Talmud Nazir (E)

forbidden.
(8) Since the termination of her naziriteship does not affect his own naziriteship.
(9) Once the husband has confirmed his wife's vow, he can no longer declare it void; v. Num. XXX, 16.
(10) By applying to a Sage.
(11) And he himself will remain a nazirite.
(12) I.e., it ceases to be sacred and may be returned to the fold.
(13) I.e., it is still sacred, v. infra 24a.
(14) For the naziriteship is null, and the animal was set aside in error, v. infra 31a.
(15) And the animal is actually a sin-offering, but cannot be offered since the woman is no longer a nazirite.
(16) For she has ceased to be a nazirite; thus Rashi and the printed text, Tosaf. and other MSS. read: ‘Since she requires
atonement,’ i.e., because she denied herself wine (v. supra 19a).
(17) Infra 23a.
(18) Viz., that she receives stripes. For she is no different from any other nazirite.
(19) After his wife drank wine.
(20) For we now see that she was not really a nazirite when she violated the rules of naziriteship.
(21) And though she is no longer a nazirite, she must receive stripes for drinking wine when she was a nazirite,
(22) Infra 23a.
Talmud - Mas. Nazir 22a
Talmud - Mas. Nazir 22a
Talmud - Mas. Nazir 22a
we are also taught in the first clause that, [if her husband does not annul her naziriteship,] she does
receive [stripes].
1
 
    Come and hear: If a woman undertakes a nazirite vow and contracts ritual defilement, and then her
husband declares [the vow] void, she is to bring a bird as a sin-offering, but not one as a
burnt-offering.
2
 Now if you suppose that the husband terminates [the vow], she ought also to bring a
bird as a burnt-offering?
3
 — What then would you have us think? That [the husband] nullifies [the
vow]? Then she ought not to bring a bird as a sin-offering either?
4
 — That is so. Here, however, we
are being given the opinion of R. Eleazar ha-Kappar, for it has been taught: R. Eleazar ha-Kappar
Berabbi said: [It may be asked,] Why does Scripture say, [And make atonement for him] for that he
sinned by reason of the soul?
5
 For against what soul has he sinned? [The reply is,] however, that
because he denied himself wine, he is called a sinner. If then this man who denied himself wine only
is called a sinner, how much more so is this true of one who is ascetic in all things!
6
 
    Come and hear the following where it is taught explicitly: If a woman vows to be a nazirite and
her companion overhears and says, ‘I too, and then the husband of the first woman declares [her
vow] void, she is released [from her vow] but her companion remains bound.
7
 From this it follows
that the husband terminates [the vow].
8
 R. Simeon however says
9
 that where [her companion] says to
her, ‘I undertake the same [obligation] as you,’ both become free.
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(1) Though here it is obvious,
(2) A nazirite who contracts defilement must bring one bird as a burnt offering and one as a sin-offering, (cf. Num. VI,
10, 11); v. supra 19a.
(3) For the husband does not affect the period before his declaration that the vow is to be void.
(4) Since she was not really a nazirite when she violated her vow.
(5) For notes v. supra p. 64.
(6) Thus she must bring a sin-offering even though the husband nullifies the vow, because she had denied herself wine.
(7) Tosef. Naz. III, 5.
(8) Continuation of the cited Baraitha.
(9) Since otherwise both women should become free together.
Talmud - Mas. Nazir 22b
Talmud - Mas. Nazir 22b

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Talmud - Mas. Nazir 22b
Mar Zutra, the son of Rab Mari said: The same problem is raised here as was raised by Rami b.
Hama.
1
 For Rami b. Hama wished to know the effect of saying, ‘Let these [victuals] be, as far as I
am concerned, as the flesh of [this] peace-offering.’
2
 Does a man, in thus linking one thing with
another, refer to the original state [of the subject of comparison],
3
 or to its ultimate state?
4
 
    But surely [the two cases] do not bear comparison?
5
 For when he says in that case, ‘Let these
[victuals], as far as I am concerned, be as the flesh of this peace-offering,’ [the fact remains that]
even though once the blood is sprinkled, this may be eaten outside [the Temple precincts, yet it] is
still sacred.
6
 In our case, on the other hand, if we suppose that she has the ultimate state in mind,
then the husband [of the first woman] has declared [the vow] void!
7
 Some consider that our problem
and that of Rami b. Hama are undoubtedly identical.
8
 
    If [a woman] says to her [companion], ‘I intend to be a nazirite in your wake,’
9
 what would the
law be? Does ‘in your wake’ [mean,] ‘I intend to follow in your wake in every respect,’ so that she
becomes free, or does it refer to her [companion's] condition before her husband declared [the
naziriteship] void, so that she remains bound?
 
    Come and hear: If a woman vows to be a nazirite and her husband overhears and adds, ‘I too’,
10
he cannot declare [her vow] void. Now should you assume that when he says, ‘I intend to follow in
your wake,’
11
 he has in mind the original situation,
12
 why should he not be able to declare her [vow]
void, whilst allowing his own to remain? Does it not follow, therefore, that what he refers to is the
situation with all its developments, and so [it is only when] he himself [is involved that he] cannot
declare [the vow] void,
13
 but where [another] woman says, ‘I intend to follow in your wake,’ she
would also be freed?
14
 — This is not the case. In point of fact, he may be referring to the original
situation, but in this case, when he says, ‘I too,’ it is as though he says. ‘I confirm it for you,’ and so
if he consults [a wise man] in order to have his ratification upset, he will be able to declare [her vow]
void, but not otherwise.
 
    [IF HE SHOULD SAY IN CONVERSATION WITH HIS WIFE,] ‘I INTEND TO BE A
NAZIRITE, WHAT ABOUT YOU’
15
 AND SHE ANSWER’ AMEN,’ HE CAN DECLARE HER
[VOW] VOID, BUT HIS OWN REMAINS BINDING: The following passage seems to contradict
this statement. [If a man says to his wife,] ‘I intend to be a nazirite. What about you?’
16
 if she
answers ‘Amen,’ both become bound [to their vows],
17
 but otherwise both are free, because he made
his vow contingent on hers?
18
 — Rab Judah replied: You should [emend the Baraitha to] read, He
can declare her [vow] void, but his own remains binding.
 
    Abaye said: It is even possible to leave the reading intact. The Baraitha supposes him to say to
her, ‘I intend to be a nazirite with you,’ thus making his vow contingent on her vow;
19
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(1) I.e., whether the vow of the second woman remains binding or not depends, not on the precise force of the husband's
declaration that a vow is void, but on the alternatives enunciated by Rami b. Hama.
(2) This might not be eaten before its blood was sprinkled on the altar, but could be eaten afterwards.
(3) Here, the flesh before the sprinkling of the blood; so that the victuals indicated would also become forbidden. This
problem is treated differently in Ned. 11b (q.v.).
(4)  After the sprinkling of the blood, when the flesh may be eaten. Similarly in the case of the second woman the
problem is: — Did she contemplate the original state of the first woman, so that she remains a nazirite, or did she also
consider the possibility of the husband declaring the vow void, when her own would also become void. As the Baraitha
says that her vow remains binding we may also infer that in Rami b. Hama's case the original state was meant and the
victuals are forbidden. The word 
tbbm
 used to convey the idea of a final state is usually taken from the root meaning
‘cold’, i.e., ‘when it had cooled down’. L. Goldschmidt suggests that it may be derived from a Syriac word ‘zenana’
meaning the savour of roast meat,’ and refers to the time when the flesh is prepared for food.

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