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no longer in sight. Although the war in Slovenia had
lasted less than ten days, there were 44
casualties on the Yugoslav army side, 19 on the Slovene side, and 10 foreigners in Slovenia at
the time were also killed. There was also considerable damage caused in the areas where
battles had taken place. This made both the population and the politicians even more
convinced that all ties between Slovenia and the rest of Yugoslavia had been severed for good
and that various compromise solutions could no longer be considered.
However, the view of the Western countries on the Yugoslav crisis changed only
slowly. Slovenia’s foreign minister Dimitrij Rupel, who visited many European capitals and
the US as part of Slovenia’s active foreign relations campaign, warned that achieving
international recognition for Slovenia’s independence would be a “lengthy process.” Slovenia
also found itself in considerable economic difficulties. While there was no real problem with
the supply of everyday necessities and food, exports and industrial production stagnated. The
National Bank of Yugoslavia blocked Slovenia’s access to primary issues, foreign loans,
foreign currency and dinars, constricting its money supply and making imports difficult. The
tense situation meant relations within Slovenia’s ruling coalition again approached crisis;
since the very beginning, the coalition had been racked by major ideological differences.
The uncertainty of the situation made it poor timing for a government crisis.
Negotiations to solve the Yugoslav situation were supposed to start in early August, but the
possibility of a peaceful agreement between the federation and the republics grew smaller and
smaller by the day. The defeat of the coup against Gorbachev in the Soviet Union (24 August)
caused considerable disappointment among the Serbian leaders and the Yugoslav generals
who were in touch with the opponents of perestroika in Moscow, but it had no great effect on
their policy. The major international powers still would not accept to the breakup of the
Yugoslav federation, but they could no longer ignore the new realities in Eastern Europe and
the Balkans. In August 1991, the Council of Foreign Ministers of the twelve European
Community states – despite protests from the federal government and the Serbian leadership,
which rejected international intervention in the Yugoslav conflict – supported the idea of a
peace conference for Yugoslavia. The council also accepted a French proposal to set up a
commission to study the legal aspects of Yugoslavia and its republics following the
declaration of independence by Slovenia and Croatia. This commission was led by the
president of the French constitutional court, Robert Badinter.
The International Conference on Yugoslavia began on 7 September 1991 in The Hague
and continued to meet until November. The European Community entrusted leadership of the
conference to the former British foreign minister, Peter Carrington. The negotiations in The
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Hague revealed that the federation and the republics had not come any closer to reaching an
agreement since the Slovene and Croatian declarations of independence. Serbia blamed both
‘secessionist’ republics for the crisis and insisted on Yugoslavia’s continuity. Croatia was
ready to accept a loose confederation, but the increasingly bloody conflict at home made it
threaten to leave the conference. The representatives of the federal government continued
their vain appeals for the federation to reconstitute itself, while Macedonia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Montenegro supported the idea of some sort of federation of independent
states. Slovene representatives rejected the idea of a “union of states,” but (under pressure
from Europe) proposed the foundation of a mini-conference on “security and cooperation”
and an economic association (along the lines of EFTA), which would be made up of
independent states – the former Yugoslav republics. The European envoys also exerted
pressure on Slovenia to extend the moratorium on independence which would expire on
7 October, but the Slovene side did not agree to this. Carrington presented his proposal for a
solution to the crisis one day before the conference on 18 October. He acknowledged that the
republics had a right to independence and sovereignty, with an international identity (if they
so wished), but persisted with the idea of at least a loose federation, which would enable their
economic, as well as to a certain extent their international and legal, co-operation.
Just over three months after the Slovene and Croatian declarations of independence
and the Brioni meeting, the European Community had fundamentally changed its stance. This
development was partly the result of Slovene diplomacy, but even more of Serbian
aggression, the war in Croatia and the increasing tension in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Milošević
and Serbia were uncompromising in The Hague and resolutely rejected Carrington’s
proposals, so the conference closed, on 5 November, without success, as Serbian forces
fiercely attacked Vukovar and Dubrovnik. The European Community reacted to the failure to
achieve peace by introducing sanctions, which affected all the former Yugoslav republics,
including Slovenia. Although European diplomats in The Hague were predicting that they
would recognise Slovenia and Croatia, the views of the EU-12 on the independence of the two
former Yugoslav republics still varied considerably. Germany and Austria (and after the
failure of the talks in The Hague also Italy) openly called for recognition. But Paris and
London – like the US and the UN – believed even at the beginning of December that they
should not rush to grant recognition (particularly to Croatia), because it would only deepen
the crisis. On 7 December, the Badinter Commission completed its work and came to the
conclusion that Yugoslavia was in the “process of dissolution.” This meant that even in legal
terms, federal Yugoslavia no longer existed. The European Community, which was