V o L u m e I : a d

A month later, in May 1967, Nasser ordered his forces into the Sinai. The

reasons for this action are unclear. The common assumption is that Moscow

warned both the Egyptian and Syrian governments that Israeli military forces

were deployed along the Israeli-Syrian border. Because Egypt and Syria

were bound by a military pact signed on 4 November 1966, Nasser sent his

army into the Sinai to force the Israelis to dilute their forces in the north and

to forestall what he assumed was an imminent attack on Syria.

The Israelis responded to the entry of Egyptian forces into the Sinai by

calling up IDF reserve forces. Nasser subsequently increased Israeli con-

cerns when he ordered the UN observers along the Israeli-Egyptian border

to concentrate in one location. UN Secretary-General U Thant responded by

pulling UN forces out of the Sinai altogether. Next, Nasser again closed

the Tiran Straits—yet another violation of the agreements that had led to the

Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai in 1957. Besides that, Jordan and Egypt

signed a military pact on 30 May 1967. This further increased the Israeli

sense of siege.

Israeli military doctrine called for preemptive strikes in case of a con-

centration of Arab forces along its borders. All that was necessary was U.S.

permission, and President Lyndon B. Johnson’s administration gave that in

early June. The war began at dawn on 5 June 1967, with Israeli air strikes first

on Egyptian and then on Syrian, Jordanian, and Iraqi air bases. The purpose

162

Arab-Israeli Wars

With a crewman on alert, an Israeli gunboat passes through the Straits of Tiran during the Six-Day War, 8 June 1967.

(Israel Government Press Office/Yaacov Agor)

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of these attacks was to neutralize the Arab air forces and remove the threat of

air strikes on Israel. This would also, at a later stage, allow the Israeli Air

Force to provide close air support to its forces on the ground.

Catching the vast bulk of the Egyptian aircraft on the ground as their

pilots were at breakfast, some 250 Israeli aircraft destroyed the backbone of

the Arab air forces within an hour. By the end of the day they had been

almost completely wiped out. More than 300 of a total of 420 Egyptian com-

bat aircraft were destroyed that day. The Israelis then turned to destroy the

far smaller Jordanian and Syrian air forces.

About an hour after the start of the air raids against Egypt, at about

8:30

A

.

M

. Israeli time, the IDF launched its ground offensive. Three Israeli

divisions attacked Egyptian forces in the Sinai, and within four days they

had destroyed the Egyptian Army in the Sinai and occupied the peninsula.

Israeli operational plans were initially restricted to the Egyptian front. The

IDF high command had developed plans to take the fighting to the Jordan-

ian and Syrian fronts, but on the morning of 5 June it had no wish to go to war

with these two Arab states.

There were, however, unexpected developments. As the Israeli troops

stormed into the Sinai, Jordanian artillery shelled the suburbs of Jerusalem

and other targets in Israel. The Israeli government had hoped that Jordan’s

King Hussein would stay out of the fray and refrain from engaging in serious

fighting. That did not happen. Jordanian troops stormed the UN Headquar-

ters in Jerusalem, inducing fears that the next step would be an attempt to

take over Israeli-held Mount Scopus, an enclave within a Jordanian-held ter-

ritory that overlooked Jerusalem. To prevent that, Israeli forces moved ahead

to secure a road to Mount Scopus, and the Jerusalem area became an un-

planned battlefield. In addition, Israeli troops moved in northern Samaria,

from which long-range Jordanian artillery was shelling Israeli seaside cities.

A full-fledged war was now in progress. It lasted two days and ended

with the complete Israeli victory over Jordanian forces. Israel then occupied

the West Bank of the Jordan River and eastern Jerusalem.

In the north, Syrian forces began to move westward toward the Israeli

border but did not complete the deployment and, for unknown reasons,

returned to their bases. For five long days the Syrians shelled Israeli settle-

ments from the Golan Heights overlooking the Jordan River Valley. Hoping

to avoid a three-front war, the Israelis took no action against the Syrians,

despite the heavy pressure from the settlers who had come under Syrian

artillery fire. It was only in the last day of the war, with the fighting in the

south and center firmly under control, that Israeli troops stormed the Golan

Heights, taking it after only a few hours of fighting.

The end of the war saw a new Middle East in which Israel controlled an

area three times as large as its pre-1967 territory. Israel had also firmly estab-

lished itself as a major regional power. It found itself in control of nearly

2 million Arabs in the West Bank, many of whom were refugees from the 1948

war. Militarily, the 1967 war marked a major military departure. First, it was

a full-fledged armored war, in which both sides, but chiefly the Egyptians

and Israelis, deployed hundreds of tanks. Second, Cold War imperatives were

Arab-Israeli Wars

163

The end of the war

saw a new Middle

East in which Israel

controlled an area

three times as large

as its pre-1967

territory. Israel 

had also firmly

established itself 

as a major regional

power.

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