32
FV_HS
firms after
IFRS
adoption. However, the difference-in-differences and the
multivariate results presented in Tables C6 and C7 suggest that
FV_HS
firms exhibit
greater reductions
in over-investment after
IFRS
adoption relative to
HL_HS
firms. These
greater reductions in over-investment cannot be attributed to the economic downturn
because all EU firms (or at least the majority of them) were facing deteriorating
economic conditions after
IFRS
adoption.
To further address
the economic downturn effect, I examine the reduction in over-
investment among UK firms only because UK firms were subject to the same downturn
in the UK economy after
IFRS
adoption. In addition, examining only UK firms
controls
for other institutional factors, such as regulatory and enforcement mechanisms, that affect
how rigorously
IFRS
standards are implemented. Table C8 presents the multivariate
results based on equation (7) of the effect
on over-investment in
PPE
among UK firms
only. The estimated
β
3
coefficient that captures the reduction in over-investment among
HL_HS
firms (67 UK firms – Panel B of Table C3) is negative although insignificant.
36
If
the economic downturn and other institutional factors in the UK are the causes for the
reduction in over-investment in the post-
IFRS
period, then I expect no significant
differences in over-investment between
FV_HS
firms (30 UK firms – Panel B of
Table
C3) and
HL_HS
firms. However, the estimated
β
7
coefficient on the interaction between
IFRS
,
FV_HS
, and
OVER_INV
is significantly negative (-0.8284; p < 0.05). Hence, my
findings in this sub-section mitigate the concern that the reduction
in over-investment
after
IFRS
adoption is an effect attributed to the economic downturn or to other
institutional factors. Rather, my results suggest that the reduction in over-investment
following
IFRS
adoption among UK firms, in particular
FV_HS
firms, is driven by the
36
Relative to most EU countries’ domestic GAAP, UK GAAP is considered to have more guidance for
impairment testing. This could be one explanation for having a non-significant
β
3
coefficient when only
UK firms are examined.
33
disciplining effect on managers of these UK firms after using historical cost accounting
with strict
impairment rules under
IFRS
.
34
CHAPTER V
SUPPLEMENTAL TEST
In this chapter, I examine whether the level of managerial ownership in firms
affects over-investment in
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