772
The Wealth of Nations
raising of the denomination of the coin.
An augmentation, or a direct raising of the denomination of the
coin, always is, and from its nature must be, an open and avowed
operation. By means of it, pieces of a smaller weight and bulk are
called by the same name, which had before been given to pieces of
a greater weight and bulk. The adulteration of the standard, on
the contrary, has generally been a concealed operation. By means
of it, pieces are issued from the mint, of the same denomination,
and, as nearly as could be contrived, of the same weight, bulk, and
appearance, with pieces which had been current before of much
greater value. When king John of France, {See Du Cange Glos-
sary, voce Moneta; the Benedictine Edition.} in order to pay his
debts, adulterated his coin, all the officers of his mint were sworn
to secrecy. Both operations are unjust. But a simple augmentation
is an injustice of open violence; whereas an adulteration is an in-
justice of treacherous fraud. This latter operation, therefore, as
soon as it has been discovered, and it could never be concealed
very long, has always excited much greater indignation than the
former. The coin, after any considerable augmentation, has very
seldom been brought back to its former weight; but after the great-
est adulterations, it has almost always been brought back to its
former fineness. It has scarce ever happened, that the fury and
indignation of the people could otherwise be appeased.
In the end of the reign of Henry VIII., and in the beginning of
that of Edward VI., the English coin was not only raised in its
denomination, but adulterated in its standard. The like frauds were
practised in Scotland during the minority of James VI. They have
occasionally been practised in most other countries.
That the public revenue of Great Britain can never be com-
pletely liberated, or even that any considerable progress can ever
be made towards that liberation, while the surplus of that rev-
enue, or what is over and above defraying the annual expense of
the peace establishment, is so very small, it seems altogether in
vain to expect. That liberation, it is evident, can never be brought
about, without either some very considerable augmentation of the
public revenue, or some equally considerable reduction of the
public expense.
A more equal land tax, a more equal tax upon the rent of houses,
and such alterations in the present system of customs and excise as
those which have been mentioned in the foregoing chapter, might,
perhaps, without increasing the burden of the greater part of the
people, but only distributing the weight of it more equally upon
the whole, produce a considerable augmentation of revenue. The
most sanguine projector, however, could scarce flatter himself, that
any augmentation of this kind would be such as could give any
reasonable hopes, either of liberating the public revenue altogether,
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Adam Smith
or even of making such progress towards that liberation in time of
peace, as either to prevent or to compensate the further accumula-
tion of the public debt in the next war.
By extending the British system of taxation to all the different
provinces of the empire, inhabited by people either of British or
European extraction, a much greater augmentation of revenue
might be expected. This, however, could scarce, perhaps, be done,
consistently with the principles of the British constitution, with-
out admitting into the British parliament, or, if you will, into the
states-general of the British empire, a fair and equal representa-
tion of all those different provinces; that of each province bearing
the same proportion to the produce of its taxes, as the representa-
tion of Great Britain might bear to the produce of the taxes levied
upon Great Britain. The private interest of many powerful indi-
viduals, the confirmed prejudices of great bodies of people, seem,
indeed, at present, to oppose to so great a change, such obstacles
as it may be very difficult, perhaps altogether impossible, to sur-
mount. Without, however, pretending to determine whether such
a union be practicable or impracticable, it may not, perhaps, be
improper, in a speculative work of this kind, to consider how far
the British system of taxation might be applicable to all the differ-
ent provinces of the empire; what revenue might be expected from
it, if so applied; and in what manner a general union of this kind
might be likely to affect the happiness and prosperity of the
differrent provinces comprehended within it. Such a speculation,
can, at worst, be regarded but as a new Utopia, less amusing, cer-
tainly, but no more useless and chimerical than the old one.
The land-tax, the stamp duties, and the different duties of cus-
toms and excise, constitute the four principal branches of the British
taxes.
Ireland is certainly as able, and our American and West India
plantations more able, to pay a land tax, than Great Britain. Where
the landlord is subject neither to tythe nor poor’s rate, he must cer-
tainly be more able to pay such a tax, than where he is subject to
both those other burdens. The tythe, where there is no modus, and
where it is levied in kind, diminishes more what would otherwise be
the rent of the landlord, than a land tax which really amounted to
five shillings in the pound. Such a tythe will be found, in most
cases, to amount to more than a fourth part of the real rent of the
land, or of what remains after replacing completely the capital of
the farmer, together with his reasonable profit. If all moduses and
all impropriations were taken away, the complete church tythe of
Great Britain and Ireland could not well be estimated at less than six
or seven millions. If there was no tythe either in Great Britain or
Ireland, the landlords could afford to pay six or seven millions addi-
tional land tax, without being more burdened than a very great part