
culture.
115
Even if the issue is reduced to political participation, that is also dangerous. The violence in 2010
was precipitated in part by the attempts of Jalalabad MP Kadyrjon Batyrov to participate more fully
in Kyrgyzstan’s political life.
116
Not only was the Kyrgyz backlash against him intense, but many
108
Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission, ‘Report’, p. 83.
109
Asian Development Bank, International Monetary Fund & The World Bank (2010), ‘Joint Economic Assessment: Kyrgyz
Republic – Reconciliation, Recovery and Reconstruction’, p. 39.
110
Amnesty International (2011), ‘Still Waiting for Justice: One Year on From the Violence in Southern Kyrgyzstan’.
(London: Amnesty International).
111
Interview, Osh, 25 November 2011.
112
Engvall, Johan (2011), ‘In Kyrgyzstan, corruption is not a problem for the state, it IS the state’, Turkish Weekly Journal,
31 December.
113
The alleged racist abuse of Uzbeks in the Soviet military was a major grievance in the Uzbek SSR’s late-Soviet
sovereignty movement. See Critchlow, James (1991), Nationalism in Uzbekistan: a Soviet republic’s road to sovereignty
(Boulder, Westview), chapter 9,
114
‘Kyrgyz Army “Deserters” Turn Themselves In To Military’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 9 December 2011.
115
This makes the suggestion of employing more Uzbeks in the police force even less realistic for military service is
generally a prerequisite for police recruitment. See Matveeva, Anna, Sarin, Igor and Faizullaev, Bahrom (2012),
‘Kyrgyzstan: Tragedy in the South’, Ethnopolitics Papers, No 17, p.5.
116
This is chronicled succinctly in Melvin, Promoting a Stable and Multiethnic Kyrgyzstan, pp. 16-18.