This paper is based on a long-term research program with Rachel Kranton on the implications of identity



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In more detail Bewley (1999, pp. 1-2) summarizes his findings:  “Other theories fail in part because they



are based on unrealistic psychological assumptions that people’s abilities do not depend on their state of mind and

that they are rational in the simplistic sense that they maximize a utility that depends only on their consumption and

working conditions, not on the welfare of others.  Wage rigidity is the product of more complicated employee

behavior, in the face of which manager reluctance to cut pay is rational.  Worker behavior, however, is not always

rational and completely understandable.  A model that captures the essence of wage rigidity must take into account

the capacity of employees to identify with their firm and to internalize its objectives.  This internalization and

workers’ mood have a strong impact on job performance and call for material, moral, and symbolic reciprocation

from company leadership.”  (1999, pp. 1-2)

42

Following the argument by Chetty (2005) some employers may have been concerned with the fact that



their employees had fixed mortgages that they would find difficult to pay with cuts in nominal wages.  This puts the

violation of natural rate theory in another place: why were these financial contracts in nominal rather than in real

terms?

31

not cut money wages in the Connecticut recession of 1991-1992.  Bewley concludes from his



extensive interviews that, even though substitute labor was easily available, employers were

reluctant to cut wages because of the negative effects of such cuts on morale.  He says that firms

are afraid that cuts in money wages will cause workers no longer to “identify” with their

companies.

41

  Even if there would be no immediate consequences from such cuts during the



recession, Bewley’s employers thought there would be future consequences when the labor

market returned to normal.  Workers would shirk, and they would also be more likely to quit. 

These stories indicate that workers are not just thinking about their wages in real terms, relative

to the price level or the wages received by others, but they also have a special aversion to cuts in

wages below their current nominal levels.

42

  Such behavior fails to conform to the underlying



assumptions of natural rate theory: that workers only care about relative wages and relative

prices.


The Great Depression affords a third observation inconsistent with natural rate theory, at

least as long as inflationary expectations are adaptive.  An accelerationist Phillips Curve, as in

the usual textbook rendition of natural rate theory, suggests that for the whole of the Great



43

See Yellen and Akerlof (2004, p. 24).

44

There are other possible reasons for this failure of the standard predictions from natural rate theory. 



Inflationary expectations may not have been adaptive; the failure of deflation to accelerate could be due to

expectations that the price level would return to some normal level.  In the US, the National Recovery Act, which

encouraged firms to increase prices, and unionization, which gave a fillip to wages, could also have affected the

trade-off between inflation and unemployment.  But unemployment was so very high for so very long, and it’s the

absence of accelerating deflation was so universal across countries, this still seems to be a dog that did not bark.  It

seems to point to a problem with natural rate theory.

32

Depression, from 1930 to 1940, inflation should have been below inflationary expectations; with



adaptive expectations there would then have been a steady decline in inflation.  Such a prediction

is far off the mark, not just for the United States, but for every country in the Great Depression

for which pricing and unemployment data is available.   The data reveal no evidence whatever in

any country of constantly declining inflation, even under conditions of massive unemployment.

43

 

The United States experienced rapid deflation from 1929 to 1933, but thereafter inflation neither



systematically rose nor fell for the next decade.  A dynamic simulation in a sticky-money wage

model of the US economy by Bill Dickens, George Perry and myself (1996) with sticky money

wages and unemployment such as occurred in the Great Depression seems to offer an

explanation.  It fits the data all but exactly.

44

  

Further phenomena indicate that wage bargains are not made with only real



considerations in mind.  Two questionnaire studies yield a fourth type of evidence that workers

care about the their nominal wage, and not just their real wage.  Shafir, Diamond and Tversky

(1997) asked respondents to comment on a vignette about two young women who take their first

jobs with the same initial income.  Specifically they asked respondents who will be better off:

Barbara, who receives a five percent raise in the presence of four percent inflation; or Ann, who

receives a two percent raise when inflation is zero.  79 percent of respondents said that Barbara

would be worse off than Ann economically.  Nevertheless, 64 percent of respondents thought



45

Shafir, Diamond, and Tversky (1997, pp. 351-352).

46

Shiller (1997, p. 37).



33

that Barbara would be happier.

45

  Contrary to the assumptions of natural rate theory, these



responses indicate that people’s happiness is affected by the level of their nominal, and not just

their real, wage increase. 

It might be easy to dismiss the findings of Shafir et al as just an oddity from a single

study.  But another study, with a different form of questionnaire, independently found a similar

response.  Robert Shiller found that 49 percent of a sample of the general public either fully or

weakly agreed with the following statement:  “if my pay went up I would feel more satisfaction

in my job, more sense of fulfillment, even if prices went up as much.” An additional 11 percent

of the general public were undecided, while only 27 percent completely disagreed.  This, of

course, is very similar to the public’s view of Ann and Barbara.  Notably, it is also in stark

disagreement with the view of professional economists.  90 percent of economists weakly or

strongly disagreed with the statement.  77 percent were in complete disagreement.

46

  



This question was just one in Shiller’s study with very large differences between

economists and the general public regarding inflation.  Such differences in response questions

the theoretical basis of natural rate theory: that those who pay and those who receive wages have

exactly the same mind-set as economists.  They should be concerned only with real wages or real

prices.  They should not be happier if pay goes up even though prices go up as much.  The views

of professional economists accord with such a mental frame.  This lack of concordance between

professional economists and the public is contrary to the basic theoretical reason why natural

rate theory is appealing.  




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