and West Germany. In all, approximately 1,000
airframes were sent abroad,
complementing a tally of more than 4,000 for domestic use and making the
Phantom the most-produced Western fighter aircraft in the postwar period.
Although prolific by any standard, F-4 production numbers were dwarfed
by the MiG-21 Fishbed, which entered Soviet service in 1959 and was pro-
duced by the USSR, several Warsaw Pact countries, India, and China in
numbers exceeding 10,000 units over the next forty years. With a length of
51 feet 8 inches and a wingspan of only 23 feet 5 inches, the Fishbed was
much more compact than any of its contemporary Western adversaries. Al-
though its size limited the aircraft’s range, its light weight allowed speeds
surpassing Mach 2 and provided the first successful fighter and interceptor
combination in the Soviet air fleet. The PLAAF also made extensive use of
the Fishbed (designated J-7) after it was licensed by the Soviets in 1961. Al-
though early production numbers were kept low by deteriorating Sino-Soviet
relations, production of the delta-winged fighter began again in earnest in the
late 1970s and early 1980s and continued to the conclusion of the Cold War.
Taking on the true interceptor role was the MiG-25 Foxbat, which
entered service in 1970 specifically to counter the threat of Mach 3 U.S.
bombers that, although they never came into existence, were presupposed to
be the next logical step in aircraft development on both sides of the Iron
Curtain. Although the MiG-25 could generate enough thrust to propel the
aircraft to speeds upwards of Mach 3.2, unknown outside Soviet circles,
structural limitations meant that reaching speeds higher than Mach 2.8 would
almost certainly result in complete engine failure. Also unknown to the West
at the time was that the Foxbat had negligible maneuverability and close
combat potential; thus, Western air analysts found themselves presented
with an aircraft that they assumed could beat all challengers. This scare, later
proven to have been unfounded, resulted in increased research and devel-
opment into what would become the F-15 and F-16 programs.
The early 1970s saw a flurry of fighter deliveries to both camps in their
efforts to maintain an edge in air superiority. The MiG-23 Flogger and its
eponymous ground attack counterpart, the MiG-27, entered service in 1973
and 1975, respectively. In the United States, 1972 marked the operational
introduction of the Grumman F-14 Tomcat, which, when coupled with the
newly designed AIM-54 Phoenix missile, provided the U.S. Navy with a for-
midable interceptor. The F-14 would prove a major success worthy of replac-
ing the aging F-4. The F-14 also became the premier Iranian fighter.
January 1976 saw the first delivery of an operational McDonnell-Douglas
(later Boeing) F-15 Eagle, which set the standard in tactical fighter design
through the closing years of the Cold War. The Eagle amassed an enviable
no-loss record in air-to-air engagements, most often in the hands of Israeli
pilots fighting Syrian-flown MiGs. Following on the heels of the F-15 were
the General Dynamics (later Lockheed-Martin) F-16 Fighting Falcon in
1979 and the U.S. Navy’s McDonnell-Douglas F/A-18 Hornet in 1983.
With the skyrocketing costs of modern fighters, some West European
countries decided to keep pace with U.S. advancements by combining re-
search and funding. The result of a consortium among Britain, Italy, and
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Germany was the Panavia Tornado, a multirole combat aircraft (MRCA) that
first flew in 1974 and would enter service in its interdiction and strike con-
figuration with each of its sponsor nations as well as in an air defense varia-
tion in Britain. Dassault Aviation maintained its primacy within the French
aerospace industry when its futuristically named Mirage 2000 gained opera-
tional status with the Armée de l’Air in 1983.
Both the 1983 Mikoyan MiG-29 Fulcrum and the 1986 Sukhoi Su-27
Flanker were developed out of the Soviet-advanced tactical fighter initia-
tive, which called for direct counterparts to fourth-generation U.S. aircraft.
Although potentially equal in raw technical capability to the U.S. models,
the Fulcrum and Flanker were costly to produce and effected limited results
in combat, due largely to the widening gulf in pilot proficiency between the
East and the West.
As the Soviet military had concentrated almost exclusively on tactical
airpower during World War II, at the end of the conflict the Allies had a near
total monopoly on strategic bombers. Foremost among these was the vener-
able Boeing B-29 Superfortress, which had been employed solely in the
Pacific theater and was best known for the delivery, by the Enola Gay, of the
first atomic bomb over Hiroshima in August 1945. The B-29 continued
active service throughout the 1940s and early 1950s, most notably as Presi-
dent Harry S. Truman’s nuclear ace against the Soviets during the Berlin
Blockade as well as during the Korean War. The Superfortress proved so suc-
cessful, in fact, that Soviet leader Josef Stalin ordered clones produced by
reverse engineering from those that had been forced to land in Soviet terri-
tory in 1945. The resultant aircraft, known as the Tupolev Tu-4 Bull, entered
service in 1949 as the Soviet Air Force’s first nuclear-capable bomber and
was rumored to be true to its American antecedent right down to the bullet
holes found in one of the recovered B-29s.
The Soviets were not content to see the United States maintain heavy
bomber superiority. One of the first designs was the Tupolev Tu-14, a twin-
engine jet aircraft of traditional appearance produced from 1947 in a variety
of models and remaining in service until the 1960s. The first successful
Soviet bomber design, however, was the superb twin-engine Ilyushin Il-28
Beagle, which first appeared in prototype in 1948. It remained in first-line
service for some twenty years and flew in the service of the People’s Repub-
lic of China (PRC) throughout the Cold War. It was the counterpart to the
British Canberra and U.S. North American B-45. More than 10,000 Il-28
bombers were built and distributed to Soviet bloc nations. The Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) obtained a number of
Il-28s from the Soviets and flew them against the Republic of Korea (ROK,
South Korea) at the beginning of the Korean War in June 1950.
The first Soviet giant bomber was the huge Myasishchev Mya-4 Bison
swept-wing turbojet bomber, developed on the orders of Stalin beginning in
1949 as a plane that could reach the United States and return to base. It first
became known to the West in 1955 when, much to Soviet Premier Nikita
Khrushchev’s satisfaction, a scheme of repeatedly flying the limited stock of
Mya-4 Bisons over the reviewing stand at the Moscow air show achieved its
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