State V. Johnson



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speaking, she was able to determine the angle as “slight.”  She further testified that the 

trajectory angle of the bullet was not beyond 20 degrees — “slight incline” and “not a lot 

of deviation in the up and down plane.”   

{¶75}   The trial court denied Johnson’s Crim.R. 29 motion for judgment of 

acquittal and the matter was submitted to the jury.     



{¶76} While the jury was deliberating, Johnson moved for a mistrial based on the 

state’s use of enlarged summaries of the cell phone records during its rebuttal closing 

argument.  Johnson maintained the improper demonstrative evidence was used by the 

state for the purpose of showing that Johnson acted with prior calculation and design by 

“lying in wait” to shoot Coates.  After conducting a hearing, the trial court concluded 

that the enlargements were not prejudicial because the jury also heard testimony that 

Johnson drove to Cleveland for the sole purpose of picking up Coleman and her children. 

{¶77} The jury returned a verdict of not guilty on the charge of aggravated murder, 

but guilty of murder and both counts of felonious assault and the attendant firearm 

specifications.  The trial court subsequently found Johnson guilty of having a weapon 

while under disability and the notice of prior conviction and repeat violent offender 

specifications.  Johnson was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 25 years to life in 

prison.    He now appeals his convictions, raising six assignments of error. 

I.    Manifest Weight of the Evidence 

{¶78}  In his first assignment of error, Johnson contends that “the trial court erred 

in entering a conviction which was against the manifest weight of the evidence, in 




violation of defendant’s right to due process of law, as protected by the 14th Amendment 

to the United States Constitution.” 



{¶79} “‘A manifest weight challenge * * * questions whether the prosecution met 

its burden of persuasion.’”  State v. Ponce, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91329, 

2010-Ohio-1741, ¶ 17, quoting State v. Thomas, 70 Ohio St.2d 79, 80, 434 N.E.2d 1356 

(1982).  The manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard of review requires us to review 

the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the 

credibility of witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the 

trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the 

conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.  State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 

339, 515 N.E.2d 1009 (9th Dist.1986), paragraph one of the syllabus.    The discretionary 

power to grant a new trial should be exercised only in exceptional cases where the 

evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 

386, 1997-Ohio-52, 678 N.E.2d 541. 



{¶80}  Under well-settled precedent, we are constrained to adhere to the principle 

that the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony are matters 

for the trier of fact to resolve.    See State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231, 227 N.E.2d 

212 (1967).  Although we consider the credibility of witnesses in a manifest weight 

challenge, we are mindful that the determination regarding witness credibility rests 

primarily with the trier of fact because the trier of fact is in the best position to view the 

witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures, and voice inflections — observations that 



are critical to determining a witness’s credibility.    State v. Clark, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

94050, 2010-Ohio-4354, ¶ 17, citing State v. Hill, 75 Ohio St.3d 195, 205, 

1996-Ohio-222, 661 N.E.2d 1068, and State v. Antill, 176 Ohio St. 61, 66, 197 N.E.2d 

548 (1964). The trier of fact is free to accept or reject any or all of the testimony of any 

witness.  State v. Smith, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93593, 2010-Ohio-4006, ¶ 16.  As this 

court has previously recognized, a defendant is not entitled to a reversal on 

manifest-weight grounds merely because inconsistent evidence was presented at trial.  

State v. Gaughan, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90523, 2009-Ohio-955, ¶ 32, citing State v. 

Raver, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 02AP-604, 2003-Ohio-958, ¶ 21. 

{¶81}  Johnson argues that his convictions are against the manifest weight of the 

evidence because the state’s theory of the case ignored the fact that Coleman also called 

Gale to the scene, and Gale had more of a motive to shoot Coates because Coleman was 

his live-in girlfriend, and he had a physical altercation with Coates during which time 

Gale was stabbed.  Johnson also contends that the jury lost its way because all the 

witnesses were untruthful with the police, provided inconsistent accounts of the events

and the trajectory of the bullet paired with the testimony did not fit that Johnson was the 

shooter.  However, the jury heard all the evidence, including the conflicting and 

self-serving testimony by the witnesses, and considered the circumstances surrounding 

Johnson’s identification as the shooter.  Additionally, the testimony about the trajectory 

of the bullet, coupled with Howard’s testimony, demonstrates that Johnson’s presence in 

the driveway does not exclude him as the shooter. 




{¶82} Green, Fussell, and Howard were the only individuals who did not have any 

self-preservation motives at this trial.  Green and Fussell both testified about seeing a 

man walking toward Green’s house with a gun. Fussell testified that he heard the gun 

being “cocked.”  Both described the man as “light-skinned,” and testified that moments 

after the man passed, they heard a gunshot.  While neither saw the shooting, Officer 

Crosby testified that Green told her on scene that either “Ed” or “Capone” shot Coates.   



{¶83}  The jury also heard Gale’s testimony of his involvement.  While his 

testimony and actions taken after being stabbed, including throwing away his bloody 

clothes, were suspect, the jury heard this testimony and drew its own conclusions from it.   

Gale testified that he and Coates engaged in a physical altercation during which he was 

stabbed.  But when Johnson approached the scene with a gun drawn, Gale started 

retreating toward his vehicle.  He then heard a gunshot and saw Coates lying in the 

doorway.  Although Gale’s testimony was self-serving and he was untruthful with 

everyone, certain consistencies existed about the events of the shooting and the actions 

thereafter, which demonstrates that the jury did not lose its way in finding Johnson guilty. 

{¶84}  The jury heard testimony that Johnson drove up in front of Green’s house 

and yelled for Coleman to “come on,” while she was retrieving her children and fighting 

with Green in the house.    When she did not respond, Johnson pulled off and parked away 

from the scene to wait for them, which is consistent with Howard’s testimony that he saw 

Coleman and Gale walking down the street and enter a dark-colored vehicle that was 

parked and driven by someone else.     




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