Conservative Twenties, Revolutionary Thirties [ 31 ]
recognized and viewed as detached from the national interests en-
listed in their service.
The roles which Germany or Russia, or for that matter, Italy or Ja-
pan, Great Britain or the United States, are playing in World War II,
though forming part of universal history, are no direct concern of this
book; fascism and socialism, however, were live forces in the institu-
tional transformation which is its subject. The elan vital which pro-
duced the inscrutable urge in the German or Russian or American
people to claim a greater share in the record of the race forms part of
the conditions under which our story unfolds, while the purport of
fascism or socialism or new deal is part of the story itself.
This leads up to our thesis which still remains to be proven: that
the origins of the cataclysm lay in the Utopian endeavor of economic
liberalism to set up a self-regulating market system. Such a thesis
seems to invest that system with almost mythical faculties; it implies
no less than that the balance of power, the gold standard, and the lib-
eral state, these fundamentals of the civilization of the nineteenth cen-
tury, were, in the last resort, shaped in one common matrix, the self-
regulating market.
The assertion appears extreme if not shocking in its crass material-
ism. But the peculiarity of the civilization the collapse of which we
have witnessed was precisely that it rested on economic foundations.
Other societies and other civilizations, too, were limited by the mate-
rial conditions of their existence—this is a common trait of all human
life, indeed, of all life, whether religious or nonreligious, materialist or
spiritualist. All types of societies are limited by economic factors.
Nineteenth-century civilization alone was economic in a different
and distinctive sense, for it chose to base itself on a motive only rarely
acknowledged as valid in the history of human societies, and certainly
never before raised to the level of a justification of action and behavior
in everyday life, namely, gain. The self-regulating market system was
uniquely derived from this principle.
The mechanism which the motive of gain set in motion was com-
parable in effectiveness only to the most violent outbursts of religious
fervor in history. Within a generation the whole human world was
subjected to its undiluted influence. As everybody knows, it grew to
maturity in England, in the wake of the Industrial Revolution, during
the first half of the nineteenth century. It reached the Continent and
[ 32 ] The Great Transformation
America about fifty years later. Eventually in England, on the Conti-
nent, and even in America, similar alternatives shaped daily issues into
a pattern the main traits of which were identical in all countries of
Western civilization. For the origins of the cataclysm we must turn to
the rise and fall of market economy.
Market society was born in England—yet it was on the Continent
that its weaknesses engendered the most tragic complications. In or-
der to comprehend German fascism, we must revert to Ricardian En-
gland. The nineteenth century, as cannot be overemphasized, was
England's century. The Industrial Revolution was an English event.
Market economy, free trade, and the gold standard were English in-
ventions. These institutions broke down in the twenties everywhere—
in Germany, Italy, or Austria the event was merely more political and
more dramatic. But whatever the scenery and the temperature of the
final episodes, the long-run factors which wrecked that civilization
should be studied in the birthplace of the Industrial Revolution,
England.
Part Two
Rise and Tall of
Market Economy
[ I. Satanic Mill ]
C H A P T E R T H R E E
"Habitation versus
Improvement"
t the heart of the Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth century
there was an almost miraculous improvement in the tools of
production, which was accompanied by a catastrophic dislocation of
the lives of the common people.
We will attempt to disentangle the factors that determined the
forms of this dislocation, as it appeared as its worst in England about
a century ago. What "satanic mill" ground men into masses? How
much was caused by the new physical conditions? How much by the
economic dependencies, operating under the new conditions? And
what was the mechanism through which the old social tissue was de-
stroyed and a new integration of man and nature so unsuccessfully at-
tempted?
Nowhere has liberal philosophy failed so conspicuously as in its
understanding of the problem of change. Fired by an emotional faith
in spontaneity, the common-sense attitude toward change was dis-
carded in favor of a mystical readiness to accept the social conse-
quences of economic improvement, whatever they might be. The ele-
mentary truths of political science and statecraft were first discredited
then forgotten. It should need no elaboration that a process of undi-
rected change, the pace of which is deemed too fast, should be slowed
down, if possible, so as to safeguard the welfare of the community.
Such household truths of traditional statesmanship, often merely re-
flecting the teachings of a social philosophy inherited from the an-
cients, were in the nineteenth century erased from the thoughts of the
educated by the corrosive of a crude utilitarianism combined with an
uncritical reliance on the alleged self-healing virtues of unconscious
growth.
Economic liberalism misread the history of the Industrial Revolu-
tion because it insisted on judging social events from the economic
[35]
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