REP Programme Paper: Averting Violence in Kyrgyzstan: Understanding and
Responding to Nationalism
www.chathamhouse.org
25
Needless to say, these projects were not cheap. The construction of the towering bronze statue of
Manas, near mainly Uzbek areas of the Kora-Suv region on the approach road to the city from the
airport, was voted support of 31 million som (about two-thirds of a million dollars) by Osh city
council. Justifying this vast expenditure while many neighbourhoods still lay in ruins, Myrzakmatov
‘explained how the construction of the statue of our father Manas played an important role in the
creation of an ideology and was extremely important for the next generation.’
92
Myrzakmatov underlined this in his speech at the opening of the Barsbek statue. He recounted that
Barsbek was a great hero at a time when Kyrgyz statehood flourished, but most of his speech was
about the defence of Kyrgyz statehood today. ‘Osh city can be considered the linchpin [tyrkyk] of
Kyrgyz statehood,’ he insisted. ‘Last year,’ he continued, it was not ordinary Uzbeks and Kyrgyz,
but separatists who threatened ‘the integrity of the state, our national language, our sacred culture
and our inviolable boundary.’
93
Here, we see again the deep-seated insecurity about Kyrgyz
national statehood, how the state, culture and even language are imperilled. Therefore, he
concluded, ‘The Osh tragedy is evidence of how extremely important it is to raise in the young
generation a patriotic spirit and to strengthen in the general public a love for the fatherland.’
Invoking the defence of ‘the divine spirits of our father Aykol Manas and Kagan Barsbek,’ he
concluded by calling the population of Osh to ‘unity’ and ‘concordance’ and by declaring his wish
that Kyrgyz statehood would prove ‘everlasting.’
A recurring theme of Myrzakmatov’s is that outside forces, backing the Uzbek separatists, also
represent a grave threat to Kyrgyz statehood. In a major article published in June 2011 in the Osh
Shamy newspaper, he offered a trenchant critique of aspects of the
findings and recommendations
of the Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Committee (KIC).
94
Writing in the same newspaper, journalist Abdiraim
Mamytov railed at foreign newspapers like the
Financial Times and
New York Times that, he said,
had accused the Kyrgyz of ‘crimes against humanity’ and ‘genocide.’ He argued that the KIC’s
report was driven by the same geopolitical interests that were behind NATO’s attacks on Serbia.
95
Myrzakmatov’s book carries colour plates of his supporters staging demonstrations in Osh against
the perceived threat of foreign intervention, carrying banners with slogans like ‘We will not allow
Kyrgyzstan to be broken apart’ and, in English, ‘No OSCE police’ and ‘Say “NO” to Kyrgyz
Kosovo!’.
It might appear that there is a contradiction between organizing a ‘year of strengthening the
relations, concordance and friendship between ethnic groups in the city of Osh’, and imposing
unambiguously Kyrgyz statues upon the landscape of Osh. I put this directly to Myrzakmatov in an
interview in 2011.
96
He replied, ‘By building statues of Barsbek, of Manas, we are strengthening the
Kyrgyz state and thereby are guarding the peace between the peoples.’ In
this view, the reason for
ethnic tensions is the weakness of the Kyrgyz state project and the lack of a strong national
ideology: inter-ethnic peace in Osh is thus to be guaranteed through unity (birimdik) by creating
loyalty to a strong state with a clear Kyrgyz character and ideology. That is to be achieved through
the use of Kyrgyz language and the symbolic reinforcement of the Kyrgyzness of Osh as an
integral part of the Kyrgyz state. Although interpreted as dangerous nationalism by foreign
analysts, this has a rationale in its own terms and needs to be seen as the main ‘policy response’
of the mayor of Osh to the violence of 2010. As the next section shows, it is radically different from
that of the international community.
92
Orozmamatova, Barchinai, ‘Deputattar Osh shaardyk Kengeksinin XXX sessiyasy’ [The 30th session of the deputies of
Osh municipal council],
Osh Shamy, 13 October 2011.
93
‘Osh shaarynyn meri M. Myrzakmatovdun Barsbek kagandyn aykelin achuu azeminde sozy’ [The words of Osh mayor M.
Myrzakmatov at the opening of the statue of Barsbek khaghan], Osh Shamy, 20 October 2011.
94
‘Osh shaarynyn meri M. Myrzakmatov: ”El aralyk beytarap komissira uluttar aralyk mamilesi kurchtuuga bagyttalgan
butum chygardy”’ [The independent international commission has issued its conclusions about the deterioration of inter-
ethnic relations], Osh Shamy, 7 May 2011.
95
Mamytov, Abdiraim, ‘Koogalandan kiyinki kooptuu oyundar’ [Dangerous games after the riot], Osh Shamy, 28 May 2011.
96
Interview, 28 November 2011, Osh.
REP Programme Paper: Averting Violence in Kyrgyzstan: Understanding and Responding to Nationalism
www.chathamhouse.org
26
6. UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES
In the aftermath of the June 2010 violence, there have been numerous international policy
responses. These entail the actions and statements of neighbouring and more distant states, major
intergovernmental and international agencies, and smaller international non-governmental
agencies of all stripes. Their activities have included the provision of humanitarian and longer-term
development aid, the production of investigative reports, a large-scale inquiry, bilateral cooperation
with the Kyrgyz government and Osh municipal authorities, and cooperation with local NGOs on a
plethora of programmes including promoting reconciliation and the protection of human rights.
This section is not an attempt to exhaustively summarize and evaluate them. Rather, it explores
how well some of these interventions have understood and grappled with the challenges related to
Kyrgyz nationalism. It is based on an analysis of published reports, and also interviews with
representatives of international actors in Kyrgyzstan, local agencies who worked with them and
individuals who participated in their programmes.
97
By and large, international actors have failed to understand the trajectory of Kyrgyz nationalism and
its role in conditioning responses to the Osh violence.
98
This leads to two problematic assumptions
shaping policy, each of which will be discussed below. The first is that nationalism is a pathology
that can be isolated to a few extreme individuals in politics and the media, and be eradicated by a
central government that is willing and able to do so. The second is that it is therefore feasible to
promote and foster the full civic reintegration of Uzbeks as citizens of an inclusive state. These
assumptions do not take proper account of Kyrgyz nationalism, and, as a result, many policies
proposed or pursued are unrealistic. Some are even dangerously counter-productive, playing into
the hands of nationalists and fuelling a backlash against the Uzbek minority community whose
interests they seek to protect.
Misdiagnosing nationalism
The first erroneous assumption proceeding from the international community’s misunderstanding of
Kyrgyz nationalism is the misdiagnosis of it as an isolated streak of extremism in Osh that could be
contained by concerted action from Bishkek.
99
The International Crisis Group’s 2012 report,
‘Kyrgyzstan: Widening Ethnic Divisions in the South', is typical of this. It largely blames the plight of
Uzbeks in Osh on the ‘anti-Uzbek policies’ of the city’s mayor, Melis Myrzakmatov, ‘an ardent
Kyrgyz nationalist’ by whom the city is ‘dominated.’
100
The report is very superficial. For example, at
one point it focuses on his ‘program of monumental architecture’ aimed at ‘reconfiguring the city’s
identity to emphasise Kyrgyz roots.’ This is a correct observation of a disturbing process. However,
it then says that he has erected monuments to ‘Manas, Kurmanjan Datka, and other Kyrgyz
leaders,’ although Myrzakmatov has not erected a statue of Kurmanjan Datka – that statue in Osh
dates to the Akaev period. Likewise, it goes on to say that ‘another commemorates Kyrgyz
nomadic traditions’, an observation followed by some brief notes on the ethnic history of the
Ferghana Valley, and an implication that a better statue to erect would be one of Babur.
101
It does
not apparently bother to discover the subject of this other statue – presumably Alymbek, who is
recognized by both Uzbek and Kyrgyz historians as an important leader at a time when the
Ferghana Valley lacked ethno-territorial division.
97
As these interviews were largely conducted under guarantees of anonymity, it has obviously not been possible to attribute
them.
98
It is recognized that a major challenge facing international organizations is that of ensuring the impartiality of local staff
who play important roles in receiving, transmitting and reporting understandings to foreign managers, directors and policy-
makers.
99
This is also commonly true of academic analysis. Thus, for example, Marlène Laruelle correctly recognizes that
nationalism is ‘an increasingly dominant psychological frame for interpreting Kyrgyzstan’s problems’, but goes on to isolate
this ‘wave of nationalism’ to southern leaders who represent ‘ethno-nationalist radicalism.’ See Laruelle, ‘The paradigm of
nationalism in Kyrgyzstan’.
100
International Crisis Group, ‘Kyrgyzstan’, p. 1.
101
Ibid., p. 8.