30
Table C6 presents the univariate results, using difference-in-differences, of the
effect on investment in
PPE
for
HL_HS
firms and
FV_HS
firms that are more likely to
over-invest based
on the highest tercile of
OVER_INV
. If there is indeed a reduction in
over-investment in the post-
IFRS
period relative to the pre-
IFRS
period, then among
these firms I expect lower investment in
PPE
in the post-
IFRS
period. For
HL_HS
firms,
the mean
CAPEX
is significantly lower (p < 0.01)
in the post-
IFRS
period
than in the pre-
IFRS
period. This result indicates that there is a reduction in
over-investment in the post-
IFRS
period among
HL_HS
firms and is consistent with my first hypothesis. Further, for
FV_HS
firms, the mean
CAPEX
is significantly lower (p < 0.01) in the post-
IFRS
period
than that in the pre-
IFRS
period. This result indicates that there is a reduction in over-
investment in the post-
IFRS
period among
FV_HS
firms and is also consistent with my
first hypothesis. When comparing
FV_HS
firms to
HL_HS
firms using difference-in-
differences, the difference in mean
CAPEX
is significantly negative (p < 0.05), which
suggests that
FV_HS
firms exhibit greater reductions in over-investment in the post-
IFRS
period relative to
HL_HS
firms.
Table C7 presents the multivariate results based on equation (7) of the effect on
over-investment in
PPE
for my total sample that includes both
HL_HS
firms and
FV_HS
firms. Consistent with my earlier results in Table C5, the estimated
β
3
coefficient on the
interaction between
IFRS
and
OVER_INV
is significantly negative (-0.3332; p < 0.01).
As predicted by hypothesis 2, the estimated
β
7
coefficient on
the interaction between
IFRS
,
FV_HS
, and
OVER_INV
is significantly negative (-0.6852; p < 0.05). The
magnitude of
β
7
coefficient suggests that when the likelihood of over-investment is high,
FV_HS
firms, on average, exhibit an incremental reduction of approximately 20.4% in
CAPEX
(capital expenditures) after
IFRS
adoption relative to
HL_HS
firms.
35
35
The percentage is computed as
β
7
/mean_
CAPEX
(-0.6852/-3.3539).
31
Interestingly, I find no significant difference in the levels of investment in
PPE
(capital expenditures) between the pre-
IFRS
and the post-
IFRS
periods. The multivariate
results in Tables C5 and C7 reveal
that the estimated
β
1
coefficient on
IFRS
is not
significant. This finding suggests that the reduction in over-investment after
IFRS
adoption is not at the expense of an increase in under-investment.
Taken together, the univariate and the multivariate results in Tables C6 and C7
provide evidence that supports my second hypothesis (H2). UK firms that switched from
fair-value accounting under UK GAAP to historical cost
accounting with strict
impairment rules under
IFRS
exhibit greater reductions in over-investment in
PPE
after
IFRS
adoption relative to other EU firms that used historical
cost accounting with
impairment testing prior to
IFRS
adoption.
Overall, my findings in this sub-section provide evidence relevant to the debate
on whether fair-value accounting for non-financial assets, such as
PPE
, should become
mandatory or more broadly used (e.g., Ball 2006; Barth 2006; Schipper 2005; Watts
2006). In particular, my findings indicate that having historical cost accounting with strict
impairment rules as an accounting alternative for non-financial assets under
IFRS
promotes more efficient investment decisions. Therefore, my findings suggest that any
shift towards a mandatory fair-value accounting for non-financial assets under
IFRS
could have an adverse effect on investment efficiency.
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