Russia and Eurasia Programme paper: 2012/02
Yüklə 0,74 Mb. Pdf görüntüsü
|
- Bu səhifədəki naviqasiya:
- 5. UNDERSTANDING LOCAL RESPONSES
- Kyrgyz government policy responses
- Osh government policy response 1: promoting ‘tolerance’
REP Programme Paper: Averting Violence in Kyrgyzstan: Understanding and Responding to Nationalism www.chathamhouse.org 21
Kyrgyz nationalism framed the violence of June 2010 not as an isolated incident but as the latest manifestation of a long-term Uzbek plot to break up the country. Such narratives were repeated not simply by populist sections of the media, but also by elected politicians. For example, Nathan Hamm reports on the unsubstantiated accusations by populist MP Jyldyz Joldosheva about the supposed activities of a sinister Moscow-based ‘Congress of Uzbeks’ dedicated to furthering the plot. He claims that President Atambaev has echoed some of these claims, ‘playing the game of reckless, racist speculation.’ 72
down Uzbek-language media outlets and curtailed and threatened Uzbek-language education. Furthermore elected Uzbek politicians have fled abroad, as the courts and police have targeted Uzbeks accused of participating in the violence. It would thus be easy to conclude that the main response of Kyrgyz society since the June 2010 violence has been to victimize and persecute Uzbeks, and effectively to exclude them from participation in society as citizens enjoying equal civic rights by virtue of their supposed disloyalty. It is as if the message is that Uzbeks have no authentic claim to be part of Kyrgyzstani society, cannot expect equal treatment and do not belong there. However, that is not the complete picture. Both the national government in Bishkek and the municipal authorities in Osh city have devised and (to an extent) implemented comprehensive policies to promote good ethnic relations and emphasize the place that Uzbeks have in Kyrgyzstan. Against trenchant foreign criticism of the treatment of Uzbeks since 2010 by ‘nationalist’ politicians, Kyrgyz elites point to these policies as evidence of their commitment to an inclusive, multi-ethnic future. This section considers these local policy responses and argues that it is a mistake to dismiss them – but that their apparent failure to change the situation is due to their underlying nationalist assumptions about the tribal organization and insecurity of Kyrgyzstan.
Kyrgyz central government policy responses to June 2010 events are difficult to gauge at this moment owing to the change of president in 2011. During the interim presidency of Roza Otunbaeva in 2010-2011, a Department of Ethnic, Religious Policies and Interaction with Civil Society was established in the President’s Office, headed by Mira Karybaeva. It has analysed and compiled the findings and recommendations of the various national and international reports on the Osh violence, and has produced a ‘concept of ethnic policy and consolidation’ entitled ‘Kyrgyzstan is my homeland’, plus an action plan on their implementation, which is comprehensive in coverage but vaguer in terms of responsibility and funding sources. 73 It spotlights a commitment to Kyrgyzstan as a ‘multilingual’ and ‘multicultural’ society, with a ‘guarantee to the representatives of all ethnicities that form the people of Kyrgyzstan that they can maintain their native languages, create conditions for its study and development, and does not allow discrimination by failure to know state and official languages.’ In 2011, Mira Karybaeva told me that the government therefore regarded the threat by the Mayor of Osh to close down Uzbek schooling as ‘very serious,’ and considered it, along with the renaming of the ‘Kyrgyz-Uzbek University’ and Kara-Suu region’s instruction to Uzbek schools to open Kyrgyz classes as ‘unacceptable’ and exceeding local authority. 74 Likewise, calls by populist protestors and leaders such as Jyldyz Joldosheva in May 2012 for the scrapping of Uzbek-language university
72
http://registan.net/2012/04/05/kyrgyz-mp-claims-to-unearth-new-uzbek-plot/ However Hamm provides little evidence to support his claims about Atambaev. 73
Republic, ‘Mekenim Kyrgyzstan: Conception of ethnic policy and consolidation of the society in the Kyrgyz Republic and Action Plan through 2015’ and ‘Action Plan on Implementation of Ethnic Policy and Society Consolidation of the Kyrgyz Republic Through 2015’, 10 June 2011. 74
Interview, Bishkek, 27 October 2011.
REP Programme Paper: Averting Violence in Kyrgyzstan: Understanding and Responding to Nationalism www.chathamhouse.org 22 entrance exams have been vigorously rebuffed by the Atambaev administration. 75 This is encouraging, but at this stage it is too early to identify the approach that the Atambaev administration will take towards ethnic matters, or the extent to which it is able to enforce its writ in Osh.
A recurring theme in international analysis of inter-ethnic relations in Osh since June 2010 has been the role of the city’s mayor, Melis Myrzakmatov. According to the reports of organizations such as the International Crisis Group, his role has been inflammatory and caused great consternation among Osh’s Uzbeks. 76 As seen in section 4, Myrzakmatov interpreted the violence as an attempt by Uzbek separatist leaders, backed by powerful interests in Uzbekistan, to dismember the state in a violent uprising. Versions of this theory are widely believed within Kyrgyzstan: by presenting himself as the saviour of the state who crushed the uprising and deterred an Uzbekistani invasion, Myrzakmatov rode a wave of populist nationalism he helped create. Because of this he has emerged as a champion of the countrywide populist nationalistic opposition; harder-line nationalist candidates defeated in the autumn 2011 presidential elections subsequently allied themselves with him. In March 2012 he further bolstered his position when his party, Uluttar Birimdigi (literally: the unity of the ethnic groups), won the greatest number of seats in Osh city council elections. 77
Myrzakmatov has energetically pursued two sets of policies in particular that have a bearing on ethnic relations in Osh: promoting tolerance and developing a symbolic Kyrgyz ideology for the city. Overall, he is critical of the Soviet model of schooling in national-minority languages, and states that the model he prefers was that of the United States, where, he claims, numerous ethnic groups coexist with a sense of their unique history but primarily consider themselves ‘American’. 78
The first plank of Myrzakmatov’s policy response to the 2010 violence has been to promote tolerance. As an article in the mayoralty-controlled newspaper Osh Shamy put it, ‘Tolerance is the way to peaceful existence.’ 79 In the aftermath of the June violence, Myrzakmatov announced his desire to rebuild not mono-ethnic Uzbek mahalla neighbourhoods, but mixed neighbourhoods of apartment blocks, as he claimed that ‘ethnically mixed housing would prevent future violence’ by reducing distance between communities. 80 This was subsequently shelved under international pressure. The core of Myrzakmatov’s promotion of ‘tolerance’, however, was built around his declaration of 2011 as ‘The year of strengthening the relations, concordance and friendship between ethnic groups in the city of Osh.’ In a decree on 31 January 2011, he set out a comprehensive plan for the year’s events. 81 The extensive programme was a medley of schemes including those dedicated to improving public healthcare provision, raising consciousness of citizens’ rights and promoting sport.
75
Central Asia, 18 May 2012. 76
International Crisis Group (2012), ‘Kyrgyzstan: Widening Ethnic Divisions in the South’, Asia Report, No 222, 29 March 2012. See detailed analysis of this paper in section 6.
77
Toktonaliev, Timur. ‘Southern Kyrgyz Mayor Strengthened by Local Polls’, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Reporting Central Asia, 7 March 2012. 78
‘Osh Shaarynyn meri M. Myrzakmatov: “El aralyk beytarap komissiya uluttar aralyk mamilesi kyrchutuuga bagyttalgan butum chygardy”’ [The independent international commission has issued its conclusions about the deterioration of inter- ethnic relations] Osh Shamy, 7 May 2011, p.2 (headline with portrait of mayor on page 1).
79 Osh Shamy, 11 June 2011, p. 11.
80 Myrzakmatov is reported as saying that ‘Mixed neighborhoods didn’t suffer during the violence [...] So we want to create integrated neighborhoods where children [of various ethnicities] play together and people live side by side and make friends.’ Feifer, Gregory (2011), ‘In Kyrgyzstan, Uzbeks Criticize Osh Reconstruction Plan’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 11 August 2012. 81
‘Osh shaaryna uluttar aralyk mamileni, yntymaktuuluktu, dostuktu chingdoo jyldyn otkoruu boyuncha ish-charchlar plany’ [A plan of activities for implementing the year of strengthening the relations, concordance and friendship of the ethnic groups of Osh city’], Osh Shamy, 5 February 2011.
Yüklə 0,74 Mb. Dostları ilə paylaş:
|