REP Programme Paper: Averting Violence in Kyrgyzstan: Understanding and
Responding to Nationalism
www.chathamhouse.org
33
Uzbeks as part of Kyrgyzstan’s society.’
126
This may best be done through the existence of bilingual
departments of history in Osh’s higher education institutes, and/or by the establishment of a
dedicated research institute under the sponsorship of the President or Academy of Sciences, as
proposed above. Obviously this measure, and the previous one, can only be done in partnership
with state funders of higher education.
There has been no evidence of separatism in recent years among Uzbek communities in
Kyrgyzstan. Uzbek leaders should continue to quash and rebut any hint of separatism, whether
aimed at autonomy or secession, within their own communities. They should also be wary of
pursuing constitutionally legitimate forms of political participation that nonetheless might, at this
sensitive moment in Kyrgyzstan’s history, be misinterpreted as disloyalty to the state. This is not to
accept second-class citizenship. Uzbeks should continue to seek justice for themselves and their
families when faced with abuse or mistreatment (including by state officials), just as other citizens
of Kyrgyzstan should. Like all citizens, they should fight for their rights within the current
constitutional provisions and hold Kyrgyzstan to the high ideals that it formally ascribes to. Rather,
it is a tactical move to keep a low profile politically for the time being as they work out the strategy
for a long-term future in Kyrgyzstan.
Suggestions for foreign actors
Foreign actors can possibly assist the situation by promoting structural reform of the judiciary,
enabling job creation and urban renewal, and encouraging processes of reconciliation and truth-
telling by drawing on experiences elsewhere. They can also go to considerable lengths to address
the insecurities in Kyrgyz national ideology and thus ease pressure on Uzbeks. In its
recommendations for conflict prevention in the Ferghana Valley, Saferworld argue that ‘conflict-
sensitive economic development’ will help reduce tensions.’
127
It can be further argued that ‘conflict
sensitivity’ is not simply trying to avoid the impression that the distribution of material aid is seen to
disproportionately benefit one group over another. It is endeavouring to make sure that the policies
and practices of all foreign actors are designed not to exacerbate ethnic tensions needlessly, by
being sensitive to the concerns and trajectories of Kyrgyz nationalism.
Therefore the ‘international community’ should aim to make Kyrgyz their primary local language
of operations rather than Russian. For example, documents should be produced primarily in
Kyrgyz. New staff, particularly those based in Osh, should be trained in Kyrgyz before Russian,
even if it is recognized that this shift can only practically occur following a lead from Kyrgyz society.
NGO workers and academics who either moved from working in Uzbekistan when that became
politically difficult, or who work primarily among Uzbeks in Osh, should learn Kyrgyz as well as
Uzbek. In some cases, some of these people adopted Uzbek names and personas in Uzbekistan
that they continue to use in inappropriate ways in Kyrgyzstan.
Foreign actors must also be careful to consider how aid is perceived. For example, in the post-
June 2010 reconstruction, rebuilt Uzbek homes were visibly flagged under the names and symbols
of foreign organizations. In contrast, the extensive road-building and other infrastructural work
funded by donors to benefit the entire city was not so visibly marked as being the product of foreign
aid, enabling the populist mayor to take credit for this work.
128
As a result, many Kyrgyz in Osh
have interpreted the aftermath of the violence as foreigners supporting Uzbeks with the mayor
alone helping Kyrgyz, fuelling the anti-Uzbek backlash. Foreign actors should also avoid
inflammatory symbolic gestures that exacerbate nationalist sentiment, such
as suggesting the
name of the country be changed or ignorantly criticizing the construction of certain monuments
without understanding what they are or represent.
126
Melvin, Promoting a Stable and Multiethnic Kyrgyzstan, p.50.
127
Saferworld (2011), ‘Looking Back to Look Forward: Learning the Lessons of Conflict Prevention in the Ferhana Valley’,
(London: Saferworld), p.32.
128
For example, ‘Oshtogy ayaldamalar ondogluuda’ [Osh’s bus-stops are being renovated], Osh Shamy, 30 June 2011. In
this report, the restoration of some 90 bus-stops around Osh is credited to the mayor, whereas the funding provided by
international donors is not mentioned.
REP Programme Paper: Averting Violence in Kyrgyzstan: Understanding and Responding to Nationalism
www.chathamhouse.org
34
Rather than defending the outdated Soviet system of minority-language education in its present form,
foreign actors should work with progressive elements in Kyrgyzstan’s Uzbek community and with the
Kyrgyz educational authorities to support the redesign of the Uzbek schooling system by assisting
a partial transition to Kyrgyz instruction (see above). Foreign governments and organizations can assist
by facilitating the involvement of international pedagogical experts on this theme.
Foreign actors should focus on working with institutions rather than individuals. Demonizing
certain individuals as embodiments of irrational nationalism backfires to the detriment of the ability
of foreign organizations to promote good ethnic relations. They should recognize that Kyrgyz
nationalism is an inescapable element of the political landscape that must be worked with to curtail
its exclusionary trends and promote an inclusive model of nation-building.
Finally, foreign actors should recognize the trans-boundary framing of the issues within Kyrgyzstan,
and work with the governments of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to support the higher education of
Kyrgyz and Uzbek minorities respectively.
Suggestions for Uzbekistan
The government of Uzbekistan was widely praised in Kyrgyzstan for its perceived role in calming the
violence by assisting refugees without intervening directly in support of Kyrgyzstan’s Uzbeks. (There
have even been unconfirmed reports that Uzbekistan’s security forces took swift precautionary
measures to protect its ethnic Kyrgyz population from retaliatory attacks.) Uzbeks in Osh, however,
felt betrayed that more support was not forthcoming, as they believed Uzbekistan’s long-standing
unwillingness to identify with them emboldened those who attacked them. In a region where most
governments (including that of Kyrgyzstan) provide some measure of cultural assistance to co-
ethnics abroad, this distance could potentially backfire by creating anger in Uzbekistan that a future
populist leader there could exploit, to the detriment of good relations between the two republics.
Uzbekistan must thus strike a difficult balance between not exacerbating existing Kyrgyz suspicions
and also demonstrating some moral identification with co-ethnics in Kyrgyzstan.
Uzbekistan should therefore continue to assure Kyrgyzstan that it respects its territorial integrity
and would strongly oppose any irredentist movement within it. The successful completion of a
mutually satisfying boundary delimitation treaty would assist here, alongside a border-management
system that facilitates trade and the ability of Kyrgyz in Uzbekistan and Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan to
maintain trans-boundary social links.
Uzbekistan’s authorities should also aim to develop a role in supporting a redesigned Uzbek
educational system in Kyrgyzstan. This would not be the provision of resources (which are often
inappropriate due to incidental material related specifically to Uzbekistan’s state-building project),
but of exchange programmes for school and university-level students of Uzbek literature and
language. This should be unexceptional: Iran supports an Iranian studies centre in Osh State
University, Turkey the teaching of Turkish in schools and Bishkek’s Manas university, and Russia
some Russian-language higher educational establishments.
129
To avoid inflaming Kyrgyz fears, this
would be part of a bilateral agreement that sees Kyrgyzstan supporting the education of
Uzbekistan’s Kyrgyz citizens (see next recommendation).
Finally, Uzbekistan should do more to assure Kyrgyzstan’s population that its co-ethnics in the
country are treated well. As outlined in section 4, the perception that Uzbekistani Kyrgyz are
relatively disadvantaged in comparison with Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks is a source of great anger in
Kyrgyzstan. Measures such as bilateral educational (at school and higher levels) and professional
(for example agricultural) exchange programmes, and invitations to Kyrgyzstani journalists to meet
Uzbekistan’s Kyrgyz community, are needed to demonstrate material and institutional support for
the Kyrgyz community. Ideally this measure and the previous one would occur simultaneously, as
part of a programme of bilateral exchange that is seen to treat Kyrgyz in Uzbekistan the same as
Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan.
129
This is the outline of an argument put to me in an interview with a leading figure in Uzbek education in Kyrgyzstan, 25
October 2011.
REP Programme Paper: Averting Violence in Kyrgyzstan: Understanding and Responding to Nationalism
www.chathamhouse.org
35
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Dr Nick Megoran is a Senior Lecturer in Political Geography at Newcastle University, England. His
research has focussed on the process and implications of building nation-states in Central Asia.
His main empirical topics have been the emergence and management of international boundaries
in the Ferghana Valley, geopolitical theory and international relations, and ideologies of nation-
building. He was educated in political geography at Durham, Roskilde and Cambridge, and is book
review editor of the journal Central Asian Survey.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I am very grateful to the British Academy for funding research for this paper through a Mid Career
Fellowship (2011-12). However this paper is based on work in the city of Osh and, more broadly,
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, since 1995, funded by a number of bodies. The ESRC funded my
doctoral research (1997-2002), and Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge, and the British Academy
(Small Grant: 38394) supported post-doctoral research (2002-05). James Nixey and Lubica
Pollakova of Chatham House have been marvellously supportive. I am grateful too to Aijan
Sharshenova for collecting newspaper articles for me from the Kyrgyz press, and an anonymous
scholar for doing the same in Uzbekistan. John Heathershaw, Asel Doolotkeldieva, Dave Gullette,
Alisher Khamidov, Aijan Sharshenova and David Lewis, plus two anonymous referees, gave useful
comments on earlier drafts of the paper. I presented versions of this paper to the Central Eurasian
Studies Society, the Kyrgyz-British Society, and to Chatham House, and comments from
participants were useful in clarifying the argument.