The Hundred Years' Peace [19]
needed peace in order to function, the balance of power was made to
serve it. Take this economic system away and the peace interest would
disappear from politics. Apart from it, there was neither sufficient
cause for such an interest, nor a possibility of safeguarding it, insofar
as it existed. The success of the Concert of Europe sprang from the
needs of the new international organization of economy, and would
inevitably end with its dissolution.
The era of Bismarck (1861-90) saw the Concert of Europe at its
best. In two decades immediately following Germany's rise to the sta-
tus of a Great Power, she was the chief beneficiary of the peace interest.
She had forced her way into the front ranks at the cost of Austria and
France; it was to her advantage to maintain the status quo and to pre-
vent a war which could be only a war of revenge against herself. Bis-
marck deliberately fostered the notion of peace as a common venture
of the Powers, and avoided commitments which might force Germany
out of the position of a peace Power. He opposed expansionist ambi-
tions in the Balkans or overseas; he used the free trade weapon consis-
tently against Austria, and even against France; he thwarted Russia's
and Austria's Balkan ambitions with the help of the balance-of-power
game, thus keeping in with potential allies and averting situations
which might involve Germany in war. The scheming aggressor of
1863-70 turned into the honest broker of 1878, and the deprecator of
colonial adventures. He consciously took the lead in what he felt to be
the peaceful trend of the time in order to serve Germany's national in-
terests.
However, by the end of the seventies the free trade episode (1846-
79) was at an end; the actual use of the gold standard by Germany
marked the beginnings of an era of protectionism and colonial expan-
sion.* Germany was now reinforcing her position by making a hard
and fast alliance with Austria-Hungary and Italy; not much later Bis-
marck lost control of Reich policy. From then onward Great Britain
was the leader of the peace interest in a Europe which still remained a
group of independent sovereign states and thus subject to the balance
of power. In the nineties haute financewas at its peak and peace seemed
more secure than ever. British and French interests differed in Africa;
the British and the Russians were competing with one another in Asia;
the Concert, though lamely, continued to function; in spite of the Tri-
* Eulenburg, F., "Aussenhandel und Aussenhandelspolitik," in Grundriss der Sozia-
lokonomik, Vol. VIII, 1929, p. 209.
[ 20 ] The Great Transformation
pie Alliance, there were still more than two independent Powers to
watch one another jealously. Not for long. In 1904, Britain made a
sweeping deal with France over Morocco and Egypt; a couple of years
later she compromised with Russia over Persia, and the counteralli-
ance was formed. The Concert of Europe, that loose federation of in-
dependent powers, was finally replaced by two hostile power group-
ings; the balance of power as a system had now come to an end. With
only two competing power groups left, its mechanism ceased to func-
tion. There was no longer a third group which would unite with one
of the other two to thwart whichever one sought to increase its power.
About the same time the symptoms of the dissolution of the existing
forms of world economy—colonial rivalry and competition for exotic
markets—became acute. The ability of haute finance to avert the
spread of wars was diminishing rapidly. For another seven years peace
dragged on but it was only a question of time before the dissolution of
nineteenth-century economic organization would bring the Hundred
Years' Peace to a close.
In the light of this recognition the true nature of the highly artifi-
cial economic organization on which peace rested becomes of utmost
significance to the historian.
C H A P T E R T W O
Conservative Twenties,
Revolutionary Thirties
T
he breakdown of the international gold standard was the invisi-
ble link between the disintegration of world economy which
started at the turn of the century and the transformation of a whole
civilization in the thirties. Unless the vital importance of this factor is
realized, it is not possible to see rightly either the mechanism which
railroaded Europe to its doom, or the circumstances which accounted
for the astounding fact that the forms and contents of a civilization
should rest on so precarious foundations.
The true nature of the international system under which we were
living was not realized until it failed. Hardly anyone understood the
political function of the international monetary system; the awful
suddenness of the transformation thus took the world completely by
surprise. And yet the gold standard was the only remaining pillar of
the traditional world economy; when it broke, the effect was bound to
be instantaneous. To liberal economists the gold standard was a purely
economic institution; they refused even to consider it as a part of a so-
cial mechanism. Thus it happened that the democratic countries were
the last to realize the true nature of the catastrophe and the slowest to
counter its effects. Not even when the cataclysm was already upon
them did their leaders see that behind the collapse of the international
system there stood a long development within the most advanced
countries which made that system anachronistic; in other words, the
failure of market economy itself still escaped them.
The transformation came on even more abruptly than is usually
realized. World War I and the postwar revolutions still formed part of
the nineteenth century. The conflict of 1914-18 merely precipitated
and immeasurably aggravated a crisis that it had not created. But the
roots of the dilemma could not be discerned at the time; and the hor-
rors and devastations of the Great War seemed to the survivors the ob-
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