POST-INDUSTRIAL
SOCIETY
91
Post-Industrialism As An Ideology
If the "theory" of post-industrial society has so little to recommend
it logically or empirically, why is it so popular? The answer is obvious.
It functions—or has functioned—as a useful ideology for certain
social forces and interests. It is an ideology in that it supports and
justifies a certain way of looking at what is happening or what it is
hoped will happen, a way of looking at social change congenial to per-
sons and groups with particular interests and predelictions." This is
not to say that it is exceptional, as social theories go, in this respect.
Nor, it should be stressed, is this to say that Bell and his followers are
necessarily consciously seeking to mask reality for sinister purposes.
But neither persons nor groups can totally abstract themselves from
their backgrounds, interests, and life experiences, direct or vicarious.
What functions does the post-industrial ideology serve in contem-
porary intellectual politics? It is first and above all an attempt to
refute classical Marxism, not by denying its validity but by going
beyond it. Neither Bell nor most other post-industrial proponents
would consider themselves conservatives or "right-wingers," nor
would they and their ideas probably be welcome in traditional conser-
vative circles. Not for them Burke or De Maistre or Calhoun,
Goldwater or Charles Maurras or Russell Kirk. They are "liberals"
and/or, to varying degrees, "social democrats." Yet they accept the
existing Western capitalist order—especially as they see it evolv-
ing—as both desirable and inevitable. The early stages of in-
dustrialism may have led to oppression and misery, making class con-
74. On Bell as an establishment ideologist see Kleinberg,
op. cit.,
esp. Pp. 22-23 and
Michael Marien, "Daniel Bell and the End of Normal Science,"
The Futurist
VII
(1973): Pp. 262-268. Marien elsewhere speaks of
Coming
as "a venture in welfare-state
ideology." "The Two Varieties of Post-Industrial Society,"
Futures
9 (1977) P. 426.
Touraine also sees Bell as " 'an ideologist,' or, as he is personally independent, 'a doc-
trinaire'." "Review Symposium: The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism,"
op. cit.,
P. 470. Giddens describes Bell as "advanced capitalism's most successful advertising
man,"
op. cit.,
P. 21, while Michael Miles argues "Official liberals have ready in the vi-
sion of a post-industrial society a theory of social and economic change by which they
can dismiss in advance any opposition to the corporate state."
The Radical Probe: The
Logic of Student Rebellion
(New York: Atheneum, 1971) P. 80. Even a sympathetic
critic holds that "Although Bell seeks to provide an objective analysis, his approach is
somewhat distorted by certain• implicit normative biases of an Establishment intellec-
tual." Jones,
op. cit.,
P. 20.
92
THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER
flict a moral and' political option. But capitalism by unleashing the
powers of science and technology has, through economic growth,
made possible enough prosperity and through the rise of the (carefully
managed) social welfare state enough equality (of opportunity—the
only legitimate aspiration, as Bell especially insists)" to satisfy any
legitimate aspirations of the common man. Whether or not this
economic utopia has in fact been achieved in the United States or in
any of the other industrial democracies is beside the point; it is ob-
vious why those who are well-off in these societies would like to
believe that it has been and that industrialism
along with its
discontents
has been superceded by history. Post-industrial ideology
triumphs over Marxist ideology by rendering it simply
vieux jeu.
The second ideological function of the ideology of post-
industrialism is the defense of the "new class" in American society
and its current status and aspirations.
76
Deep down inside virtually
75. See "Coda," to the
Coming, op. cit.,
Pp. 408-451
76. There is much confusion on this issue among post-industrial theorists because of
the fact that the "new class" is divided—to vastly oversimplify—between technocrats
and what are often styled "literary intellectuals," the latter group being allegedly large-
ly adherents of an "adversary culture" hostile to many elements of technocracy. As
Jones states,
op. cit.,
"Bell presupposes that his projected meritocratic elite is likely to
succeed in its use of intellectual technology to cope with societal problems. With some
qualification, he glorifies the knowledge elite and manifests belief in the efficacy of
established institutions." Yet
Cultural Contradictions
is largely devoted to the theme
that the intelligentsia is a menace to the society Bell envisages, leading to a disjunction
between the cultural and societal realms. Bell's friend Kahn devotes much energy and
fervor to discussing the dangers posed by important elements of the new knowledge
elite,
Things to Come, op. cit.,
Pp. 88-113. Similarly, S.M. Lipset writes "...Daniel
Bell...and others have identified the intensified strength of this leftward tendency, as a
reflection of structural changes in advanced or 'post-industrial' society, which have
created a massive intelligentsia, a highly educated oppositionist class." "The Paradox
of American Politics,"
The Public Interest
No. 41 (Fall, 1975) 172. Apparently post-
industrialism, like capitalism, creates its own gravediggers. Arch-conservative political
theorist and tactician Kevin Philips accepts the concept of post-industrial society and
uses it to explain how post-industrialism has led to the domination of politics by a
knowledge elite hostile to traditional American values, one which must be politically
combatted. "The Post-Industrial Revolution has created a new knowledge elite heavily
liberal in politics."
Mediacracy. American Parties and Politics in the Communications
Age
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1975) P. 31. Philips virtually identifies the post-
industrial society with the "Communications" revolution.
Ibid.,
P. v as of course Bell
himself does at times.
Coming, op. cit.,
Pp. 214, 479. One observer sees resentment
against liberal post-industrial elites leading to fascism. Dale Vree, "A Fascism in Our
Future?"
Worldview
20 (November 1977): Pp. 14-23. For a balanced view of the "new
class" see James T. Barry, "Welcome to the New Class,"
Commonweal
CVI (1979):
Pp. 73-77. See also B. Bruce-Briggs, (ed.),
A New Class?
(New Brunswick, N.J.: Trans-
action Books, 1978).