The eu’s Legitimacy in the Eye of the Beholders



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, van werkelijkheid tegen schijn’. This article by Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens is also published in the Guardian (October 4, 2004).

106 The number of articles are an indicator of the importance of an issue, see Liebert and Trentz (2008: 9).

107 ‘nu gaan werken aan voorstellen voor een democratischer, socialer en groener Europa’

108 ‘De Lissabon-trein trekt namelijk te veel wagons. Daarom rijdt hij steeds langzamer. De EU moet zich concentreren op een beperkt aantal aspecten, hoofdzakelijk ter verhoging van de concurrentiekracht’

109 ‘... respect voor de waarden van de EU. In die zin zijn grenzen niet fysiek, en geen vaststaand gegeven, maar worden zij bepaald door de mate waarin men deel kan en wil uitmaken van de waardengemeenschap die de EU is.’

110 ‘De interesse van Nederlanders, maar ook van andere Europeanen voor Europa is op een dieptepunt aanbeland.’

111 De EU “pas op de plaats maakt”

112 ‘... onze waardengemeenschap’

113 There are also party political motivations involved: ‘Cameron continues to use "Europe" as a touchstone of his loyalty to the party's Europhobic right’ (Guardian March 2, 2006). Cameron is often called a ‘caring’ (left) conservative and he needs Europe to bind the hardcore rightwing of his party. In the current EU election he has pulled the Conservatives out of the European Peoples Party (EPP-ED), because they are to pro-European.

114 According to this logic Britain would come out the winner much more than other countries, even more so with QMV (Guardian June 5, 2001), but in the eyes of winner-take-all sovereignty every loss is a complete defeat of the system (Guardian December 12, 2000).

115 ‘Mais peu importe aux illusionnistes. La salle est vide, mais ils continuent leurs tours de magie devant un peuple européen virtuel. Car il n'y a pas de peuple européen mais des peuples en Europe, enracinés dans des histoires nationales, une langue, une culture, des politiques, attachés à ce qu'on appelle une nation, lieu où s'exerce la démocratie, où se fonde l'identité, où se manifeste la souveraineté.’

116 ‘... face aux effets de la mondialisation.’

117 ‘... jouer un rôle en vue sur la scène politique international.’

118 ‘... un espace supranational de paix, de démocratie et de prospérité.’

119 ‘ ... s'atteler à la construction d'une Europe qui protège ses citoyens, par-delà le grand marché, à partir de politiques fiscales, sociales et environnementales concertées.’

120 ‘... sans tenir compte de l'avis de sa majorité parlementaire, la libéralisation du marché énergétique et du régime des retraites à quelques semaines de l'élection présidentielle. Le résultat de tant d'irresponsabilité est impressionnant.’

121 The French social-democrats

122 ‘... une "réorientation des politiques européennes’

123 ‘... de mettre un coup d'arrêt aux politiques néolibérales’

124 There are some proponents, for example Siedentop (2000).

125 As Van Middelaar observes the ‘German road’, as he calls seeking legitimacy by creating a European nation, was tried, but it failed (2009). The one symbol of sameness might be not being Muslim, which then explains the resistance to Turkey’s membership, but as said earlier, there are more reasons that play a role in this position. On the other hand, there are many integrated Muslims in Europe making the idea of ‘non-Muslimness’ as a European characteristic questionable in itself.

126 In Tegenlicht: Het dilemma van de democratie (Counterlight: The dilemma of democracy): Accessible via http://www.uitzendinggemist.nl/index.php/aflevering?aflID=5654897&md5=ac87ff6d3e7222bc6e600d5eb4889d8c (accessed June 21, 2009); One might assume if nationalism would disappear national interests would fade away and in its slipstream also the balancing act. Viroli argues the nation (as a cultural entity) would not have to disappear, but would have to be depoliticized (2002: 86). Still one may wonder whether this is at all possible if one needs a cultural identity to support ‘far away’ institutions.

127 The artificial distinction was emphasised for methodological reasons, but Hont’s mongrel concepts show us that in modern democratic discourse the people, the nation, and the state have become almost intrinsic linked. Even when they are ‘objectively’ speaking not, they are perceived as such.

128 Altough if this happens it might help in the long run, because the British might come to understand their dependence on the EU, but that is another matter.

129 Guardian September 5, 2005

130 Guardian June 5, 2001

131 Jürgen Habermas’ ideal of European constitutional patriotism (Liebert and Trentz 2008: 2) plays an important role in this misinterpretation. Habermas’ constant call for more democracy only seems to widen the gap. It displays the same dynamic of Reagan’s tax policy. The idea was lowering taxes will lead to higher revenues. When asks for an explanation for the low tax revenue he responded that taxes were obviously not low enough. Further, Habermas’s source of inspiration seems to be the United States of America, bus as Siedentop, based on Alexis De Tocqueville‘s Democracy in America, points out the very divided States share(d) four important characteristics: focus on local government, the same religion, the same language and juristic administration-culture. Furthermore, there were no old established nation-states in the new world to start out with either (Siedentop 2000).

132 As one academic with regards to the Open Method of Coordination observed: ‘[T]he most obvious solution of transferring autonomy to the European level proved impracticable since member states were particularly reluctant to give up control’(Bekkers et al. 2007: 249-250).

133 ‘[I]dentities and loyalties could return with a vengeance’ (Siedentop 2000: 220).

134 One might question whether these politicians actually believe this or use it to legitimise the EU; probably it is a bit of both.

135 Rinus van Schedelen argues that in most regards the EU is more democratic than the Member States (Kieswijzer Live, the same point is made in footnote 10).

136 One might wonder whether it is even still in place on the national level of governance, which Ulrich Beck implies with the nation-state is a zombie category (2002). Then again nationalism might be the glue that is holding the national level together.

137 One might wonder whether Dutch politicians pushing for more QMV is not a way for a small country to attain more power in Europe rather than pushing toward a European superstate.

138 The EU has a ‘communication deficit’. The idea of ‘faces’ is in line with a policy brief from February 2009, that calls for visualisation of the EU (EMEDIATE 2009).

139 This analysis was given in a public speech based on his recently published De Passage naar Europa (The Passage to Europe; 2009) and later explained in further detail in a personal communication.

140 One might argue persuasively that the creation of a new nation-state on the federal level is not even a desirable development.

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