Talmud Nazir (E)

(26) [The flesh of a guilt-offering for a doubtful transgression was eaten, v. Zeb. 54b.]
Talmud - Mas. Nazir 29b
Talmud - Mas. Nazir 29b
Talmud - Mas. Nazir 29b
You cannot say so. Whilst this applies in the case of a man where only one forbidden act is
involved,
1
 you cannot argue that this should also be the case with a woman where two forbidden acts
are involved. Now what are the two forbidden acts referred to? Are they not the prohibition against
the eating of carrion,
2
 and the prohibition against the entry of profane [sacrifices] into the Temple
court?
3
 
    R. Aha, the son of R. Ika [however] demurred [to this inference
4
 being drawn], for it is surely
possible that [the eating was forbidden]
5
 because it would appear as though two rabbinic enactments
were being transgressed.
6
 
    Can we say that [the controversy between R. Johanan and Resh Lakish] is the same as that
between [the following] Tannaim? [For it has been taught:] Rabbi says that he can impose a nazirite
vow on his son until his majority;
7
 but R. Jose son of R. Judah says, [only] until he reaches the age
of making vows [for himself].
8
 Now surely [the controversy between R. Johanan and Resh Lakish] is
the same as [that between these] Tannaim, Rabbi considering it to be a [traditional] ruling with
regard to the nazirite, so that though [the son] may have reached the age of making vows [for
himself, the father] can still impose a [nazirite] vow on him until he attains his majority, whereas R.
Jose son of R. Judah who asserts [that he can do so only] until [the son] reaches the age of making
vows [for himself] is of the opinion that [the father may impose a naziriteship] in order to train him
to [carry out his] religious duties, and, now that he has passed out of his [father's] control,
9
 there is
no longer an obligation [to train him]?
10
 — I will tell you; not at all. Both [Rabbi and R. Jose son of
R. Judah may] agree that this is a [traditional] ruling with regard to the nazirite. Where they differ is
about [the vows of] one who can discriminate
11
 [but] who has not quite reached manhood. Rabbi
considers that [a youth] who can discriminate [but] who has not quite reached manhood is [permitted
to make vows] only by enactment of the Rabbis and so the right granted by the Torah [to the
parent]
12
 overrules the Rabbinical right [of the youth];
13
 whereas R. Jose son of R. Judah considers
that [a youth] who can discriminate [but] who has not quite reached manhood, has a Scriptural right
[to make vows].
14
 
    Alternatively, it may be that both [Rabbi and R. Jose son of R. Judah] would agree that [the father
may impose a naziriteship] in order to train him to [carry out his] religious duties, and that [the right
of a youth,] who can discriminate [but] who has not quite reached manhood, [to make vows] is
Rabbinic. Rabbi, on the one hand, holds that [the parent's duty] to train, which is itself Rabbinic,
overrules [the right of the youth,] who can discriminate [but] who has not quite reached manhood,
[to make vows for himself] which is also Rabbinic;
15
 whilst R. Jose son of R. Judah, who says [that
the father's right lasts only] until [the lad] reaches the age of making vows, holds that the Rabbinic
duty to train [the lad] does not set aside [the right of a youth] who can discriminate [but] who has not
quite reached manhood [to make his own vows, although this is also Rabbinic].
16
 
    Can we say that [the controversy between] the above Tannaim
17
 is the same as that between the
following Tannaim?
18
 For it has been taught: It is related that R. Hanina's father once imposed a
nazirite vow upon him and then brought him before R. Gamaliel. R. Gamaliel was about to examine
him to discover whether or not he had reached his majority
19
 — according to R. Jose
20
 it was to
discover whether he had reached the age of making vows
21
 — when [the young Hanina] said to him,
‘Sir, do not exert yourself to examine me. If I am a minor, then I am a nazirite because of my father's
[imposition], whilst if I am an adult,
22
 I undertake it on my own account.’ Thereupon R. Gamaliel
rose and kissed him upon his head, and said, ‘I am certain that this [lad] will be a religious leader
23
in Israel.’ It is said that in a very short space of time, he became in fact a religious leader in Israel.
24

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Now on R. Jose son of R. Judah's view that [the father's control lasts only] until [the boy] reaches the
age at which he can make vows [for himself], we can understand why he should have said, ‘If I am a
minor,
25
 I shall be [a nazirite] because of my father's [action, and so on].’ But on Rabbi's view that
[it lasts] until manhood, [of what value was the statement], ‘whilst if I am an adult, I undertake it on
my own account,’
____________________
(1) If he was not in fact guilty, a profane animal was sacrificed on his behalf. This the Tanna of the Baraitha considers is
forbidden.
(2) The bird, having its neck pinched, is carrion, pinching being only permitted to a true sacrificial bird.
(3)  And thus we see that R. Jose considers both these acts forbidden by the Torah, in contradiction to the statement
attributed to him above.
(4) That the above acts are forbidden by the Torah.
(5) Our text has, instead of this inserted phrase, ‘She is liable’, which gives no sense. We have therefore followed all the
commentators and omitted it.
(6) I.e., the eating of the bird brought by the woman was forbidden not because the comparison with the guilt-offering
brought by the man did not extend to cover it, but because two enactments of the Rabbis were involved, and this
outweighs the analogy with the guilt-offering.
(7) Lit., ‘until two hairs appear’, i.e., until there is definite evidence that he has reached puberty, usually after the end of
the thirteenth year.
(8) I.e., between the twelfth and thirteenth birthdays, when he understands the significance of a vow.
(9) For he can now make his own vows.
(10) And therefore he cannot impose one.
(11) I.e., who realises the significance of a vow.
(12) To impose a naziriteship. A halachah or traditional ruling has the force of a scriptural enactment.
(13) To make vow's himself.
(14) And when he reaches this age, his father can no longer impose a naziriteship upon him.
(15) And the father can impose a naziriteship until the boy is thirteen.
(16) And when the boy reaches the age of making vows, the father's right to impose a naziriteship ceases.
(17) Rabbi and R. Jose son of R. Judah.
(18) This is put as a question although the answer in this case is not negative. This is not uncommon (Asheri).
(19) Lit., ‘produced two hairs’, as a sign of puberty. On this view, he was thirteen years old at the time.
(20) I.e., R. Jose son of R. Judah. V. Tosaf.
(21) The boy was only twelve years old according to R. Jose.
(22) In regard to making vows.
(23) Lit., will render halachic decisions.’
(24) Tosef. Nid. V.
(25)  It is here supposed that all the young R. Hanina meant was, ‘If I cannot yet make vows myself,’ no special
significance attaching to his use of the word minor’.
Talmud - Mas. Nazir 30a
Talmud - Mas. Nazir 30a
Talmud - Mas. Nazir 30a
seeing that he was still under his father's control?
1
 — [Rabbi will reply that] he really said, ‘I intend
to be one on my father's account [if he still has the right to impose it],
2
 and on my own account
[otherwise].’ Now if he had in fact reached manhood at that time, his own naziriteship would take
effect; if [he reached manhood] after [observing the naziriteship], he would have observed his
father's naziriteship.
3
 But suppose he reaches [manhood] during this period, what is to happen then?
4
Now on R. Jose son of R. Judah's view that [the father's right lasts] until the age at which he can
make vows [for himself], all will be well,
5
 but on Rabbi's view that [the right lasts] until he reaches
manhood, how will you explain what happened?
6
 — In point of fact, on Rabbi's view no other
solution is possible,
7
 than that he should observe [naziriteships] both on the father's account and on
his own account.
8
 

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