10
The Economist
April 22nd 2023
Leaders
Some uses of
AI
are banned altogether, such as subliminal adver
tising and remote biometrics. Firms that break the rules will be
fined. For some critics, these regulations are too stifling.
But others say an even sterner approach is needed. Govern
ments should treat
AI
like medicines, with a dedicated regulator,
strict testing and preapproval before public release. China is
doing some of this, requiring firms to register
AI
products and
undergo a security review before release. But safety may be less
of a motive than politics: a key requirement is that
AI
s’ output
reflects the “core value of socialism” (see China section).
What to do? The lighttouch approach is unlikely to be
enough. If
AI
is as important a technology as cars, planes and
medicines—and there is good reason to believe that it is—then,
like them, it will need new rules. Accordingly, the
EU
’s model is
closest to the mark, though its classification system is over
wrought and a principlesbased approach would be more flexi
ble. Compelling disclosure about how systems are trained, how
they operate and how they are monitored, and requiring inspec
tions, would be comparable to similar rules in other industries.
This could allow for tighter regulation over time, if needed. A
dedicated regulator may then seem appropriate; so too may
intergovernmental treaties, similar to those that govern nuclear
weapons, should plausible evidence emerge of existential risk.
To monitor that risk, governments could form a body modelled
on
CERN
, a particlephysics laboratory, that could also study
AI
safety and ethics—areas where companies lack incentives to in
vest as much as society might wish.
This powerful technology poses new risks, but also offers ex
traordinary opportunities. Balancing the two means treading
carefully. A measured approach today can provide the founda
tions on which further rules can be added in future. But the time
to start building those foundations is now.
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T
ens
of thousands
of Ukrainian soldiers are readying for ac
tion; checking their kit, writing what might be their last let
ters. We do not know when or where, but soon Ukraine will
launch its longplanned counteroffensive against the invaders
who squat, illegally and murderously, in almost a fifth of the
country. The fate of Ukraine and the shape of the West’s alliances
may depend on what happens in the next few weeks.
Ukraine may never have a better chance than this. The occu
piers are weakened; during the past two months, Russia has
marched into a killing zone around Bakhmut, in the Donbas re
gion, and it has so far failed to replace the tens of thousands of
men it has lost there. Vladimir Putin has passed new laws that
will make it easier to draft more cannon fodder, but it will be
months before his unlucky new recruits are available for action.
Ukraine has received a bonanza of
NATO
standard weapons (see Europe section): tanks,
precision missile systems, powerful artillery;
and millions of rounds of ammunition. Fighter
planes are on the way, though only from Poland
and Slovakia. America and the main European
powers are still holding back, as they did for too
long over supplying tanks.
What should Ukraine do with the advantage
it currently enjoys? It should try to break, or at least disrupt, the
land bridge that connects Crimea to Russia, via Donbas. Creating
this bridge is the only achievement Mr Putin can boast of for all
the Russian blood and treasure he has poured into his war; but it
is a considerable one. Without it, Crimea, a Ukrainian peninsula
which he seized and annexed in 2014, is vulnerable, reachable
only by sea or via the Kerch roadandrail bridge, which some
one (presumably Ukraine) partly blew up last October.
The battlefield has been remarkably static for the past five
months, since Ukraine drove the Russians back across the
Dnieper in Kherson province in November. This is bad news, be
cause it suggests that the conflict is in danger of freezing along a
new “contact line” that would leave Ukraine challenged along
most of its south and east, and shorn of most of its sea access; a
big problem for a country that depends on exporting commod
ities. Far better for Ukraine to go into any future talks holding
more of an advantage, and with Russia facing a genuine chal
lenge to its occupation of Crimea. That might convince Mr Putin
that if he does not settle, he could lose what he has gained.
The risks are high, though. Ukraine has a limited supply of
the surfacetoair missiles needed to deter Russian bombers.
Russia is well dug in along most of the front line, with multiple
layers of trenches and dragonsteeth antitank obstacles. When
attacking, Ukraine will need its troops to outnumber the defend
ers, and it can only muster such numbers in limited areas. Even
if it punches through Russia’s defences, it will need to exploit
such breakthroughs carefully, or risk its troops being encircled.
So Ukraine, and its Western backers, should prepare for the
possibility that the counteroffensive will yield
only marginal gains, or worse. And even if it
does break the land bridge, there is no guaran
tee that Mr Putin will come to the negotiating
table. He no doubt hopes that if he drags the war
on long enough, Western support for Ukraine
will start to wobble.
Ukraine’s backers should not assume that
the coming battle will be the last one. It is al
most certainly not. Once the dust settles, Ukraine will still need
to secure whatever gains it has made, and stiffen its defences to
make future Russian land grabs more difficult. The fact that Rus
sia’s renewed offensive around Bakhmut has gone so poorly
does not mean that all such attacks will be bungled. America and
Europe must make clear that they will support further military
pushes by Ukraine.
And to deter Mr Putin, they should also make plain that they
will back Ukraine for many years to come. The sooner the West
starts spelling out the details of the security guarantees it will of
fer to Ukraine, the better. America and Britain (as well as Russia)
underwrote Ukraine’s territorial integrity in 1994, and then did
nothing as Mr Putin brazenly violated it in 2014. The next guar
antees must be genuine.
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