The eu’s Legitimacy in the Eye of the Beholders

9.3 – The Three Discourses as Narratives

Let us now examine the national discourses. These narratives place the numerical differences in their context. They will demonstrate that a quantitative analysis is a very useful and reliable means for presenting differences in qualitative data. Further, these narratives will reveal several other aspects that would not have come forward in the numbers alone, but that are important for our understanding of the EU’s legitimacy deficit in people’s perception.

9.3.1 – The Dutch Debate: Infighting Federalists

The Dutch seem to accept the EU as a necessity for a small country in a globalised world. Leaving the EU ‘would mean exchanging shared sovereignty for virtual sovereignty, from reality to fantasy’ (NRC June 27, 2000).¹⁰⁵ This accounts for the positive evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy when focussing on output as well as the higher number of publications on the EU.¹⁰⁶ This consensus could also explain why there is no single perception focussing on output legitimacy with many observations, because the necessity of the EU to further Dutch interests is widely accepted. More specific, the EU is defended by its historical and current ability to spread peace and prosperity across the European continent. The left do criticise Europe for being too liberal and not social and green enough and after the rejection of the constitution they called upon the leaders within the EU to ‘now go to work on proposal for a more democratic, social and green Europe’ (Volkskrant June 25, 2005).¹⁰⁷

The second characteristic is the emphasis on input legitimacy that leads to a negative evaluation. This emphasis is the result of a ‘federalist consensus’, because there are no actual opponents to EU-cooperation and to some extend federalisation. The Dutch rightwing parties – the conservative-liberals (VVD) and Christian-democrats (CDA) – are staunch supporters of the EU.

Former Euro-commissioner VVD’er Frits Bolkenstein describes the EU’s problems as follows: ‘The Lisbon-train pulls to many carts. That is why it keeps driving slower. The EU should concentrate on a limited number of aspects, primarily the increase of competiveness (NRC February 7, 2005).¹⁰⁸ He does not fear supranational institutions, but too much Europe, which to some extend is the VVD’s position on national issues as well: a small state and a free market.

The CDA perceive the EU as a value community in line with their views on the Netherlands. Some Dutch parties on the (centre-)left also see Europe as a values community: ‘[The cornerstone is] respect for the values of the EU. In that sense the borders are not physical, and not an inevitable fact, but they are determined by the measure in which one can and wants to be part of the value community which the EU is’ (NRC February 7, 2005).¹⁰⁹ There is though clear difference with the CDA for the latter focus on religious heritage rather than universal, humanist values.

The Dutch electorate though is Euro-sceptic, which might actually be the result of the federalist consensus. There is (one should say was) no real no-camp. The pro-European elite struggle with the growing Euro-sceptic sentiments among the people – ‘The interest of the Dutch, but also of other Europeans for Europe is at an all time low’ (Volkskrant October 17, 2001).¹¹⁰ The solutions are further democratisation, a temporary stop to further expansion/integration – ‘The EU should “hold its position for a moment”’(Volkskrant June 3, 2005)¹¹¹ – , or to convince ‘the people’ that the EU does not endanger the national identity or even is itself a ‘value community’ of which we are a part (Volkskrant December 7, 2004).¹¹² None of these solutions though seems to strike a chord with the electorate.

Finally, there is much discussion about the exact finalité politique. Most prominently feature: the policy competences for the tiers of government (What the Germans call a Kompetenzenkatalog) and the type of economy the EU should aspire to be. These discussions often stay vague and unspecific, except if the article focuses on the subject rather than the EU.

In conclusion, the Dutch discourse is a kind of federalist infight. Most parties participating in the discourse agree that the Netherlands’ future lies in Europe, but what the exact form should be is the real question. The right wants a small state and a free-market, whilst the left see Europe as a way to promote social(-economic) justice at home and across the globe, thus they want a state to control the market. The people though are struggling with the far away structures of the EU and they do not seem to be swayed by either prospect.

9.3.2 – The British Struggle: Europhobes versus Gaullists

In the debate and solution for the EU’s legitimacy deficit, the British discourse could not be any different from the Dutch. Europe is less important as indicated by the smaller number of articles published, but also there is no real British federalist position. The main federalist contributions are by foreign dignitaries, like Joschka Fischer and José Manuel Barroso (Respectively: Independent May 16, 2000 and Independent December 12, 2005).

The first group in the British discourse are the Europhobes. They are represented by the conservative party, United Kingdom Independent Party (UKIP) and the majority of the mass media, but also Labour and Green parliamentarian are part of this group (Independent May 19, 2005). One commentator paints the following picture of Britain’s future:

After rejecting the single currency in a referendum and following several more years of increasing isolation, Britain cuts its ties with the European Union and applies for membership of Nafta, the North American free trade agreement. Some supporters of ever closer links between the English speaking nations take the fantasy one stage further and envisage the UK as the 51st and most powerful state of the union. (Guardian June 30, 2000).
The point of this quote is not to show how unrealistic some Europhobes are, but rather to indicate how far removed the British are from any Dutch conception of the possibility and desirability of a European federation. Most British people have a sincere, whether realistic or not, fear of what William Hague, former leader of the conservative party, describes as: ‘sliding down a slipway to a superstate’ (Independent December 12, 2000).¹¹³

On the other hand, there are the pro-Europeans represented primarily by the then Labour prime-minister Tony Blair. Blair’s position though is not federalist either, rather he argues for Europe as a way to further Britain’s interests in a globalised world. ‘[Blair] is a modern Gaullist’ (Guardian May 3, 2001). He is clearly aware of this as the following anecdote illustrates: ‘When one official murmured during a Downing Street meeting on the speech that one passage's emphasis on nation states seemed "rather Gaullist", Blair gave him the thumbs up sign. "De Gaulle," he replied. "Top man"’ (Independent October 5, 2000). The two men differ in one regard: Blair does not value mercantilism, but its Anglo-Saxon counterpart: free-trade. Still, the EU is a means to national ends.

It is this position that accounts for the many positive observations characterised by a nationalist concept of legitimacy with a focus on input and indirect legitimacy – ‘To Blair […] the Council of Ministers […] is the EU's democratic core’ (Independent October 5, 2000). The EU is thus already indirectly legitimated. If democratisation is needed it should be achieved through ‘a second chamber of the European Parliament to be made up of national parliamentarians to stop the EU overstepping its powers’ (Independent May 29, 2001). A focus on output legitimacy often leading to a negative evaluation is also partially explained by Blair’s Gaullism. The EU is too expensive and more importantly it focuses on the wrong issues. It should be ‘a "superpower [military and economic interests] not a superstate"’ (Guardian October 7, 2000). For as Blair puts it: 'The question that is being debated by the people of Europe is how do you, in this era of globalisation, make our economies strong and competitive?' (Independent June 3, 2005).

The selected pro-European newspapers also in part explain that negative evaluation. They contain editorials that try to make the case for Europe. They try to convince the British public by pointing out the missed opportunities of not being at the heart of Europe, which makes the evaluation of the output more often negative than in the Netherlands. An interesting absentee in the discourse is the EU as the historical bringer of peace and prosperity to the continent, but then again Great-Britain was ‘victorious’ in World War Two and might see itself in this role. The EU is recognized by some as the bringer of peace in the ‘neighbourhood’.

As one might notice reference is often made to Tony Blair. This is because personification of positions is very common. This might be the result of the British political system, which is more person-orientated. The United Kingdom is ‘[s]teeped for centuries in winner-take-all juices’, which also influences media coverage. The British results in Brussels are approached as an international organisation, in which ultimately everything depends on the national heads of state. ‘National victory and/or defeat seems to be the only basis on which most Brits can understand events (Guardian December 12, 2000). This makes the comprehension of the EU’s complex decision procedures hard.¹¹⁴

There are two important elements that further differentiate the British discourse from the Dutch. First, the British discuss more specific policy issues, most prominently their own rebate: ‘[T]here can only be movement on the rebate if there are equivalent advances in relation to the Common Agricultural Policy’ (Independent June 16, 2005). This brings us the second difference, which can be summarised as: What are the French doing? Europe is France for the British. Both British positions fear being trapped in a social-market designed by the French and ‘British critics most object to [the constitution], as being typically French’ (Guardian May 26, 2006).

The British discourse is a struggle for the heart and minds of the British people between Europhobes and Gaullists. The former anxiously fear submerging in a European superstate, whilst the latter see the EU as a way to further British interests in a globalised world. The tacit consent is that neither wants to sacrifice British parliamentary sovereignty, but their different analyses of the chances and dangers for the United Kingdom within the EU results in different positions.

9.3.3 – The French Dilemma: Gaullists versus Federalists

France falls in-between the other two discourses with a mixed emphasis on input and output legitimacy. This position is explained by the fact that it combines one position from each discourse: the Dutch federalist position and the British Gaullist position. This in turn explains that there are fewer observations characterised by a universalist concept of legitimacy with a focus on input and direct legitimacy leading to a negative evaluation then in the Netherlands and why there is more emphasis on output legitimacy than in the Netherlands, yet less than in the United Kingdom.

The French discourse also stands out in several respects. The most remarkable finding is the almost complete absence of articles in period one and then the sudden and dramatic increase in period two. Larry Siedentop argues that the Euro was a French idea to keep German power in check after reunification. The constitutional treaty though is perceived as a Anglo-Germanic half-breed with bits and pieces from both federalism and free-market ideology, both of which are opposed to the French (administrative) culture of étatism (2000: 137-140). From this perspective, the introduction of the Euro would not trigger French anxieties, but the constitutional treaty is a completely different story. The French see themselves as the leaders of Europe, but their influence is gradually declining or as Timothy Garton Ash puts it: “[They] fear an enlarged EU with Paris no longer in the driving seat” (Guardian May 26, 2006).

Let us turn to the first position in the discourse: the Gaullist position. They perceive, a contraire to their British counterpart, the EU as more and more problematic. Gaullist were fine with Europe when in was ‘theirs’, but they are now turning away from it. They argue that democracy is naturally structured on the national level in the nation and cannot be moved to the European level.
But regardless of the magicians. The room is empty, but they continue their magic tricks in front of a virtual European people. Because there is no European people, but only peoples in Europe, rooted in national histories, language, culture, policies, attached to what we call a nation where democracy is exercised and where identity is based, which is manifested in sovereignty (Figaro March 2, 2005).¹¹⁵
A political order needs a political will, which can only exist on the national level. This explains to some extend why a nationalist conceptualisation of legitimacy does not lead more often to a positive evaluation like in the other discourses.

Federalists, on the other hand, seek to legitimize the EU through further democratisation. They perceive the EU as a means to protect France ‘from the effects of globalisation’ (Figaro December 14, 2001)¹¹⁶, but also as a way to ‘play a role in the international political arena’ (Figaro May 19, 2005)¹¹⁷ and form an opposing power to the USA. This is the reason for many positive evaluations of the EU’s legitimacy assessed with nationalist concept of legitimacy and a focus on output legitimacy, but not using any model of political order. This ‘essentially’ Gaullist bid for power knows a more humanist version, which aims to promote peace and social justice (e.g. Figaro June 21, 2005). The EU is ‘a supranational space of peace, democracy and prosperity’ (Libération October 20, 2004)¹¹⁸, which in turn explains why a universalist conceptualisation is more positive than in other discourses. Federalists want the EU ‘to pursue the construction of a Europe that protects its citizens, beyond the free market, using tax policies, social and environmental conclusions' (Libération October 12, 2005).¹¹⁹

In Libération, there is another analysis of the EU’s legitimacy deficit, namely the French political system itself personified by former Gaullist president Jacques Chirac. He is seen as having too much power, being unaccountable and on top of that his policy choices are disliked – [He pushed through] without taking into account the opinion of the parliamentary majority, the liberalization of energy market and the pension system a few weeks before the presidential election. The result of such irresponsibility is impressive’ (Libération June 4, 2005).¹²⁰ This internal dissatisfaction then reflects poorly on the European level of governance, which is the reason for the negative evaluation of the EU’s legitimacy when focussing on indirect legitimacy.

French commentators are critical of the EU for being too Anglo-Saxon, specifically the constitution. One of the most prominent figures is former prime-minister and potential presidential candidate, Laurent Fabius from the Parti Socialiste¹²¹, who moved away from his party-line to the no-camp calling ‘for a “reorientation of European politics”’ (Libération May 19, 2006).¹²² This is further interesting, because as we saw in the United Kingdom the argument for fearing Europe is exactly the opposite: Europe is too French and thus too socialist.

The French are alike to the British in two respects. First, they also focus on national political figures, which might relate to the powerful position of the president within their political system. Secondly, they return the favour of distrust. The distrust of the British is most apparent in their fear of an ‘a-social’ economic model and their hope ‘to put an end to neoliberal policies’ (Libération March 23, 2005).¹²³

The French dilemma seems to boil down to how to deal with their loss of power in the EU. This may explain both the sudden interest in the EU and why French Gaullists are turning away from Europe. The federalists, on the other hand, keep believing in the EU. The leftwing federalist might support further democratisation as a way to get around the conservative president. Either way the French are trying to get to grips with their future in Europe in one way – Gaullist – or another – federalist.