CHApTer 6
The Need to Justify Our Actions
9
and then get to choose one to keep. The other would be kept for administrative rea-
sons. The students were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In Condition
One, students were informed that they had the option of exchanging photographs
within a five-day period; in Condition Two, students were told that their choice
was final. The researchers found that prior to making the choice between the two
photographs, the students liked them equally. The experimenters then contacted the
students two, four, and nine days after they had made their choice to find out if those
who had a choice to exchange photographs liked the one they chose more or less
than did those in the no-choice (irrevocable) condition. And, indeed, the students
who had the option of exchanging photographs liked the one they finally ended up
with less than did those who made the final choice on the first day.
Interestingly, when students were asked to predict whether keeping their options
open would make them more or less happy with their decision, they predicted that
keeping their options open would make them happier. They were wrong. Because they
underestimated the discomfort of dissonance, they failed to realize that the finality of
the decision would make them happier.
Creating the Illusion of Irrevocability
The irrevocability of a decision always
increases dissonance and the motivation to reduce it. Because of this, unscrupulous
salespeople have developed techniques for creating the illusion that irrevocability
exists. One such technique is called lowballing (Cialdini, 2009; Cialdini et al., 1978;
Weyant, 1996). Robert Cialdini, a distinguished social psychologist, temporarily
joined the sales force of an automobile dealership to observe this technique closely.
Here’s how it works: You enter an automobile showroom intent on buying a particu-
lar car. Having already priced it at several dealerships, you know you can purchase it
for about $18,000. You are approached by a personable middle-aged man who tells
you he can sell you one for $17,679. Excited by the bargain, you agree to write out a
check for the down payment so that he can take it to the manager as proof that you
are a serious customer. Meanwhile, you imagine yourself driving home in your shiny
new bargain. Ten minutes later the salesperson returns, looking forlorn. He tells
you that in his zeal to give you a good deal, he miscalculated and the sales manager
caught it. The price of the car comes to $18,178. You are disappointed. Moreover,
you are pretty sure you can get it a bit cheaper elsewhere. The decision to buy is not
irrevocable. And yet in this situation far more people will go ahead with the deal than
if the original asking price had been $18,178, even though the reason for buying the
car from this particular dealer—the bargain price—no longer exists (Cialdini, 2009;
Cialdini et al., 1978).
There are at least three reasons why lowballing works. First, although the cus-
tomer’s decision to buy is reversible, a commitment of sorts does exist. Signing a check
for a down payment creates the illusion of irrevocability, even though, if the car buyer
thought about it, he or she would quickly realize that it is a nonbinding contract. In the
world of high-pressure sales, however, even a temporary illusion can have real conse-
quences. Second, the feeling of commitment triggered the anticipation of an exciting
event: driving out with a new car. To have had the anticipated event thwarted (by not
going ahead with the deal) would have been a big letdown. Third, although the final
price is substantially higher than the customer thought it would be, it is probably only
slightly higher than the price at another dealership. Under these circumstances, the
Lowballing
An unscrupulous strategy whereby
a salesperson induces a customer
to agree to purchase a product at
a low cost, subsequently claims it
was an error, and then raises the
price; frequently, the customer will
agree to make the purchase at the
inflated price.
TrY IT!
The Advantage of Finality
Ask five friends who are not in this psychology class the fol-
lowing question: Imagine you are shopping for a particular cell
phone and you find it in two stores. The price for the phones
is identical, but in Store A you have the option of exchanging
the phone within 30 days, while in Store B all sales are final.
One week after your purchase, which situation will make you
happier with the cell phone: Store A (with the option to return
the phone) or Store B (purchase not revocable)?
M06_ARON6625_08_SE_C06.indd 9
07/03/12 3:31 AM
10
CHApTer 6
The Need to Justify Our Actions
customer in effect says, “Oh, what the heck. I’m here, I’ve
already filled out the forms, I’ve written out the check—why
wait?” Thus, by using dissonance reduction and the illu-
sion of irrevocability, high-pressure salespeople increase the
probability that you will decide to buy their product at their
price.
The Decision to Behave Immorally
Of course, decisions
about cars, appliances, racehorses, and even presidential
candidates are the easy ones. Often, however, our choices
involve moral and ethical issues. When is it OK to lie to
a friend, and when is it not? When is an act stealing, and
when is it just “what everyone does”? How people reduce
dissonance following a difficult moral decision has implica-
tions for their self-esteem and for whether they behave more
or less ethically in the future.
Take the issue of cheating on an exam. Suppose you are a college sophomore taking
the final exam in organic chemistry. Ever since you can remember, you have wanted to
be a surgeon, and you think that your admission to medical school will depend heavily
on how well you do in this course. A key question involves some material you know
fairly well, but because so much is riding on this exam, you feel acute anxiety and draw
a blank. You glance at your neighbor’s paper and discover that she is just completing her
answer to the crucial question. Your conscience tells you it’s wrong to cheat, and yet, if
you don’t cheat, you are certain to get a poor grade. And if you get a poor grade, you
are convinced that there goes medical school.
Regardless of whether you decide to cheat or not, the threat to your self-esteem
arouses dissonance. If you cheat, your belief or cognition “I am a decent, moral person”
is dissonant with your cognition “I have just committed an immoral act.” If you decide
to resist temptation, your cognition “I want to become a surgeon” is dissonant with
your cognition “I could have nailed a good grade and admission to medical school, but
I chose not to. Wow, was I stupid!”
Suppose that after a difficult struggle, you decide to cheat. According to dissonance
theory, it is likely that you would try to justify the action by finding a way to minimize
its negative aspects. In this case, an efficient path to reducing dissonance would involve
changing your attitude about cheating. You would adopt a more lenient attitude toward
cheating, convincing yourself that it is a victimless crime that doesn’t hurt anybody, that
everybody does it, and that, therefore it’s not really so bad.
Suppose, by contrast, after a difficult struggle, you decide not to cheat. How would
you reduce your dissonance? Again, you could change your attitude about the morality
of the act, but this time in the opposite direction. That is, to justify giving up a good
grade, you convince yourself that cheating is a heinous sin, that it’s one of the lowest
things a person can do, and that cheaters should be rooted out and severely punished.
How Dissonance Affects personal Values
What has happened is not merely a
rationalization of your own behavior, but a change in your system of values. Thus,
two people acting in two different ways could have started out with almost identical
attitudes toward cheating. One came within an inch of cheating but decided to resist,
while the other came within an inch of resisting but decided to cheat. After they had
made their decisions, however, their attitudes toward cheating would diverge sharply as
a consequence of their actions (see Figure 6.2 on next page).
These speculations were tested by Judson Mills (1958) in an experiment he per-
formed in an elementary school. Mills first measured the attitudes of sixth graders
toward cheating. He then had them participate in a competitive exam, with prizes
awarded to the winners. The situation was arranged so that it was almost impossible
to win without cheating. Mills made it easy for the children to cheat and created the
illusion that they could not be detected. Under these conditions, as one might expect,
some of the students cheated and others did not. The next day, the sixth graders were
again asked to indicate how they felt about cheating. Sure enough, the children who
After he cheats, this student
will try to convince himself that
everybody would cheat if they had
the chance.
M06_ARON6625_08_SE_C06.indd 10
07/03/12 3:31 AM