Russia and Eurasia Programme paper: 2012/02



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REP Programme Paper: Averting Violence in Kyrgyzstan: Understanding and Responding to Nationalism 

www.chathamhouse.org 

 33  

Uzbeks as part of Kyrgyzstan’s society.’



126

 This may best be done through the existence of bilingual 

departments of history in Osh’s higher education institutes, and/or by the establishment of a 

dedicated research institute under the sponsorship of the President or Academy of Sciences, as 

proposed above. Obviously this measure, and the previous one, can only be done in partnership 

with state funders of higher education. 

There has  been no evidence of separatism in recent years among Uzbek communities in 

Kyrgyzstan. Uzbek leaders should continue to quash and rebut any hint of separatism, whether 

aimed at autonomy or secession, within their own communities. They should also be wary of 

pursuing constitutionally legitimate forms of political participation that nonetheless might, at this 

sensitive moment in Kyrgyzstan’s history, be misinterpreted as disloyalty to the state. This is not to 

accept second-class citizenship. Uzbeks should continue to seek justice for themselves and their 

families when faced with abuse or mistreatment (including by state officials), just as other citizens 

of Kyrgyzstan should.  Like all citizens, they should fight for their rights within the current 

constitutional provisions and hold Kyrgyzstan to the high ideals that it formally ascribes to. Rather, 

it is a tactical move to keep a low profile politically for the time being as they work out the strategy 

for a long-term future in Kyrgyzstan. 

Suggestions for foreign actors 

Foreign actors can possibly assist the situation by promoting structural reform of the judiciary, 

enabling job creation and urban renewal, and encouraging processes of reconciliation and truth-

telling by drawing on experiences elsewhere. They can also go to considerable lengths to address 

the insecurities in Kyrgyz national ideology and thus ease pressure on Uzbeks. In its 

recommendations for conflict prevention in the Ferghana Valley, Saferworld argue that ‘conflict-

sensitive economic development’ will help reduce tensions.’

127


 It can be further argued that ‘conflict 

sensitivity’ is not simply trying to avoid the impression that the distribution of material aid is seen to 

disproportionately benefit one group over another. It is endeavouring to make sure that the policies 

and practices of all foreign  actors are designed not to exacerbate ethnic tensions needlessly, by 

being sensitive to the concerns and trajectories of Kyrgyz nationalism.  

Therefore the ‘international community’ should aim to make Kyrgyz their primary local language 



of operations rather than Russian. For example, documents should be produced primarily in 

Kyrgyz. New staff, particularly those based in Osh, should be trained in Kyrgyz before Russian, 

even if it is recognized that this shift can only practically occur following a lead from Kyrgyz society. 

NGO workers and academics who either moved from working in Uzbekistan when that became 

politically difficult, or who work primarily among Uzbeks in Osh, should learn Kyrgyz as well as 

Uzbek. In some cases, some of these people adopted Uzbek names and personas in Uzbekistan 

that they continue to use in inappropriate ways in Kyrgyzstan. 

Foreign actors must also be careful to consider how aid is perceived. For example, in the post-

June 2010 reconstruction, rebuilt Uzbek homes were visibly flagged under the names and symbols 

of foreign organizations. In contrast, the extensive road-building and other infrastructural work 

funded by donors to benefit the entire city was not so visibly marked as being the product of foreign 

aid, enabling the populist mayor to take credit for this work.

128

  As a result, many Kyrgyz in Osh 



have interpreted the aftermath of the violence as foreigners supporting Uzbeks with the mayor 

alone helping Kyrgyz, fuelling the anti-Uzbek backlash. Foreign actors should also avoid 



inflammatory symbolic gestures  that exacerbate nationalist sentiment, such as suggesting the 

name of the country be changed or ignorantly criticizing the construction of certain monuments 

without understanding what they are or represent.  

                                                      

126

 

Melvin, Promoting a Stable and Multiethnic Kyrgyzstan, p.50.



  

127


 

Saferworld (2011), ‘Looking Back to Look Forward: Learning the Lessons of Conflict Prevention in the Ferhana Valley’, 

(London: Saferworld), p.32. 

128


 

For example, ‘Oshtogy ayaldamalar ondogluuda’ [Osh’s bus-stops are being renovated], Osh Shamy, 30 June 2011. In 

this report, the restoration of some 90 bus-stops around Osh is credited to the mayor, whereas the funding provided by 

international donors is not mentioned.

  



REP Programme Paper: Averting Violence in Kyrgyzstan: Understanding and Responding to Nationalism 

www.chathamhouse.org 

 34  

Rather than defending the outdated Soviet system of minority-language education in its present form, 



foreign actors should work with progressive elements in Kyrgyzstan’s Uzbek community and with the 

Kyrgyz educational authorities to support the redesign of the Uzbek schooling system by assisting 

a partial transition to Kyrgyz instruction (see above). Foreign governments and organizations can assist 

by facilitating the involvement of international pedagogical experts on this theme.  



Foreign actors should focus on working with institutions rather than individuals. Demonizing 

certain individuals as embodiments of irrational nationalism backfires to the detriment of the ability 

of foreign organizations to promote good ethnic relations. They should recognize that Kyrgyz 

nationalism is an inescapable element of the political landscape that must be worked with to curtail 

its exclusionary trends and promote an inclusive model of nation-building.  

Finally, foreign actors should recognize the trans-boundary framing of the issues within Kyrgyzstan, 

and work with the governments of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to support the higher education of 

Kyrgyz and Uzbek minorities respectively. 

Suggestions for Uzbekistan 

The government of Uzbekistan was widely praised in Kyrgyzstan for its perceived role in calming the 

violence by assisting refugees without intervening directly in support of Kyrgyzstan’s Uzbeks. (There 

have even been unconfirmed reports that Uzbekistan’s security forces took swift precautionary 

measures to protect its ethnic Kyrgyz population from retaliatory attacks.) Uzbeks in Osh, however, 

felt betrayed that more support was not forthcoming, as they believed Uzbekistan’s long-standing 

unwillingness to identify with them emboldened those who attacked them. In a region where most 

governments (including that of Kyrgyzstan) provide some measure of cultural assistance to co-

ethnics abroad, this distance could potentially backfire by creating anger in Uzbekistan that a future 

populist leader there could exploit, to the detriment of good relations between the two republics. 

Uzbekistan must thus strike a difficult balance between not exacerbating existing Kyrgyz suspicions 

and also demonstrating some moral identification with co-ethnics in Kyrgyzstan.  

Uzbekistan should therefore continue to assure Kyrgyzstan that it respects its territorial integrity 

and would strongly oppose any irredentist movement within it. The successful completion of a 

mutually satisfying boundary delimitation treaty would assist here, alongside a border-management 

system that facilitates trade and the ability of Kyrgyz in Uzbekistan and Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan to 

maintain trans-boundary social links. 

Uzbekistan’s authorities should also aim to develop a role in supporting a redesigned Uzbek 



educational system in Kyrgyzstan. This would not be the provision of resources (which are often 

inappropriate due to incidental material related specifically to Uzbekistan’s state-building project), 

but of exchange programmes for school and university-level students of Uzbek literature and 

language. This should be unexceptional: Iran supports an Iranian studies centre in Osh State 

University, Turkey the teaching of Turkish in schools and Bishkek’s Manas university, and Russia 

some Russian-language higher educational establishments.

129

 To avoid inflaming Kyrgyz fears, this 



would be part of a bilateral agreement that sees Kyrgyzstan supporting the education of 

Uzbekistan’s Kyrgyz citizens (see next recommendation). 

Finally, Uzbekistan should do more to assure Kyrgyzstan’s population that its co-ethnics in the 

country are treated well. As outlined in section 4, the perception that Uzbekistani Kyrgyz are 

relatively disadvantaged in comparison with Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks is a source of great anger in 

Kyrgyzstan. Measures such as bilateral educational (at school and higher levels) and professional 

(for example agricultural) exchange programmes, and invitations to Kyrgyzstani journalists to meet 

Uzbekistan’s Kyrgyz community, are needed to demonstrate material and institutional support for 

the Kyrgyz community. Ideally this measure and the previous one would occur simultaneously, as 

part of a programme of bilateral exchange that is seen to treat Kyrgyz in Uzbekistan the same as 

Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan. 

                                                      

129


 

This is the outline of an argument put to me in an interview with a leading figure in Uzbek education in Kyrgyzstan, 25 

October 2011.

 



REP Programme Paper: Averting Violence in Kyrgyzstan: Understanding and Responding to Nationalism 

www.chathamhouse.org 

 35  

ABOUT THE AUTHOR 

Dr Nick Megoran is a Senior Lecturer in Political Geography at Newcastle University, England. His 

research has focussed on the process and implications of building nation-states in Central Asia. 

His main empirical topics have been the emergence and management of international boundaries 

in the Ferghana Valley, geopolitical theory and international relations, and ideologies of nation-

building. He was educated in political geography at Durham, Roskilde and Cambridge, and is book 

review editor of the journal Central Asian Survey

 

 



 

 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

I am very grateful to the British Academy for funding research for this paper through a Mid Career 

Fellowship (2011-12). However this paper is based on work in the city of Osh and, more broadly, 

Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, since 1995, funded by a number of bodies. The ESRC funded my 

doctoral research (1997-2002), and Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge, and the British Academy 

(Small Grant: 38394) supported post-doctoral research (2002-05). James Nixey and Lubica 

Pollakova  of Chatham House have  been marvellously supportive. I am grateful too to Aijan 

Sharshenova for collecting newspaper articles for me from the Kyrgyz press, and an anonymous 

scholar for doing the same in Uzbekistan. John Heathershaw, Asel Doolotkeldieva, Dave Gullette, 

Alisher Khamidov, Aijan Sharshenova and David Lewis, plus two anonymous referees, gave useful 

comments on earlier drafts of the paper. I presented versions of this paper to the Central Eurasian 

Studies Society, the Kyrgyz-British  Society, and to Chatham House, and comments from 

participants were useful in clarifying the argument. 



Document Outline

  • Executive Summary
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Violence in Osh: past, present and future.
    • Aftermath of June 2010 violence
    • The potential for further violence
  • 3. Understanding nationalism in Kyrgyzstan.
    • Kyrgyz historical political imagination
    • The insecurity of Kyrgyz nationalism
    • Implications of insecurity
  • 4. Kyrgyz nationalism and the issue of Osh
    • Before 2010
    • The Uzbekistan comparison
    • After 2010
  • 5. Understanding local responses
    • Kyrgyz government policy responses
    • Osh government policy response 1: promoting ‘tolerance’
    • Osh government policy response 2: symbolic
  • 6. Understanding International responses
    • Misdiagnosing nationalism
    • The advocacy of civic reintegration
    • Summary
  • 7. Conclusions and Recommendations
    • Suggestions for Kyrgyz society
    • Suggestions for Kyrgyzstan’s Uzbeks
    • Suggestions for foreign actors
    • Suggestions for Uzbekistan
  • About the author
  • Acknowledgments

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